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GOD SAVE CATALONIA!

Xavier Rubio (editor)

ENGLAND'S INTERVENTION IN CATALONIA DURING THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION



CAMP DE MART



LLIBRES DE MATRÍCULA

GOD SAVE CATALONIA!

England's intervention in Catalonia
during the War of the Spanish
Succession

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CAMP d'E MART, 3

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Introduction

The War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714) is undoubtedly one of the most important wars in the history of Catalonia. Its consequences have shaped the political and economic Catalan panorama of the last 300 years, and its stamp on society is still so present that battles like Almansa (1707) and especially that of September 11th in Barcelona (1714) have become reference dates in the country's culture. Nevertheless, the conflict is quite unknown, as there are not many works attempting to explain it from a military and political point of view.

The first important point, which is often not even considered in Catalan and Spanish historiography, is the global dimension of the war; it is not a civil conflict in Catalonia, and not even a struggle for the Spanish throne between the pretenders Charles of Austria and Philip of Bourbon. Almost all European countries were involved (especially Spain, France and England, but also the Netherlands, the Austrian empire, Savoy and Portugal, to mention just a few). It is therefore clear that the reasons behind the will of each government to fight in this war were completely different, and economic and political, and even religious, motivations became intertwined.

The war was fought all over Europe, but also in other parts of the planet like America. Catalonia was clearly one of the areas with the greatest number of war actions, because of its great geostrategic importance as a wedge between Spain and France. If we focus on the war operations in Catalonia, we can see how soldiers enrolled in the most diverse European armies battled for strong points and clashed in large and often very bloody pitched battles (both on land and at sea). The English army stands out as it bore the burden of the defence of Catalonia throughout almost the whole of the war in the number of soldiers involved as well as the money invested. This issue is certainly not mentioned much in works dealing with the War of the Spanish Succession for several reasons.

From the English point of view, the endless stream of successes achieved by the English army in Flanders under the command of John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, focus the majority of English works on this war on the operations in northern and central Europe, leaving Catalonia as a sideshow.

From the Catalan point of view, however, the scales are tilted towards political instead of military issues. It was with England that the *Vigatans*¹ signed a pact in Genoa in June 1705, according to which Catalonia would turn against Philip and support the cause of Archduke Charles. Therefore,

1 *Vigatans* was the name given to Archduke Charles' supporters during the War of the Spanish Succession, as opposed to *botiflers*, Philip's supporters.



without the support of Queen Anne and the Whig government, the role of the Catalans in this war would have been much less important. But at the same time, it was England that broke the clauses of the treaty during the negotiations that put an end to the War of the Spanish Succession. The so-called «English treason» (as it is known in Catalonia) is one of the key factors in explaining the withdrawal of Allied troops from Catalonia and why England left the country in the hands of King Philip.

It must be noted, however, that contrary to the opinion of classical historiographic works, this peace did not leave Catalonia in a desperate situation in which the Catalans decided to stand fast and defend their land against all odds. Charles (then already Emperor Charles VI) still considered the Catalans as his subjects (and these considered themselves as part of his empire). It could be considered that the peace treaties brought in some kind of balance of forces, as they prevented France from helping Philip in his attempt to crush the Austriacists.

When Louis XIV massively intervened in Spain, in spring 1714, Charles and the Whigs unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the cooperation of the English government, then in the hands of the Tories, in sending some kind of help to the besieged city of Barcelona. But the political scenario in London prevented Charles' wishes and the Catalan State disappeared as a result after September 1714.

As this is a work on military history, we do not want to condemn or justify the actions of the English government during the war and the peace negotiations, nor focus on political issues. Our aim is to give a general overview of the massive English intervention in Catalonia by studying the English army, its finances, its battles and its sieges, among other aspects. In our work we use rather unknown primary sources, never studied before, which provide key economic data for understanding the great effort England made in sustaining the war in Catalonia from 1705 to 1711. Regarding the main military actions in which the English army took part, we have studied these from primary text sources, allowing the main characters themselves to explain the events. In this way, we use official English sources and soldiers' accounts as well as the huge amount of written material from the *Narraciones Históricas* by Francesc de Castellví, the most detailed historiographic work on the military actions in the Peninsula during this war.

This book is divided in two parts. In the first, the English intervention in Catalonia is analysed from different points of view, focusing on the army finances, the political scenario and the various military units that fought in Catalonia. The second part is an account of the main battles fought by the English army in the Principality.² We have explained the

² Principality of Catalonia is a legal term (*Principatus Cathaloniae*) appeared during the

account from the viewpoint of the main characters of the battles, in order to show how war was waged during the 18th century and how the English soldiers perceived the war in which they were fighting. It is worth remarking the great number of sieges, so common in this war, as of the 4 military actions analysed in the book, three are sieges (Barcelona 1705 and 1706, Lerida 1707) while only one is a pitched battle (Almenar, 1710).

In summary, the aim of this work is to provide new data on the English intervention during the war, especially from the side of military history, in the hope that it will provide a better understanding of this landmark in the history of Catalonia. England's role in the conflict was decisive, from the Allied landing in Barcelona in 1705, to its end on September 11th 1714.

14th century and was used for all lands under the jurisdiction of the Catalan Courts, and is not a kingdom in itself but an area whose sovereign was the king of the Crown of Aragon. In the 18th century it was used as a synonym for Catalonia. It must be noted, however, that the term Principality of Catalonia also includes the former County of Roussillon, which at the time of the War of the Spanish Succession was under French sovereignty (and it has remained so until now).



Part 1

The English Army in Catalonia



“NO PEACE WITHOUT SPAIN!”

The Catalan point of view

“England is to blame for the Catalan defeat in the War of the Spanish Succession. England broke the agreements reached with the Catalans and left the country to its fate against Spain and France simply because the English government did not want Charles to become King of Spain, in addition to being Emperor of Austria.”

The English point of view

“It was impossible to remove Philip V from the Spanish throne, because Castile did not want Charles as a king. The same happened to Joseph Bonaparte during the Napoleonic invasion a century later. This, along with the severe defeat in Almansa (1707), made final defeat just a matter of time.”

These two points of view on the English³ intervention in the War of the Spanish Succession in the Iberian Peninsula are common in the great majority of published works on the war, usually written during the 19th century and thereafter.⁴ They are clearly two mutually exclusive points of view, but in analysing the European political scenario at the beginning of the 18th century, we quickly realize that reasoning along these lines is too simplistic, especially taking into account the great economic, political and military complexity of the major and minor powers at that time.

We should attempt to build a richer and more global image if we want to understand what happened in Catalonia regarding the English intervention during the war.

³ Strictly we can also speak about British intervention, instead of English intervention, as the Act of Union was signed in 1707. However, as all contemporary primary sources refer to English and not to British, in this work we will use the first term.

⁴ For the Catalan point of view see Soldevila (1995) or Soler (1998, p.165-166) for a popular history. For the English point of view see Falkner (2005, p. 222), Mahon (1832, p. 393) or Chandler (2000, p. 283).



The political and military scenario

As in almost all great wars fought in the previous 200 years, many of the troops and much of the effort were focused in Flanders. Here, the Allied army of English, Dutch and Imperial troops defeated the Bourbon armies defending the French border time and time again. The overall command of these allied forces was given to a brilliant commander: John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough.

Under his command the English regiments formed the core of the Allied army which defeated the French and conquered the territory of present-day Belgium, and even crossed the borders of the kingdom of Louis XIV, the absolutist monarch of France.

Flanders was not the sole stage of war outside the Peninsula. There were also military actions in Central Europe, along the route of the Danube linking France with the Austrian Empire. Northern Italy also became another hot spot of this war, where a balance was reached between the Bourbon forces and the Allied under the command of Eugene of Savoy.



The Duke of Marlborough, one of the more brilliant commanders of the time (Wikimedia).



Europe in 1700 (ICC).





Louis XIV, absolutist monarch of France.

Marlborough had full powers, not only in the military sphere, but also in the diplomatic, and was empowered to conclude treaties on behalf of Queen Anne. This was essential, given the difficulties in handling such a complex alliance of countries, with diverse and often conflicting goals. From a Catalan point of view, we cannot understand the English role in the peace negotiations (which led to the withdrawal from the war) without considering what was happening on all these fronts, and especially in Flanders.

During the final phases of the war, the Allied troops were already invading France, following the battles of Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706), Oudenaarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709). In 1711, after crossing the so-called Ne Plus Ultra line, Marlborough laid out plans for ending the war by occupying the Bourbon core lands (Chandler, 2000, p. 288-298). However, Marlborough was forced from office because of his wife's stormy relationship with the Queen and her subsequent dismissal from court, as well as the growing disagreements between the Tory and Whig factions.



Battle of Oudenaarde, July 11th 1708, according to Tindal (ICC).

It is then in the Parliament of England where we will find many elements for understanding this complex muddle. Unlike the absolutist French and Spanish monarchies, independent from any kind of parliamentary control, the English political scenario was a complex net of intertwined



ideas and interests which met in the modern London, creating one of the more unstable but also creative societies of that time. In a little over 50 years, England witnessed a military dictatorship under Oliver Cromwell, a brief restoration under Charles II, and finally the Glorious Revolution (1688), in which William of Orange-Nassau was crowned King of England as William III, despite Jacobite attempts to regain power.

At the beginning of the 18th century, Anne, William's daughter, was Queen of England, amidst a constant struggle with Parliament, divided between the Whig and the Tory parties. While the former wanted to remove the French supremacy in continental Europe once and for all, the latter had close connections with France and with the Jacobites and were opposed to war.

At the beginning of the war the government was in the hands of moderate Tories, led by Sidney Godolphin and with the Queen's support. Godolphin gradually shifted towards Whig points of view, and the party rose to predominance. Among the Whigs one of the most influential character was Marlborough's wife, Sarah Jennings, Queen Anne's intimate friend, and a fervent supporter of the Whig cause, Sarah Jennings managed to make her husband one of the main characters in the war (Chandler, 2000, p. 58-59). The English war effort was thus closely tied to the Whig predominance in Parliament, where budgets were approved and treaties negotiated. There were indeed Whig representatives who sealed a treatise with a group of Catalan representatives from the vigatans faction, the Pact of Genoa, according to which England would help in the anti-Bourbon revolt on the lands of the former Crown of Aragon. From that very moment, and until the end of the war, the Whigs (then also known as «the war party») strived to reach a sufficiently decisive military victory to put an end to the French hegemony in Europe. So much so that after the great victory at Ramillies (1706), the government took on the motto «No peace without Spain», because one of the binding clauses for allowing peace negotiations with France was the removal of Philip from the Spanish throne (Falkner, 2005, Appendix 1).



Queen Anne (ICC).

The English economic expenses in the war grew gradually, but despite certain significant defeats (like that in Almansa (1707)) war seemed to turn against the Bourbons, who were immersed in an even greater financial crisis.





Sidney Godolphin, the main character of English policy during the War of the Spanish Succession (Wikimedia).

The decisive Allied victory at Ramillies, according to Tindal (ICC).



At the end of 1710, owing to various factors including the growing enmity between Queen Anne and the Whigs,⁵ overwhelming financial expenses and the Dutch withdrawal from war, the Tories took over in the English government (Muñoz and Catà, 2009, p. 85). This party, opposed to war, saw that the time had come for initiating peace feelers with Louis XIV and Philip V, always from a position of strength obtained through military victories. Nevertheless, the first action was forcing Marlborough from office, as the great general had fallen from favour in the English court.⁶ Now freed from a successful military leader, the Tories reached a very advantageous peace treaty with France, which kept Gibraltar and Port Mahon in English hands and left Philip as King of Spain. For the Catalans the outcome was the defeat of September 11th 1714, but this brief analysis shows how English reality was rather complex and that the crowning of Charles as Emperor was not reason enough, on its own, for explaining the English behaviour with Catalonia.

5 Especially with Sarah Jennings, Marlborough's wife, dismissed from the court in spite of the former friendship with Queen Anne (Chandler, 2000, p. 279-280).

6 Marlborough and his wife repeatedly asked for the office of Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, held by Marlborough during the war, to become a post held for life. The answer was always negative and raised many suspicions, as 50 years before, Oliver Cromwell had made a similar move, was proclaimed Lord Protector and thus turned England into a de facto military dictatorship (Chandler, 2000, p. 238).



The peninsular theatre of war

Putting aside the English political scenario, we now focus on analysing the Catalan position in this context.

The first thing is that it was England who, almost single-handedly, afforded the Catalans some hope of success. It was the English navy which secured materiel shipments to the troops in Catalonia, as well as the transport of regiments for its defence (English regiments, but also Imperial, Portuguese and Dutch regiments). It was English money which, to a large extent, armed the Catalan troops.⁷ Finally, it is interesting to note that the English officers were the most offensive-minded against the Bourbons, sometimes with disastrous results.



Archduke Charles of Austria (Wikimedia).

The English activities in the Iberian Peninsula began in Portugal. As early as 1703, England sent troops to this country, and a huge amount of money in yearly instalments, which served to maintain the fighting Portuguese troops. Ironically a large part of this money came from Bourbon funds, as in 1702 a great English fleet, while attacking the port of Vigo, ran into the galleons carrying Americas treasure, escorted by a French-Spanish fleet. The English victory in the ensuing battle, under Admiral Sir George Rooke, gave a huge booty worth over a million pounds sterling (Parnell, 1905, p. 37), probably used later for managing the first war years, besides sealing the alliance between England and Portugal.



Sarah Jennings, Duke of Marlborough's wife (Wikimedia).

After successfully assaulting Gibraltar in 1704, Lord Peterborough, the sole commander of the land forces in the Peninsula, was ordered to sail to Barcelona with a large military force, while the Pact of Genoa between Catalan representatives and the English government was sealed.⁸ Once Barcelona was Allied-occupied, the revolt rapidly spread all over Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon. The support for the Austriacist cause in Catalonia was a clever Allied move, because of

⁷ See Espino (2006, p.128-129) and Porta (1984, p.306-308).

⁸ On the great squadron that sailed to Barcelona, see Porta (1984, p. 345-352).



its strategical situation as a wedge between both Bourbon crowns. Louis XIV quickly reacted and sent an army against Barcelona in the spring of 1706. After a tough siege, the defenders won thanks to the English help and the Catalan effort: the English fleet transported large reinforcements while the country revolted, destroying Bourbon supply lines. The outcome was the destruction of Louis and Philip's forces and a swift Allied march against Madrid, now defenceless.

Nonetheless, in the following year the massive French contribution, in men and money, rebuilt the Bourbon army in the Peninsula, which in the fields of Almansa, under the command of the Duke of Berwick, reduced to nothing the previous year Allied victory. In this battle the majority of Peninsular Allied troops were wiped out, including most of the troops defending the Portuguese theatre and almost all English regiments.

The traditional historiography sees this battle as the turning point in the war, the point marking the beginning of the Allied defeat, as soon afterwards all Valencia and Aragon fell in Bourbon hands. But the English government decided to get even more involved with Charles and Catalonia. Expenditure in the Peninsula doubled and more than twenty new regiments were raised. This, along with the successful attack by the Duke of Savoy menacing Toulon (which sank the whole French Mediterranean fleet), prevented the Bourbon forces from occupying all the Catalan lands during 1707-1708.⁹ At this point the English government, convinced of forcing Philip to give up the Spanish throne, even suggested sending Marlborough and the main part of the Flanders troops to Catalonia.¹⁰ The idea did not succeed, as Marlborough was opposed, arguing that it would mean a disaster for the Dutch, left alone against the bulk of the French army. The final agreement was to raise a new army in Catalonia to reconquer the ground lost in the Peninsula, while keeping Marlborough and his men in Flanders.¹¹ Moreover, Charles was greatly successful in the diplomatic sphere, even being confirmed as a King of Spain by the Pope (Montaner et al., 2006, p. 9).

At the start of the 1710 campaign, then, a new and impressive Allied army was ready to act, with even more men than the one who fought at Almansa. Under the command of the imperial Marshal Guido Wald Rüdiger, Count of Starhemberg, the core of the Allied infantry and cavalry was formed by English regiments, under General James

9 Berwick was forced to divert part of his forces to the defence of Toulon and was unable to campaign beyond Lerida, as he initially intended. See Paoletti (2006) and Ostwald (2000).

10 Among the supporters of this idea, demanding the raising of 20,000 men in Catalonia, is James Stanhope, who afterwards became Commander-in-Chief of the English forces in the Principality.

11 For the arguments see Chandler (2000, p. 203-204).



Stanhope, the architect of the Allied victory at Almenar, which opened the way to the advance into Aragon (Rubio, 2008). After Almenar, the Bourbon army retreated from Catalan lands and soon afterwards was annihilated in Zaragoza. The victory in Zaragoza allowed Charles III to enter Madrid unopposed and be crowned as King of Spain. This last move was probably too risky, as it gave time to the Bourbon supporters to reorganize and stretched the Allied supply lines. The decision was taken mainly by the English commanders, who wanted Charles to be crowned quickly and thus end the war the short way. (Castellví, 1997-2002, vol. III, p. 181-188).

At this point the situation seemed desperate for the Bourbon arms, so Louis XIV considered abandoning his grandson and reaching an agreement with the Allies to leave Philip without the Spanish throne. This was a wise decision, as besides losing Spain, France was about to be invaded; the Sun King had his own problems and could not help Philip anymore. However he decided to rebuild again the Bourbon army in Spain as a last attempt to turn the fortunes of war. This action unexpectedly turned the tide again, now in favour of Bourbon interests.

The Duke of Vendôme rebuilt the Bourbon army, which now had large contingents of French troops. This new army threatened Starhemberg at Madrid while, at the same time, a French army under the command of the Duke of Noailles attacked Northern Catalonia towards Girona. The Allied army, forced to defend Catalonia, its logistic and political base in the Peninsula, began a disadvantageous retreat from Castile, chased by Vendôme. Because of various arguments with Starhemberg, Stanhope led the English troops along a different route from the rest of the imperial army and made a nonsensical halt in the village of Brihuega, while the rest of the army kept on marching. Vendôme seized the opportunity and isolated the whole of the English army, forcing it to surrender. The next day Vendôme clashed with Starhemberg at Villaviciosa; though indecisive, the result allowed the Allies to reach Catalonia unmolested and establish a new line of defence in the Cardona-Manresa-Igualada axis, which was to last until the end of the war.¹²

The great English defeat in Brihuega happened just as the Tories rose to power. Obviously such a defeat was nothing short of traumatic in England and the government had to rebuild the peninsular army once more, as it had to do in 1707, after Almansa. The huge amount of money and men involved in the project tilted the scales towards peace and confirming Philip on the Spanish throne.

12 The Bourbon attempt to cross it in 1711 led to the battles of Prats de Rei and Cardona, which resulted in important Allied victories.



With all due differences taken into account, the Iberian Peninsula was a kind of Vietnam for England, a place of never-ending war, which raised the costs in money and manpower year by year. Adding to that the fact that it was not a defensive war, but one fought far away from the homeland, this scenario encouraged the supporters of peace, who were strengthened as the war progressed, finally forcing the withdrawal from war at an especially delicate point for the English military.

This all contradicts the hypothesis defended by many English historians, according to which the true reason for the English withdrawal from war was the inability to control Castile, caused by the defeat in Almansa, and the civilian resistance. This last point on civil resistance is worth remarking because the English works usually point out the similarities of this situation and that witnessed by the defeated Napoleonic troops in Spain during the Peninsular War. In comparing both wars, 19th century English historians accepted this reasoning for explaining the English defeat in the peninsular theatre during the War of the Spanish Succession, but the fact is that there were no civil armed groups threatening the Allied march on Madrid in 1710. In fact, if we apply the same line of reasoning to the other side of the conflict, we would be unable to explain how the troops of the Two Crowns (Spain and France) controlled Aragon, Valencia and especially Catalonia, even more taking into account that in this case there were indeed instances of irregular warfare.¹³ In the 18th century the ideas of *total war* and *nation at arms* were unknown, but not so during the Napoleonic wars a century later. Thus, the requirements that could lead to a general popular uprising against the occupying forces were simply not fulfilled (and were intrinsically impossible). It is in this way how Philip was able to occupy and keep control of the Austriacist lands, using a great number of Spanish and French troops and a brutal repressive policy.

Turning to the traditional Catalan point of view, firstly we must underline the fact that the Catalan authorities never thought, during the final phase of 1713-1714, that they were fighting alone.¹⁴ They always considered themselves subjects of Charles III (then already Emperor Charles VI), and, correspondingly, he always considered Catalonia as part of his

¹³ It should be noted that the typical irregular warfare of the 18th century, based on sudden attacks and skirmishes by small groups of soldiers for the control of the logistical resources of an area (the so-called *petite guerre* or *kleine Krieg*), is very different from the *guerrilla* warfare of later centuries. While in the first case the actions are performed by professional fighters, with goals established by their commanders, in the latter the clashes are usually arbitrary and performed by civilians.

¹⁴ For example, in a letter written by Marquis del Poal in May 14th 1714 to the Catalan authorities, he suggests to publish the letters received from the Emperor, in order to raise the spirits of the Catalans. It is worth remarking that in all the reports written by Poal to Barcelona City Council (Consell de Cent) he considers himself a subject of the Emperor (Bruguera, 1871, vol. I, p. 651-653).



kingdom. But for the Catalan historiography of the 19th century, the idea of resistance against all odds was much more comforting. On one side, it fitted with the Romantic ideals emanating from the French Revolution. On the other, at that time the European culture was divided between francophiles and germanophiles¹⁵ and the siding of the Catalan historians with the former made the War of Succession an uncomfortable conflict, with Catalonia allied with the Austrians against the French. In this way it seemed much more politically correct to explain how Catalonia was abandoned by the Austrians, leaving out the fact that the Catalans then considered themselves subjects of Charles and members of the Austrian Empire (Alcoberro, 2005).

The Austrian troops left Catalonia in 1713, following the treaties that also forced the withdrawal of French troops. This led to a military equilibrium between Catalans and Spaniards, in which the Spanish, ruined by the war, were unable to successfully occupy Catalonia. When the French intervened again, in the spring of 1714, Charles tried to help his Catalan subjects. According to Charles himself, in a letter to James Stanhope, he was not helping Barcelona because without the aid of the English fleet he had no squadrons which could oppose the Bourbon ships in the Mediterranean and thus the city remained isolated from imperial lands (Mahon, 1832, p. 302). This letter, dated September 8th 1714, shows how a faction of English Whigs wanted to intervene in Catalonia again under Stanhope's leadership (also a close friend of Marlborough). This is clear proof that the union of Austria and Spain under the same sovereign was feared by only one side of the English politicians, the Tories, who were against the war from the very beginning. For this reason we can conclude that the issue of the union of Austria and Spain was but an excuse for negotiating peace, and not the true reason. Even before the death of Emperor Joseph I in 1711, the Tories were already defending a more peaceful stance than that supported by the Whig government. In this scenario, a seemingly private affair like the break between Sarah Jennings, Marlborough's wife, and Queen Anne was probably a decisive factor; Anne thereafter gave more support to the Tories, which greatly contributed to the final outcome in favour of peace negotiations and to Marlborough's fall into disgrace, even retiring into a self-imposed exile.

Study of a lesser-known primary source

In order to provide new insights on these issues it is worth analysing a primary source which has received little attention so far. It is the book *An Impartial Enquiry into the management of the war in Spain*, published in 1712 by John Morphew at the request of the Ministry at Home.



¹⁵ This tension was of political origin and ultimately led to First World War.

This work is a collection of administrative documents and accounts on the conduct of the war by the English troops in the Iberian Peninsula. The reason behind the publication was the defence of Lord Peterborough's actions, Commander-in-Chief of English troops from 1705 until 1707. This Tory military leader was accused by the Whigs of deliberate incompetence in order to make the Allied offensive fail, because, without any clear reason, he opposed Charles' troops advance into Madrid in 1706. Moreover, he was responsible for some other weird actions (like not wanting an attack on Barcelona in 1705 or not pursuing the retreating French troops in 1706), so much so that he was forced from office just before the Battle of Almansa. Then a harsh argument raised between Tories and Whigs on Peterborough's actions, and was still lively in 1712 when this work was published.

Among certain interesting information, there are records of all councils of war from the capture of Barcelona in 1705 to the Battle of Almansa. Two parts are especially informative: a list of shipments of English troops to Spain and a yearly report on the statement of account and the expenditures regarding the Iberian Peninsula. While the former is useful for understanding the complexity of military operations and the constant transfer of troops from one front to another one, we will focus on the latter, trying to correlate the government-approved expenditures with the political actions taken.

An overview of expenditures

From this source in the first graph we have summarized the total English expenditure in the Peninsula, in pounds sterling by year (see Fig. 1).

This document ends July 18th 1710. For this year, analysing the daily expenditure including service pay, supplies, suppliers' payments, etc. we calculated a projected expenditure until the end of that year.¹⁶ The result is quite interesting, as it disproves the thesis according to which after the Battle of Almansa the English government lost any hope of victory in the Peninsula. In the year after the defeat there is a great increase in the budget (almost 20% higher than in 1707), the rationale of which will be commented later, but it is related to the rebuilding of the army.

¹⁶ Considering that until July 18th 1710 984,501 pounds had already been spent, we have a daily expenditure of 4,947 pounds. If we then extrapolate this figure to 365 days we obtain the value represented in the graph, 1,805,655 pounds. Of course this is just a rough figure, but analysing the expenditure of previous years, the expenditure rate is quite regular, so the extrapolated value should not be very different from the amount the English government had spent during the whole year.






Figure 1: Total English expenditure in the Iberian Peninsula.

While in 1709 the expenditure becomes stabilized because there are no new troops sent to the Peninsula nor any important changes,¹⁷ in 1710 there is a significant increase again in the budget, giving a final push for Philip's defeat. As is well known, the first results were those expected: Charles was crowned in Madrid, but the massive intervention of Louis XIV turned victory into defeat in Brihuega.

In the graph we can also see how expenditure rises year by year (except in 1709, for the reasons mentioned earlier). While in 1703 and 1704 all money goes to other zones of the peninsular stage (especially to Portugal), in 1705 the occupation of Catalonia begins and so the expenditure becomes greater year by year, as besides maintaining the Western front (Portugal), there was a new army to be created in the Eastern front (Catalonia,¹⁸ Aragon, Valencia).¹⁹

The fronts in the Iberian Peninsula

In Figure 2, we show the yearly evolution of expenditure on both fronts (the blue line is the Western front, the orange the Eastern).

¹⁷ Raising a new regiment is much more expensive than maintaining one already formed, as raising a new regiment means acquisition of weapons and clothes, recruiting of troops, etc.

¹⁸ Catalonia is the English and Austriacist core land in the Eastern front. Except for some isolated military campaign, the great majority of expenditures is related to the Catalan lands, where troops were stationed.

¹⁹ We included the expenditure for the Gibraltar garrison in the Eastern front accounts, as this is the way the English agents managed them in this document. Anyway, it does not distort the graph, as it represents a very small and quite regular amount.



This is a quite revealing graph on the English intervention in the Peninsula, even when we restrict ourselves to the recorded data, without the calculated projection for 1710. The expenditure for Portugal remains approximately constant around 200,000 pounds sterling per year, while it rises enormously in the case of Catalonia. Beginning in 1705, in the following two years the budget doubles and in 1708 reaches the figure of a million pounds sterling. And taking into account that the data for 1710 end in July and that by that date 800,000 pounds were already spent, it is not difficult to conclude that this year would have witnessed the greatest expenditure by the English government.

This difference between both fronts shows the different political stances. While the Western front is but a diversion, where the English government pays the Portuguese crown a yearly amount for remaining at war against Philip, the Eastern front is the core of the English policy in the Peninsula: each year the involvement is greater, not only for defending Catalonia, but also for twice creating an army (in 1705-1706 and in 1710) which defeated the Bourbon troops and reached Madrid.




Figure 2: English expenditure in the Peninsula by front.

Thanks to the exquisite accuracy with which expenditures were recorded in this document we can analyse where all the money went in greater detail. For each front we have divided the expenditure in four chapters: payments to the crown (Portuguese or Austrian), raising and maintenance of English regiments, transport of troops, and casualties



(supplies and ransoms for prisoners of war, hospitals, physicians, reparations to wounded), to which we added a general fifth chapter on other expenditures, including the few entries not fitting any of the former.

The Western front

Figure 3 shows the expenditure divided in 5 chapters (crown in blue, men in orange, transport in yellow, casualties in green and other expenditure in brown).




Figure 3: Expenditure in the Western front by chapters.

The first thing worth noting is that the two main chapters are payments to the crown and maintenance of troops. The first, except for 1705, is virtually constant throughout the war, with a mean value of nearly 150,000 pounds per annum, paid as maintenance for 13,000 Portuguese combatants according to the treaties between both crowns. The 1705 exception coincides with a peak in troop maintenance. This is probably due to the fact that having a much larger number of English troops defending Portugal, the payments to the Portuguese crown were deemed no longer necessary. On the other hand, with the arrival of Allied troops in Catalonia, the maintenance of English troops in Portugal plummets, as the majority of troops were transferred to Barcelona and Valencia. From this time there is a slight increase in the expenditure for troop maintenance, but never reaching the ceiling of 400,000 spent in 1705. The casualty chapter is constantly low, as there were no major



engagements with English participation on this front, so no ransoms were paid. The yearly expenditure in the casualty chapter corresponds almost exclusively to the maintenance of a hospital and the payments to the army physicians and surgeons. Regarding transport there is a significant amount of expenditure only at the beginning of the war, when many regiments were transferred from England and Ireland to Portugal. From this point on, and taking into account that transport from Portugal to Catalonia is included in the Eastern front books, there is no expenditure related to transport. This is confirmed by the embarkation documents, as there are few transfers to Portugal after 1705.




Figure 4: Expenditure in the Eastern front by chapter.

The Eastern front

Figure 4 shows the expenditure breakdown for the Eastern front, quite different from the previous one:

Firstly, the difference in expenditure between both fronts must be noted. Not only is the total amount vastly greater in Catalonia (in the final years it reaches 5 times the amount spent in Portugal), but for the large part it is destined to the English troops

Regarding troop maintenance, the graph shows a constant increase in the expenditure, reaching 600,000 pounds in 1707. After the defeat in Almansa and the destruction of the English army, a great reform was initiated, in which the number of regiments in Catalonia was greatly reduced, as many of them were disbanded or merged due to their low



numbers. This is the reason behind the smaller maintenance in 1708, although the total expenditure in this year is higher than in the previous year. Nonetheless, in 1709 there is again a great increase in the expenditure for maintenance, 200% higher, which coincides with the final rebuilding of the English army in Catalonia.²⁰ The trend for 1710 was even greater than in 1709, confirmed by the arrival of new reinforcements from other theatres of war to serve under Starhemberg and Stanhope and fighting in Almenar, Zaragoza, Brihuega and Villaviciosa. Beginning in 1705, the numbers include entries for the two regiments detached at Gibraltar and Alicante.

Related to the maintenance chapter are the casualties. The figures for this chapter are clearly greater on this front than on the Western one, as the main battles were fought here (3,713 pounds during the 8 years on the Western front, against 138,801 pounds on the Eastern front). Moreover, the consequences of the Almansa defeat are clear in the annual breakdown, especially for 1708. During the 18th century, as can be seen in this document, the governments paid the enemy to maintain prisoner troops, and it is also seen that the English, contrary to other nations, had their own campaign hospital to look after the wounded, and that large amounts were paid for the physicians and surgeons caring for the soldiers. Finally, it is somewhat surprising to find entries regarding large payments to officers having lost a limb or to families having lost a relative in the war. The document is therefore an extraordinary tool for researching into the caring of wounded soldiers and the treatment of prisoners in the 18th century, an issue highly under-represented in the literature. It shows a much kinder behaviour than might be presumed, with payments to the soldiers' widows, and even for the physicians and surgeons' widows.²¹

Regarding transport, two years show a significant increase in the sea traffic to Catalonia. This matches the years in which the two English armies on the Eastern front were raised: the first in 1706 coincides with the defence of Barcelona and the push towards Castile; the second, in 1708, coincides with the shipments of new recruits to Barcelona in order to rebuild the army after the defeat in Almansa.

In the «Others» chapters, the surprising Government payments to Eugene of Savoy are included. Eugene was the commander of the Allied troops in Northern Italy, where no English regiments were present. This document, then, shows how, besides paying for its own operations as well as those of the Portuguese, the English crown allocated large amounts

20 See Castellví (1997, III, p.19-20)

21 For instance, there is an entry for 100 pounds sterling addressed to the widow of a physician from an English hospital in Catalonia.



of money to its Austrian allies, helping them in supporting fronts where no English troops were stationed. The level of involvement and strength implied by these data is revealing, as it shows England as the great power supporting the Great Alliance and the nation that was most stubbornly fighting to win the war.

A curious and quite interesting entry in the document is the payment in 1706 to a publisher for a booklet on correct behaviour addressed to English troops. The publisher, who was paid 14 pounds sterling, was Joseph Downing, and the booklet was entitled *The Soldier's Monitor*. Being serious advice to soldiers, to behave themselves with a just regard to religion and true manhood. The English authorities, then, were concerned that their mainly Protestant and Anglican troops should behave correctly towards the local Catholic population, although results were disparate.

Finally, the most difficult chapter to interpret is that of payments to the crown. As Charles was from the House of Hapsburg and was the main beneficiary of a victory, the English do not give him any yearly aid for his help against the Bourbons, as is the case with the Portuguese. Nonetheless, there is a very interesting set of entries for payments to nobles switching sides in the war, passing to the Austriacist field and stating their allegiance to Charles III. Many of these nobles were probably Catalan.

In this chapter there is a peak in 1706, with an expenditure of 67,276 sterling pounds, and another, even higher, in 1708, with a total of 337,043 pounds, followed by a value still fairly high in 1709 (69,971 pounds). Our hypothesis is that these peaks correspond to different situations. The first peak in 1706 shows the efforts of the English government in helping Charles in his raising of various regular regiments. This date coincides with the raising of the Catalan regiments (mountain fusiliers,²² Catalan Guards, etc.) and this fact suggests that the troops raised by Charles were, in fact, paid, armed and supplied by the English government, at least at the beginning. This fact is confirmed by other entries, in which the government makes payments to Charles for using his troops in the Iberian Peninsula.

It is also suggestive to relate the 1708 maximum to the decrease in the English troops maintenance that same year. It must be remembered that after Almansa, Valencia and Aragon fell in Bourbon hands, as well as Lerida, and the Allied army was almost destroyed. For defending Catalonia the English government, which already had thousands of troops stationed in other theatres, paid a large amount of money to

²² Mountain fusiliers was a kind of professional light infantry, organized in the same way as the line infantry.



the Austrian Empire for sending some 5,000 troops to Catalonia from Italy. Therefore, at a time of dire crisis and shortage of manpower, the government sent and kept Austrian troops on Catalan lands, paying more than 300,000 pounds.

Finally, the 1709 expenditure is allocated to the raising of an artillery train for replacing the one lost in Almansa. The raising of this siege artillery train means that Parliament endorsed a great investment to take the offensive, as it is evident that these large guns are only needed if you are going to attack an enemy strongpoint. All this suggests that in 1709 and 1710 the government was still heavily involved in the war in Catalonia, strengthening its will to defeat Philip and making Charles III King of Spain.

Some unknowns

As the entries of the document are quite brief, some doubts arise. We want to underline some of these unknowns, the solution of which could shed new light on various issues regarding this complex war.

Firstly, in 1709, we find the acquisition of 27,000 «Pistoles». The reason is clear: it is necessary to arm all troops recently raised and this number does not appear disproportionate bearing in mind that each trooper was equipped with two pistols. The problem is that instead of using the English term *pistol*, the Catalan one is used, raising doubts on the possible difference between both weapons. The entry also suggests the idea that these thousands of pistols were manufactured by Catalan gunsmiths, although the number seems totally unfeasible for the Catalan industry of the time. Weapon manufacturing was certainly important in Catalonia, especially in Ripoll and Barcelona, but the number is so high that the aim of the accountant in recording an entry in a foreign language in an official English document remains unknown.

Similar to this entry we find another in 1710, for the acquisition of 4,000 Spanish Pistoles» to be shipped to Portugal in exchange for a large number of horses. In this case the figure could indeed have been assumed by the Catalan weapons industry, and the term «Spanish» could be related to the miquelet gunlock (also known as the Spanish lock or the Catalan lock) with which the weapons would be equipped. It seems clear that the war brought great profits to some Catalan manufacturing industries, especially to weapons manufacturers. It is interesting to ask whether the same is true regarding other supplies like clothes, ammunition bread, artillery trains, etc. accounted for in the document, as the answer could give some hints on the reasons behind the staunch Catalan support to



the Allies during the war: Barcelona became the Austriacist capital in the Peninsula and, as a such, the political, social and economic centre of Charles III's court and of a kingdom, something that had not happened for many centuries.

An entry of 1709 cites a certain Colonel Wythers, to whom 300 pounds are paid for his extraordinary expenditure while serving in a Catalan regiment. A similar case, presented in the document on troop embarkations, explains the raising in 1708 of 5 regular battalions of Catalan infantry after the defeat in Almansa, in order to defend Catalonia. According to the document, two of them formed Blosset's Regiment, another two Lord Gallway's Regiment and the last was christened Regiment Saragossa, probably formed by Aragonese Austriacists. We suppose Gallway was one of the commanders of Gallway's Regiment, but it is a very late date, as it is believed that all these regiments were disbanded in mid-1708. Anyway, both entries suggest that the presence of Catalan men in English-paid regiments might be higher than is currently accepted, which would mean an increase in the (already quite high) numbers of Catalan troops in Austriacist regiments during the war.²³

«It is not for the interest of England to preserve the Catalan liberties»²⁴


There is no doubt that England's withdrawal from the Peninsula is largely to blame for the final Catalan defeat of 1714. Nonetheless, as we have tried to show in this chapter, neglecting the internal political struggle in England leads to a simplistic vision of the facts that took place in the final stages of the War of the Spanish Succession. Moreover, until now the huge financial effort that the Catalan adventure implied for England has not been properly emphasized, and the faith with which Parliament kept a military lead in the Peninsula, defending Catalonia and threatening Castile until 1710, has not been sufficiently highlighted. Undoubtedly this investment (not only in money, but also in manpower and political assets for the Whig government) is, for any nation, far more important than abiding by the clauses of a treaty, like that of Genoa. Around 1700, the English economy was on the verge of collapse, due in part to the various military conflicts at the turn of the century which,

23 See, for instance, Parnell (1905, p. 267), in which it is explained how these regiments were formed by Catalan soldiers commanded by English officers.

24 Sentence attributed to Lord Bolingbroke, England's Prime Minister, during the Utrecht negotiations in 1713 (Soldevila, 1995, p. 11).



in fact, were not threatening the country security.²⁵ It is clear then that the great financial effort was one of the determining factors in England's withdrawal from war.²⁶



Europe after the treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt.

All the same, to underrate the importance of military actions, as has been done too commonly, is of no help in clarifying the situation. As we have proven with the analysis of the expenditure, the English government was not willing to withdraw from the Peninsula after Almansa; quite the

25 Among these conflicts, those related to Flanders were especially important. The financial situation was truly desperate, and was partly corrected by Isaac Newton, appointed to the post of Warden of the Mint, who brought in reforms and assisted in the Great Recoinage, decisively improving the English economy.

26 See the comments on the widespread corruption in the English army stationed in Catalonia in Falkner (2005, p. 227-228). Many episodes of corruption were related to dummy battalions. Despite being completely false, if we consider other sources such as hospital entries or statements of accounts, they reflect the English government's concern for the continuous economic cost of the war.



contrary, it invested even more resources in trying to turn the situation, a goal achieved at least temporarily. However, the great defeat in Brihuega, worse for the English than that of Almansa (because all officers and rank surrendered) was key in the rise to power of the “party of peace”. The Tories, after guaranteeing political hegemony and the cooperation of Queen Anne, sped up peace feelers in order to pin down a treaty favouring England, leaving aside the Austrian allies, and especially the Catalans. It is in this context that we must consider the publication of the anonymous work *The Deplorable History of Catalans*, one of the numerous weapons used in the struggle between Tories and Whigs, as the latter were still defending Charles III as King of Spain in 1714. The Whig current of opinion sympathetic to the Catalans had at least some reward, as it prevented the English fleet from helping Philip in the sea blockade of Barcelona, as promised by Lord Bolingbroke (Soldevila, 1995, p. 12).

Queen Anne’s death, in August 1714, caused a new political change favouring the Catalan Austriacist cause, as the new King George I was a fervent Whig supporter. Immediately preparations for sending help to Barcelona were initiated, but the fall of Barcelona into Bourbon hands thanks to the massive French intervention, prevented the time needed for an Austriacist revival.





THE REGIMENTS INVOLVED



James Stanhope was the commander of all English forces in Catalonia from 1708 to 1711.

An irascible character, his disagreements with Guido von Starhemberg were constant, due to his tendency to adopt aggressive tactics. Although Stanhope's tactics often gave great results, they were also one of the reasons behind the English defeat in Brihuega, as Stanhope refused to follow Starhemberg's retreat route to Catalonia, so fatally dividing the Allied forces.

The English army, as all other European armies involved in the War of the Spanish Succession, was organized according to an administrative structure allowing the fluid management of thousands of men. The basic unit was the regiment, commanded by a Colonel, which grouped several hundreds of soldiers of the same kind (infantry, cavalry or dragoons). These were professional forces of volunteers working in the army for a variety of reasons. These soldiers, usually from the lower class and impoverished areas were commanded by officers from the lesser nobility, who had bought entry to the different ranks (Lieutenant, Captain, Colonel) by buying commissions. In this system the Colonel bought a commission for commanding a regiment from the highest army authority (usually the King). This patent allowed him to sell the lower

offices in the unit ladder, and with the money obtained he recruited, clothed and armed the soldiers. The Colonel's direct subordinates were the Captains, each of which commanded a company (often clothed at their expense) with support from Lieutenants and the non-commissioned officers.

Training was a key factor in combat, as combat systems were based in complex linear formations which, due to their very nature, were quite difficult to control and manoeuvre during a battle. For this reason the drill, under the responsibility of sergeants major, was paramount to guaranteeing the unit's performance, increasing its firepower and improving its efficiency in combat.

Soldiers each year received a uniform with the regimental colours, which identified them and gave a more homogeneous image to the unit. In the English regiments red was the most common colour (hence their later name of redcoats) but each had a different distinctive colour, which was used in the facings (linings, hems and braiding on coats). The colours might be different each year, and adding to that the constant changing of commanding colonels, it is sometimes quite difficult to individually identify each English unit that served in the Catalan campaigns.



Preliminary notes

As we will see in this chapter, information regarding the presence of English regiments in the Peninsula, and especially in Catalonia, is scarce, fragmentary and often contradictory. Some significant problems are the constant transfer of regiments from one stage to another (especially between Portugal and Catalonia), the several written forms of proper names, and, especially, the lack of a numerical standards in the organization of 18th-century English army. Regiments are distinguished by their kind (foot, horse, dragoons) and by the Colonel's name. Another problem is the high casualty rate among the officers, as the death or leave of a Colonel sometimes meant a change in the regimental name. In the following list we have named the regiments according to the first officer commanding them in the Peninsular campaign.

We have tried to compile a coherent list of all regiments present in the campaigns, using the work *Narraciones Históricas* by Francesc de Castellví, and two especially interesting sections of the report published by the Ministry at Home *An impartial enquiry into the management of the war in Spain* as the main sources. The first is the listing of regiments embarked to the Peninsula from 1703 to 1708, where the number of troops participating in Almansa is recorded. The second is the report on the expenditures caused by the war in the Peninsula, already discussed in the previous chapter, and where we can find references to the various regiments, as new materiel had to be purchased on a regular basis.

Another source consulted, despite not being strictly a primary source, is a collection of the information included in various English archives. The work, in six volumes, gathers all officer's names serving in the English army in the years 1661-1714, with many documentation related to the casualties in combats.²⁷

We have also used some war accounts,²⁸ as well as two more recent works attempting to gather all available information on the English army.²⁹ It must be stressed, however, that the data provided by these sources is sometimes contradicted by primary sources, and this is a proof that there is no correct general overview yet of the English regiments involved in the War of the Spanish Succession. Lastly, the research carried out at the Arxiu de la Diputació Provincial de València and the Biblioteca de Catalunya regarding English wounded soldiers entering the hospitals, has confirmed many of the data gathered and has allowed some regimental colours to be identified.

²⁷ Dalton (1902).

²⁸ See, e.g. Mahon (1832), Falkner (2005), Parnell (1905).

²⁹ Grant (2004) and Barthorpe (1980).



Cavalry and dragoons

Mounted English units that took part in the War of Succession were considered by their contemporaries as the best in Europe. Having few strictly regiments of horse, regiments of dragoons assumed similar tasks on the battlefield with excellent results, like in the Battle of Almenar, for example. So, to the usual dismounted infantry, *petite guerre* and reconnaissance tactics, typical of this kind of arm, the cavalry charge with sword in hand of the regiments of horse is brought in.

The English regiments were divided into many troops, which on the battlefield were grouped into 2 or 3 squadrons, each with a strength of 150 troopers.³⁰ However, the regiments were usually at understrength; in Catalonia, as in the other war theatres, the regiments had just around 50 or 60% of their theoretical strength.

Although the English dragoons should have been divided in companies, instead of troops (because of their original basis as mounted infantry), contemporary documents use both names, because they performed typical tasks of regiments of horse.

English cavalrymen were always superior to their French and Spanish counterparts, due largely to their aggressiveness and tactics. Their commanding officers were always imbued with the traditional spirit of considering the cavalry an offensive weapon, and James Stanhope was the main example of this, although with diverse results. All the same, contrary to the Bourbon cavalry, the English cavalry tactics were aimed more at the use of cold steel weapons than the use of firearms. The triumph of these tactics during the War of the Spanish Succession was decisive for the cavalry's evolution in the following years, in which it was used more and more in Stanhope's and Marlborough's way.

³⁰ For more information see, e.g. Chandler (1990, p. 42-50).





Trooper and grenadier of The Royal Regiment of Dragoons, 1708.

One of the companies of the regiment grouped, as was usual in regiments of foot, the best soldiers of the regiment as grenadiers, with their distinctive uniforms.



Drummer of The Royal Regiment of Dragoons, 1708.

As dragoons were considered mounted infantry, orders were issued by means of drums, rather than trumpets used in the regiments of horse.



Royal Regiment of Dragoons



Along with Harvey's, this is the first mounted unit to arrive in the Peninsula, and was sent to Portugal at the end of 1703. In April 1705, under the command of Lord Raby, the regiment is sent to Catalonia to support the anti-Bourbon revolt. The regiment fought here until the defeat in Brihuega. In these years the regiment was present in many engagements, although it did not take part in the Battle of Almansa (as it was garrisoned in Cullera³¹) nor in the Battle of Almenar (as it arrived when the Bourbon cavalry was already defeated).

Uniforms of The Royal Regiment of Dragoons, 1706. The uniform on the right is a drummer's, much more decorative than that of the private (on the left) as it is a non-commissioned officer.

Major General Daniel Harvey's Regiment of Horse



Uniform of Harvey's Regiment of Horse, 1710. A trooper's was not very different from that of a private, except for the fact that they wore boots instead of shoes.

The sole regiment of horse present on the Catalan war stage arrived in the Peninsula in the first expeditionary force sent to Portugal. It is one of the more active regiments, and took part in the Battle of Almansa (with 227 troopers). It suffered heavy casualties (at the end of 1707 it had less than 150 soldiers) and was rebuilt as a regiment of dragoons. It later fought in Brihuega and played an outstanding role in the Allied victory of Almenar.



Soldier of Harvey's Regiment of Horse, with a uniform contemporary of the Battle of Almenar (1710).

³¹ Village located in the zone of Marina Baixa, in Valencian Country.



General Major Conyngham's Regiment of Dragoons

This is probably a regiment with an Irish basis, considering the names of the officers. It arrived in Portugal at the end of 1704, with the second expeditionary force under Lord Galway. Some months later it embarked again, and under the command of Lord Peterborough fought in the battles for Catalonia in April 1705. In 1706 it left for Valencia, where the majority of soldiers (150) were captured in Elche, leaving just 51 troopers present in Almansa under the command of Major General Killigrew. Afterwards the commanding office goes to Major General John Pepper. The regiment is reinforced with 2 troops from Guiscard's Regiment and remained in Catalonia until the end, fighting in Almenar, Zaragoza and Brihuega.

Brigadier George Carpenter's Regiment of Dragoons

Only a detachment of 100 troopers from this Regiment was present in the Peninsula, probably grouped as a squadron. It arrived in October 1706, under command of Count of Rivers and fought in Almansa. At the end of 1707 was transferred to the Northern theatre and no more entries are recorded in the documents. Carpenter, though, was later the commander of the English cavalry in the Battle of Almenar.

Uniform of George Carpenter's Regiment of Dragoons at the time of the Battle of Almansa.



Count of Essex's Regiment of Dragoons

Like Carpenter's, only around 100 troopers from this regiment arrived in the Peninsula, in October 1706. They fought in Almansa and the regiment was disbanded at the beginning of 1708, its troopers being distributed among the other regiments of dragoons in Catalonia.

Lord Rochford's Regiment of Dragoons

This regiment arrived in Catalonia at the end of 1708, with Major-General Wills's expeditionary force, trying to secure the Austriacist Catalan territory against Bourbon attacks. It fought in Almenar, where the colonel died. With Nicholas Lepell as new Colonel, it surrendered in Brihuega.



Edward Pearce's Regiment of Dragoons




Formed from Lord Barrymore's Regiment of Foot during 1705-1706, this unit was in Almansa, where it was recorded at a strength of 273 troopers. It was discharged at the beginning of 1708 and its remaining 192 soldiers were incorporated in other mounted units. Nonetheless, there is an entry in the account book according to which in August 24th 1709 420 pounds were paid for the maintenance of the "Peirce [sic] Regiment of Dragoons", casting doubts on the true date of discharge.

Pearce's Regiment of Dragoons, the uniform received by the soldiers after the 1706 transformation.

Marquis de Guiscard's Regiment of Dragoons

De Guiscard's Huguenot troops were recruited for the unsuccessful expedition to Languedoc, planned for raising an uprising against Louis XIV. The expedition failed due to bad weather and disembarked in the Peninsula, where fought in Almansa at a strength of 228 men. After the defeat, Guiscard's Regiment withdrew to Catalonia, where it was dissolved at the end of 1708. Its 287 troopers reinforced other regiments, especially Pepper's.

Peterborough's Regiment of Dragoons



Raised in 1706 in Valencia with English soldiers from various units of foot, the regiment fought in Almansa with 303 troopers under command of Frans von Nassau, because Peterborough had gone to England. With Nassau the regiment withdrew to Catalonia and participated in the 1710 campaign, in which the Colonel died in the Battle of Almenar. The regiment served until his surrender in Brihuega, with James Stanhope as Colonel.

Peterborough's Regiment of Dragoons, raised in Valencia.



Infantry

At a time when sieges of cities and fortresses were more common than field pitched battles, the infantry was the core of all armies. With pikes already eliminated, soldiers equipped with muskets and bayonet were the backbone of the English army, participating in assaults and defence in various sieges, and in great pitched battles, forming kilometre-long lines with thousands of men.

The organisation of English units of foot was based on the equivalence between the administrative unit (regiment) and the tactical unit in battle (battalion). In many other armies the organisation was different, with multi-battalion regiments (usually 2 to 4), so it must be noted that English regiments had always fewer combatants than those of other armies. A battalion was divided into a dozen companies, one of which was a grenadier company. This elite company grouped the best, as well as tallest and bulkiest, soldiers, had better pay but performed the riskiest and most dangerous actions of the regiment, acting as a vanguard in breach assaults, performing flanking protection, laying ambushes, etc. The theoretical strength of a company was around 100 soldiers, giving a regiment of around 1,000 men. Nevertheless, regiments were usually at a strength of 30-40% of this figure, and in Catalonia regiments of just 200 men are recorded, while the usual figure is around 400.

The power of these small regiments was quite noteworthy. English tactics were different from the typical 4-rank, salvo-firing, used by the French. They formed in 3 ranks and a battalion was split into 16 platoons firing in turn at a constant rate. This splitting into platoons gave a weaker firepower but theoretically continuous, making it more effective than that of the enemies.³²

English regiments (including marines) had an outstanding role in the two sieges of Barcelona (attacking in 1705 and defending the following year) as well as in the unsuccessful defence of Lerida (1707). Casualties in these combats were high, as shown by the continuous drain of colonels and higher officers.

32 As an interesting sidenote, it must be noted that the infantry manual written by Colonel Joan Francesc Ferrer, published in 1714, considers both formations. This shows the importance the English tactics had in the Catalan army (Ferrer, 1714, p. 238-240).






Left to right: grenadiers from Gorges', Borr's, and Hamilton's Regiments. These companies of grenadiers were decisive during the sieges of Barcelona in 1705-1706. The picture shows that one of the distinctive items in the grenadiers uniform was their headgear: the grenadier stocking cap (right soldier) or the mitre (other soldiers). These were much longer hats than the usual ones, giving the grenadiers an even more impressive look.

Brudenell's Regiment of Foot

The unit of foot commanded by Colonel Brudenell was one of the first sent to the Peninsula, arriving in Portugal in 1702. It defended this front until joining with the troops disembarked in Catalonia after 1705/1706. In 1707, just before the Battle of Almansa, the regiment was practically disbanded and it was not present in the Allied defeat. In 1708 Colonel Johnson was in charge of the regiment, which was transferred to Flanders and transformed in a regiment of marines one year later.

Lord Montjoy's Regiment of Foot



It disembarked in Portugal in 1703 and followed a similar path to Brudenell's Regiment until 1707. It joined Peterborough's (and later Galway's) troops and fought in Almansa with a strength of 508 men. It suffered heavy casualties during the battle but it was present in the Peninsula until 1709, as in July a payment of 645 pounds was sent to Lord Montjoy by way of maintenance of the regiment. This is quite a small figure, so we can deduce that the regiment was somewhat weakened.

Uniforms of two privates from Montjoy's Regiment admitted to Valencia hospital during 1706.

Lord Portmore's Regiment of Foot

Sent to Portugal at the start of the war, it fought in Almansa with 462 men. Afterwards it withdrew to Catalonia without suffering many casualties, as in November 1710 it had a strength of 410 men. Its later military actions are not known, but if the regiment was not disbanded, then it was transferred to another front, as there are no more entries related to it. According to the colonel's list, Piercy Kirk takes the command of the unit in September 1710.

William Stuart's Regiment of Foot

This regiment followed the same career as Portmore's, and disembarked in Portugal at the end of 1703. Fought in Almansa with a strength of 467 men and had 388 soldiers in November 1707, after the retreat towards Catalonia. Its later actions are not known.



Stanhope's Regiment of Foot



It disembarked in Portugal in 1703, and probably the large part of the regiment was captured during the siege of Portalegre in 1704. But in April 1705 there are payments recorded to the regiment, then commanded by Colonel John Hill. It joined Galway's troops and fought in Almansa with 472 men. In November 1707 it had a strength of 472 soldiers which were probably transferred to other regiments or to other theatres of war, since it no longer appears in the documentation.

Stanhope's Regiment, 1707 uniform (already under the command of John Hill).

Barrymore's Regiment of Foot

Present in Portugal during 1703-1705, it became Pearce's Regiment of Dragoons, as seen before. It must be noted, however, that at the end of 1708 Barrymore disembarked in Portugal with a new regiment of foot, which served there until 1710.

Holcroft Blood's Regiment of Foot


It arrived in Portugal in 1703 and fought in Almansa with a strength of 461 men. It was one of the English regiments with most casualties, as in November 1707 it had only 266 soldiers. Later the regiment disappears from the payment records, so it was probably disbanded during that year's reforms. Although some sources say that it served in the Peninsula until 1710 under the command of Colonel Joseph Wightman, there are no entries under this name in the payments roll for this theatre of war.

George Wade's Regiment of Foot

The first actions of this regiment in the Peninsula are somewhat confusing, as although many documents place it there in 1706, according to the embarkations documentation it was assigned to Portugal from Flanders in 1703. However, we know for sure that from 1707 on it was one of the main units of the English army in Catalonia. It fought in Almansa (with a strength of 458 men), Almenar and Zaragoza, before surrendering in Brihuega with all troops under Stanhope.



Regiment of Foot Guards



Left to right: private, grenadier and drummer from the Foot Guards in Barcelona, 1706.

A strong detachment of this elite regiment³³ disembarked in Portugal at the end of 1704. Despite not appearing in the account books (because it was not a full regiment), it is clear that it fought in the Battle of Almansa with 400 men. The surviving troops were probably returned to the home regiment after the defeat, since there are no more records of its presence in Catalonia.




Officer, grenadier and private from the Foot Guards during 1707. Blue facings are traditional in the Royal Guards, as can also be seen in the Royal Regiment of Dragoons and the Royal Fusiliers.



³³ This unit is nowadays the famous regiment of the Grenadier Guards.

Earl of Donegall's Regiment of Foot

It disembarked in Portugal at the end of 1704. According to the embarkation roll, brigadier Richard Gorges replaced Donegall as regimental colonel in April 1705, when the regiment is sent to Barcelona and Donegall receives the command of the English army in Catalonia (he died in a counterattack against the castle of Montjuïc, during the siege of Barcelona in 1706). Like the rest of the army in the Eastern front, it was integrated with Galway's forces and fought in the Battle of Almansa with a strength of 616 men, under Richard Gorges. It was disbanded during the 1707-1708 reforms.



Privates and grenadier from Richard Gorges' Regiment of Foot in 1706, when it defended Barcelona against the Bourbon attack.

Private and grenadier from Gorges' Regiment in 1706. Note how uniforms can differ considerably from one batch to the next, although in this case regimental facings are maintained.


Southwell's Regiment of Foot

This regiment, commanded by Colonel Southwell, had a leading role in the attack against Barcelona in 1705. The officer's roll of the regiment states that the Colonel commission was given to William Southwell on February 6th 1706, but the admissions to the hospital contradict this information, so although the Colonel was James Rivers, Southwell was probably commanding the regiment before having his official commission. It was one of the few English units present at the Western Peninsular front throughout the war. It fought in Almansa (with 505 men), survived the reforms of 1707-1708 (when it had a strength of 411 men) and fought in Almenar and Brihuega. From 1708 to the end of war the regiment was commanded by Colonel Harrison.



Hamilton's Regiment of Foot

This regiment disembarked in Barcelona in 1705, but it did not fight in Almansa, due to its low numbers. It was later reformed and transferred to the Flanders theatre, where it served until the end of the war.



Soldiers from Hamilton's Regiment during the taking of Barcelona in 1705. From left to right: sergeant, private, two grenadiers and drummer. Different ranks had various and distinctive combinations of the traditional English red and regimental facings (in this case, brownish).

Officer from Hamilton's Regiment in 1707. The Union Flag or Union Jack, the official flag of the United Kingdom, was used for the first time in the 17th century, although its use was probably not widespread among the English (later British) army. During the 18th century it was a combination of England's flag (Saint George's cross) and Scotland's flag (Saint Andrew's cross). Saint Patrick's cross (Ireland's flag) was not added until 1801.



Elliot's Regiment of Foot

Like Southwell's, the regiment commanded by Elliot saw action for the first time in the fight for Barcelona in 1705. Afterwards it was stationed in Gibraltar as part of the garrison defending this strategic place from Bourbon attacks. It remained in this post until the end of the war.


Charlemont's Regiment of Foot

The unit commanded by Lord Charlemont took part in the successful Allied siege of Barcelona in 1705. Its colonel was replaced by Colonel Alnutt in 1706. The regiment defended Montjuïc in the 1706 combats and later fought in Almansa with a strength of 412 men. It suffered so many casualties that it was disbanded shortly afterwards.

John Caulfield's Regiment of Foot

This regiment sailed from Ireland to Catalonia in 1705 and fought in Almansa with 470 men, under the command of Phineas Bowles. This officer commanded the regiment during the rest of war, when the regiment joined Stanhope's forces and took part in the battles of Almenar and Brihuega.


The Royal Fusiliers



Left to right: private, grenadier and drummer from The Royal Fusiliers in 1706.

The regiment was sent to Barcelona in February 1706, in order to break the siege of the city. Afterwards, it continued in the defence of Catalan territory. In spring 1707 it was stationed in Girona and then marched to Lerida in order to defend the city after the defeat in Almansa. Under command of Lord Tyrawley it withstood the siege but eventually surrendered and was captured. However, there is a payment entry for Tyrawley troops in 1710, so it can be assumed that part of the regiment was not captured at Lerida and still served in Catalonia.

Breton's Regiment of Foot



This regiment arrived in Barcelona at the same time as The Royal Fusiliers, under the Bourbon threat to the city. It joined Galway's forces and it was present in Almansa with 428 soldiers. It survived the 1707-1708 reforms and, although appearing in the 1709 and 1710 payments, did not take part in the battles of Almenar and Brihuega, and was probably stationed as a garrison in Catalonia until the end of the war.

Soldiers from Breton's Regiment in 1706. From left to right: private, grenadier and two drummers.



Private, grenadier and drummer from Breton's Regiment at the Battle of Almansa.



Lord Mohun's Regiment of Foot

The unit commanded by Lord Mohun (often spelled Mobun in the documents) arrived in Catalonia as a reinforcement in February 1706. It did not take part in the Battle of Almansa due to its low numbers, like many other regiments. The regiment was reinforced again and the command passed to Colonel Dormer, who led the unit in the Battle of Almenar and the final campaign of 1710-1711. It was captured in Brihuega.

Lord Mohun became famous for his constant duelling, and in fact he died in a duel in 1712, a fact quite commented in the English press.

Thomas Caulfield's Regiment of Foot

Disembarked in February 1706 in Barcelona, Thomas (Toby) Caulfield's unit remained just one year in the Peninsula, and did not fight in Almansa, due to its low numbers. Then it was transferred to Flanders.

Charles Hotham's Regiment of Foot

The unit commanded by Hotham was assigned garrison tasks in the fortress of Alicante from the end of 1706. Besieged in 1709, the regiment surrendered with all other troops. The remaining troops were discharged at the end of the year.

Siege of
Alicante,
according to
Tindal (ICC).




Rungannon's Regiment of Foot

This regiment arrived in Barcelona in 1706 and had a very unfortunate performance, as it was captured in its entirety after leaving the fortress of Alicante and did not take part in the Battle of Almansa. Afterwards it was reformed under the command of Marquis de Montandre, largely completed with French Huguenots. It remained in the Peninsula until 1710, when it was paid 600 pound for raising new troops. However, we do not know where it was stationed, but it did not take part in the Battles of Almenar and Brihuega, so probably it was not with Stanhope's army marching to Castile.

Watkins' Regiment of Foot

It arrived in Gibraltar in October 1706 and was part of the garrison protecting the place from Bourbon attacks until the end of the war, according to the records in the account book, like Elliot's Regiment.

Scots Guards (Scottish Regiment of Foot Guards)



This regiment, commanded by Colonel Mark Kerr, took part in the Battle of Almansa (with a strength of 429 men), 6 months after its arrival in the Peninsula. After the Allied retreat, it took part in the defence of Catalonia in 1708-1710, contributing to the Allied victories of Almenar and Zaragoza, but eventually surrendering in Brihuega like the rest of the English army.

Private and grenadier from the Scots Guards in 1709. Note the blue facings, like all other royal regiments.

Nassau's Regiment of Foot

Very little is known about this regiment, as it is not recorded in any secondary source consulted. But according to the embarkation roll, this unit disembarked in Barcelona in October 1706, and took part in the Battle of Almansa with 422 soldiers. The account book also records some payments to Nassau's troops in 1706, thus confirming its existence. The regiment was probably disbanded in the 1707 reforms, as this colonel is the same Frans von Nassau who took command of Lord Peterborough's Regiment of Dragoons and died in Almenar in 1710.



Frédéric de Sybourg's Regiment of Foot

This mainly Huguenot regiment was assigned to the defence of Alicante in October 1706, where it remained until the assault and taking of the city by the Bourbon army, where it was captured in its entirety.

Paul de Blosset's Regiment of Foot

This regiment was raised with Huguenot troops and remained in Alicante with Sybourg's Regiment during 1706 and 1707. That year it was disbanded and the soldiers joined Sybourg's, but soon thereafter Blosset is given command of a powerful Catalan two-battalion regiment, commanded by English officers (with a strength of 407 and 508 men). This emergency measure was taken after the defeat in Almansa in order to defend the Catalan lands, and the soldiers were English-paid. The last payment is recorded in 1709, so it could be presumed that once the military situation improved these battalions were disbanded.

Farrington's Regiment of Foot

This unit arrived in Catalonia in October 1706 but did not fight in the Battle of Almansa and it was somewhat weakened. Some sources place it in Flanders, but in fact it was in the Peninsula until 1709, when the payments end. However, it must be noted that some paid regiments returned temporarily to England for some months to rebuild them and raise new troops. This might be a reason for the lack of records concerning this unit in these years.


Mackartny's Regiment of Foot

The regiment disembarked in October 1706 and took part in the Battle of Almansa (with a strength of 494 men). After the Allied retreat in 1709 the command passed to Colonel Sutton and was transferred to Flanders, where it served until the end of the war.

Pearce's, Newton's, Sankey's and Stanwix's regiments of foot

These four regiments disembarked in Lisbon in June 1707 to reinforce Austriacist positions on the Western front after the Battle of Almansa, where many regiments defending the Portuguese border had been disintegrated. They remained there until the end of the war, without noteworthy military actions, except for the unsuccessful attempt to join forces with Stanhope.

Mordaunt's Regiment of Foot



Arriving in October 1706 in Barcelona, Mordaunt's Regiment fought in Almansa with 532 men. After the retreat it took part in the defence of Catalonia and in 1708 the command passed to Windsor. Although it was present in 1710 in the Peninsular theatre of war, its exact assignment is unknown, as it did not take part in the Battles of Almenar and Brihuega.

Private and grenadier from Mordaunt's Regiment in 1707, with the uniform worn at Almansa.

Allen's Regiment of Foot



When Richard Gorges took command of Donegall's Regiment, Thomas Allen assumed the command of his former unit. Afterwards Allen was replaced in 1708 by Colonel Moore, who was in charge of the regiment until 1710. Its exact assignment is unknown, but it was in the Eastern front.

Uniform of Allen's Regiment, according to various records from the Valencia hospital archive.

Lord Galway's Regiment of Foot

Like Blosset's Regiment, this unit was formed in 1707 with two Catalan battalions for fear of a Bourbon attack against Allied positions in Catalonia. It had a strength of 491 and 502 men and was disbanded in 1708, following the recovery of the Allied presence in Catalonia.



Regiment of Foot of Saragossa

This unit was created in 1707 with Aragonese soldiers, and followed the same path as Lord Galway's Regiment, being disbanded a year after it was raised. It was a strong unit, with 424 men, and must not be mistaken for the Aragonese regiment created by Charles III in 1706.

Whetham's Regiment of Foot

This unit is not widely documented. It arrived in Catalonia at the end of 1708 and is recorded in the payments on this front 1710. Its presence in Almenar or Brihuega is uncertain, as it is not cited in any source.

Munden's Regiment of Foot

Arriving in Barcelona in the last massive shipment of English troops (end of 1708), it took part in the last actions of the war, including Almenar, Zaragoza and Brihuega. In this last battle the regiment was captured in its entirety.

Lepell's Regiment of Foot



Although this regiment would seem to have arrived in Catalonia in 1708, there are entries in the account dating back to 1705. Its assignment is not known but in 1710 Lepell was replaced by Colonel Richard, who led the unit in Almenar and Zaragoza.

Uniform of Lepell's Regiment from 1707 to 1711, when it was already under command of Colonel Richard.

Humphrey Gore's Regiment of Foot

Not a highly documented unit, it was created in 1707 and arrived in Catalonia at the end of 1708. It took part in the Battle of Almenar.



Paston's and Carle's regiments of foot

Little documented units, they arrived in Portugal at the end of 1708.


Saunderson's Regiment of Marines



This marines unit was present in the conflict from the very beginning and had a leading role in the taking of Gibraltar. Afterwards it took part in the attack on Barcelona in 1705 and was later assigned to the defence of Girona. Its final action, under command of Charles Wills, was in the defence of Lerida during the 1707 siege, where it surrendered when the city capitulated. The remaining men of the regiment were embarked again in 1709.


Charles Wills' Regiment of Marines, during the siege of Lerida in 1707.

Churchill's and Borr's regiments of marines



Private and grenadier from Borr's Regiments of Marines, during the 1705 combats for Montjuïc and Barcelona.

Not very documented units, their presence in the Eastern front is based on secondary sources only. In the account books two active regiments of marines are continuously cited, from the combats for Barcelona in 1705 until the end of the war, which could correspond to these units. The command of Joshua Churchill's regiment passed to Harry Goring in 1711.



English Marine. An admission to the Santa Creu Hospital in Barcelona is from 1705 and under the name of Rooke's Regiment. As this is the name of an English admiral, it is not known which regiment this soldier belonged to.



Artillery

Unlike other arms, there were few completely artillery regiments until well into the 18th century. Although artillery trains were unified under the name Royal Artillery, they were organized, as in the rest of the armies of the time, as scattered batteries, gathered or split according to specific needs. All personnel and soldiers related to the artillery were uniformed in the same patterns as the other arms of the army. In the Peninsula they took part in all battles involving the English, and they were especially noteworthy in the Battle of Almenar.



Uniform of the English artillery officers during the siege of Barcelona in 1706.

Origins of the soldiers

In the archives of the General Hospital of Valencia there are some 50 admissions of soldiers enlisted in the English army. In the admission form, besides the colours of the uniforms (information used by Francesc Riart for the figures in this book), the origin and age of the privates and NCOs of Lord Peterborough's army during the campaign of Valencia is recorded. These data are very useful for drawing a picture of a typical soldier of the 18th century.

The first thing we can see from the analysis of this information is that, in fact, the majority of the soldiers enlisted are Irish. This is not surprising, as Ireland has for many centuries, and especially in modern times, been a recruitment place for armies of all Europe (Spain and France had Irish regiments, as well). As at the beginning of 18th century Ireland was under English control, it is not surprising that a good part of the English army, and especially the privates, were formed by Irishmen.



The younger soldier appearing in the documents was 17 years old, the sole English drummer recorded. Nevertheless, the common idea that drummers were always the younger soldiers is not correct, as the mean age of all drummers from all armies who are admitted to the hospital is 27, with drummers of 40 and 46 years of age. It can therefore be assumed that the drummer being the youngest English soldier admitted is just a coincidence, not repeated in other nationalities. Moreover, as there is but one admission, the data has no significance.

Regarding the oldest soldier, he was 47. This is not especially old, as in other armies soldiers of 50 and 60 were recorded. These data suggest that there was no maximum age for enlistment and that a soldier's career could last all his life.

The mean age does not differ much from that of other countries, being 28.1, over a sample of 47 soldiers. This is interesting, as 28 years is quite an old age compared with soldiers from other historical periods, especially in 20th century, when compulsory conscription lowered the usual age of soldiers to the range of 18-25.

Moreover, a substantial difference between the mean age of English soldiers (around 30 years) and the mean age of Irish soldiers (26 years) can be seen. This could be tentatively explained by the levies raised in different years in each British Isle, although it could also be attributed as a distinctive younger Irish enlistment age.³⁴

Regarding age distribution, Figure 5 shows a histogram where the number of soldiers admitted as a function of their age is represented. The majority of soldiers are grouped in two age ranges: from 20 to 24 and from 28 to 33. Although this is too small a sample for achieving a conclusion, one can tentatively assume that the two ranges correspond to two levies raised in different years, with a group of older veterans having campaigned for some years, and a second group of fresh recruits.

We find this same distribution when we separate the admitted soldiers by nationality (English and Irish), as can be seen in Figure 6.

There are no noteworthy differences between both nationalities, although in the younger group of soldiers there is a clear predominance of Irishmen, compared to the second group of older soldiers, where they are more evenly distributed between both nationalities.

³⁴ Further research on Marlborough's army demographics could support or refute this hypothesis.






Figure 5: Age histogram for soldiers in the English army admitted to the Hospital of Valencia.

The analysis of this small sample of soldiers admitted to the hospital shows how the English army was composed, more or less in equal shares, by English and Irish soldiers. The age range of these soldiers was 20-35 years, with soldiers somewhat experienced and mature.




Figure 6: Soldiers distribution by age and nationality.

This was important, as units formed by veteran soldiers were more combat ready than a regiment full of fresh recruits, who knew nothing about war and did not know what a battle was.

THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION AS SEEN BY AN ENGLISHMAN

The year was 1713 when Captain George Carleton, an English officer of His Majesty's Royal Navy, spent seven days on leave at the hermitages on Montserrat mountain. He was impressed by the mountain's enigmatic landscape and the austere, but generous and open life of monks and hermits who lived there. Although he would have liked to stay longer, he could not because, in his own words, the life of a soldier was "the perfect antithesis of a hermit's life". In addition, foreigners could only reside on the mountain for a week at most. During his stay, the hall of offerings was shown to him among other places. There he saw sumptuous wonders like the diamond-encrusted sword offered by Charles III, "then King of Spain and Emperor of Germany today", which had the inscription *Pulchra tamen nigra* (Black, but beautiful). Although he declared himself an ardent Protestant, he showed respect for old Catholic habits and tried to understand Catholic rituals.



Montserrat, segons una il·lustració feta per un tal Mr. de Fer el 1705 (ICC).

He sometimes fell into the most naïve ignorance, as when he kissed the face of the Virgin instead of her hand before the distressed monk who accompanied him. On other occasions he adopted Catholic attitudes not so much out of devotion but rather as a precaution.

For example, it was known that if a Protestant soldier (and therefore a heretic) died for any reason, then the devout people did not give him a Christian burial for fear that the corpse would infect everything around. Therefore, like many other English soldiers posted in the Iberian Peninsula, the captain had a blessed rosary in his pocket as a trick and apparent guarantee of holiness (Defoe, 1809, p. 245-248).

Basically, Carleton knew the country and its diverse regional traditions because he had spent almost a decade in the Peninsula being in the first line of the main episodes of the War of the Spanish Succession.



English literature on the War of the Spanish Succession

George Carleton, to whom we refer at the beginning of this chapter, was a Protestant, a proud Englishman with a military career, an open-minded and critical observer of everything surrounding him. He unfailingly supported Queen Anne, and he thought it was a good thing fighting for his country while defending a fair cause.

Although it is difficult to believe, given the abundance of details about his life in Catalonia, this is a character belonging to the English literature of the period. The text is found in *Memoirs of Capt. George Carleton*, an *English officer* and it is an exceptional primary source of the time and context described, although it is completely fictional with regard to narrator and first hand experienced facts. Carleton's character is the product of the inventiveness of Daniel Defoe, one of the founders of the English novel and author of the famous *Robinson Crusoe*, as well as *The Life, Adventures and Piracies of the Famous Captain Singleton* and *Moll Flanders*.

It is true that there was a Captain Carleton, but he never wrote any collection of memories. Defoe used his name to give veracity to a story based on several handwritten notes of Sir Harold Williams, a military man as well, and which Defoe filled with historical news using the material collected from other sources that were already circulating at the time in the form of informational gazettes or biographies. As a businessman, Defoe travelled to France and Spain several times. These visits provided him with more personal descriptive details that may be found when he relates certain landscapes or customs, bringing memories closer to the genre of travel narrative.

Regardless of the validity of this text as a primary source, and admitting that it is at least suspicious since we are dealing with a novel, the fact is that the character created by Defoe is an excellent mirror in which the English view on the War of the Spanish Succession is reflected, so it may be useful to analyse this character to understand how the country experienced the conflict.

England and the War of the Spanish Succession

The War of the Spanish Succession caused a major uproar in the English society of the time. The policy revolved around the wartime events that took place in Europe. Gossips in the Court corridors dealt with the performance of generals and high commanders sent to the front. Abroad, agents and ambassadors sent to other courts made a diplomatic effort to arrange an alliance that, on the battlefield, did not always work.



Meanwhile, the accumulated years of war progressively emptied the English Treasury.

The war was also a before and after with regard to the influence that public opinion might have on politics. And the case of the Catalans was always on everyone's lips, as shown by later writings as *The Case of the Catalans Consider'd* or *The Deplorable History of the Catalans*, published in London on the fateful year 1714, the last chance to get help to come to the aid of Barcelona before its imminent fall.

In fact, the Tories were pioneers in using the so-called "war of the pen" in their favour. The main example of this party propaganda belongs to another father of the English novel, Jonathan Swift, the author of the famous *Gulliver's Travels*. In 1711 he published the pamphlet *Conduct of Allies*, which had a great success and in which he defended a European peace without Charles III as the Spanish monarch (*The Deplorable History of the Catalans*, 1991, p. 76).

The leading English figures acting in Catalonia between 1705 and 1711 are mentioned in the work of Daniel Defoe. The novel first appeared in 1728 in a London printing office. Defoe wanted to present the most recent history of England while recalling the Anglo-Dutch wars in the late 17th century. However, the main goal of such a complete and exhaustive review of the War of the Spanish Succession was to justify the acts of one of the most important English military commanders during the first stage of the war in the Peninsula, Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, a military man and politician.³⁵ As we shall see later, Defoe and Peterborough belonged to the most conservative wing of the English politics. In fact, the writer conceived the novel as a panegyric in favour of the actions and decisions taken by Peterborough on the battlefield. The work presents a bold Peterborough who can not implement their brilliant strategies because of other allies. However, as we have said throughout this book, this was not exactly true. Peterborough always had a passive attitude, following the canons dictated by his party, opposed to the war.

The Glorious Revolution and the start of the war

Defoe sets the beginning of Carleton's military career in 1672, the same year in which London was threatened by the Dutch fleet. Trade played a decisive role for the future of the European powers. France promoted Colbert's mercantilism, marked by a strong intervention of the state, just the opposite of the Dutch liberalism. From the mid-17th century, and with the support of a weak alliance with France, England disputed the

35 As we can see, Peterborough had a permanent group of friends who made a true propaganda campaign in his favour, thereby supporting Tories' stance on the war.



commercial supremacy in naval battles against the Dutch fleet, then the most powerful in Europe. James II finally concluded peace in 1674 due to popular pressure, which cried out to quit the war against the United Provinces and stop the voracious expansionism of Louis XIV. So, the English turned the tables and allied with the Dutch, who at the time were allied to Spain, the Austrian Empire and German principalities. Peace between the United Provinces and France was signed in 1678 in Nijmegen, leaving France surrounded by potential enemies.

In addition to these facts of war, the reign of James II was marked by other facts that caused the Revolution of 1688, better known as the Glorious Revolution. This was mainly triggered by the king giving important offices to the Catholics in a clear abuse of personal power and even harshly repressing opponents. The continuity of a Catholic monarchy was against general opinion in London and the Glorious Revolution began when various English Members of Parliament contacted the Dutch Stadtholder, William of Orange (married to Mary, James II's daughter) to ask him to land troops in England and finish with the Stuart dynasty, which they did in 1688. In the first part of his memoirs, Captain Carleton briefly explains the abdication of King James II and how the monarch fled the country to settle in France. William III of Orange and Mary accepted the joint titles of King and Queen, i. e. neither of them was simply a regent but instead both were full monarchs, in exchange for promoting Parliament's liberties. In 1689 the monarchs signed the Bill of Rights which reaffirms the constitutional monarchy of England, thus starting a new era for the country, characterised by the consolidation of English Protestantism, the influence of Parliament on the government and the European alliances against France. The Act of Toleration contributed to the climate of freedom that went on under the more liberal Whig ministers' term of office.

The revolutionary William III of Orange had fought for nearly the entire last quarter of the 17th century against the expansionist ambitions of Louis XIV. Meanwhile, the French monarch played his cards to try to return the Stuart family to the English throne by causing uprisings and rebellions among their Jacobite supporters. Therefore, relations between France and England were already rather complicated with the outbreak of the Spanish succession problem. The whig party became the main promoter of the war in Europe when they opted for the cause of Archduke Charles and formed the first alliance against a possible Bourbon union.

In 1702, when "the war was proclaimed, and preparations accordingly made for it, the expectations from all received a sudden damp, by the sudden death of King William." The Dutch Stadtholder, who had fought on many battlefields, died due to complications caused by a fall from his horse while hunting. Carleton continues explaining (Defoe, 1809, p. 95):



He [France] flattered himself, that that long-lived obstacle to his ambition thus removed, his successor would never fall into those measures, which he had wisely concerted for the liberties of Europe; but he [France], as well as others of his adherents, was gloriously deceived; that God-like queen, with a heart entirely English, prosecuted her royal predecessor's counsels; and, to remove all the very faces of jealousy, immediately on her accession dispatched to every court of the great confederacy, persons adequate to the importance of the message, to give assurances thereof.

The God-like queen to whom the captain referred to is Queen Anne, who played a key role during the War of the Spanish Succession. Anne was the sister of Mary II of England and William III of Orange's sister-in-law. During the Glorious Revolution, Anne left her father and switched over to the Dutch newcomer's side, even before James II had abdicated. Her reign coincides exactly with the war facts during the European conflict, as she was enthroned in the spring of 1702, when Allied military preparations were under way, and died of gout in the summer of 1714, when the Barcelona defenders were still resisting the Bourbon siege without foreign help (only to finally surrender on the fateful September 11th). It is worth mentioning that during her reign the Treaty of Union was concluded, which gave rise to a Great Britain united under one Parliament.

English political parties

In the mid-17th century, the English political scene finally took shape and remained unchanged until the mid-19th century, when improvements and wide-ranging changes to the electoral system of the United Kingdom were introduced after the Reform Act of 1832. In modern times, the continuing wars in defence of various monarchs as well as Cromwell's Republic established a division into two blocks still used today, at least with regard to the terminology used. The term *Tory* derives from an Irish root that originally defined an outlaw. Usually, the Tories were the royalist supporters of the most traditional monarchy and had full support from the Church of England, and as conservative politicians they were generally hostile to great reforms. In contrast, the Whigs became the great defenders of constitutional monarchy against any absolutist tendency. In economic terms, they supported free trade and gave priority to the emerging industry and not to the privileges of large landowners.

The members of the Whig party were directly affected by the reign of Charles II, who excluded them from Parliament following his principles of absolute monarchy. The Glorious Revolution was marked by the booming liberal wing, though William III of Orange ruled in a balance



between the two parties. His prime minister was a moderate Tory, but soon the Whigs dominated the decision-taking in politics. Queen Anne tried to carry on with the balance of her predecessor and sought the complicity of the most moderate Tories, like the minister of economy Lord Godolphin,³⁶ and the military man Lord Duke of Marlborough, the latter ended up repudiated by the most radical Tories. The Whigs were the main supporters of the war in favour of Archduke Charles, and in 1704 they dominated Parliament after Duke of Marlborough's victory at Blenheim. By 1706 the Whigs were encouraged and strengthened in such a way that the Tories had been displaced from the big decisions. But Queen Anne was always sceptical about the willingness of the liberals to support the war and she began to support the Tories so far left out, who saw with horror how the royal treasury emptied because of the war costs. Moreover, the enmity between Anne and Sarah Jennings (Marlborough's wife) made the Queen drift further from the Whigs and the English commander. The Tories became more powerful in Parliament with the forced resignation of Lord Godolphin in 1710 and they began discussing peace agreements with France.

Notably, in 1715 the Whigs returned to power again, where they remained as the dominant party of government until the 1760s. Seeing these political changes with the comfort offered by the historical insight of something that has already happened, we can understand the decision of the Catalans to continue the war against Philip V before the fall of Barcelona. It was a logical resistance, since it was a way to gain time waiting for a new turn in European politics that could revive Archduke Charles' cause.

War begins in Europe

The first serious clashes between the French and Allied armies took place in Northern Europe. The Imperial troops advanced and it seemed they did not know defeat. The news arrived in London while our captain was there. His comments hint at the propaganda and patriotic meaning of Defoe's *Memoirs* when, euphorically, the main character describes the first combats of the war (Defoe, 1809, p. 96):

36 Sidney Godolphin (1645-1712) held the position of High Lord Treasurer for most of the war. Accustomed to move in the court's atmosphere, he managed to lead the Tories to government in 1700. He took control of finances of the first stages of war and worked in close cooperation with his colleague Marlborough. During the conflict, he and Marlborough eventually allied with the Whigs. A series of cases of corruption in which he accused political enemies finally turned against him, to the point that he was forced to resign in 1710; as we have seen, a key factor in the rise of Tory government and the end of the war.



The first campaign gave a noble earnest of the future. Bon, Keyserwaert, Venlo, and Ruremond, were found forerunners only of Donawert, Hochstet, and Blenheim. Such a march of English forces to the support of the tottering empire, as it gloriously manifested the ancient genius of a warlike people, so was it happily celebrated with a success answerable to the glory of the undertaking, which concluded in statues and princely donatives to an English subject, from the then only emperor in Europe.

Regarding the Iberian Peninsula, the Allied offensive began in Lisbon in the spring of 1704, when Philip V declared war on the neighbouring country after knowing that Archduke Charles had moved to the Portuguese court and had established there a meeting point for all Imperial operatives. At the same time, a small fleet commanded by Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt (an Austrian military man who had been Viceroy of Catalonia in Hapsburg Spain and became quite popular among the Catalans) landed some troops near Besòs river to try to cause a revolt in the Catalan capital. This was a failed attempt and, given the reluctance of the citizens, the Imperial troops once again embarked for Portugal, but not before gathering a handful of Catalan Austriacist supporters.



On the way southwards, Darmstadt joined the bulk of the Imperial navy under the command of the English Admiral George Rooke.³⁷ When the fleet encountered the garrison that defended Gibraltar's strategic enclave, it began shooting cannons and eventually captured the Rock.

The strangest thing is that Gibraltar did not pass into Austrian or Dutch hands, but is still a British colony. As it is mentioned by some historians, when the Prince of Darmstadt conquered the garrison the Imperial emblem was raised.

Capture of Gibraltar by the Allies in 1704 (ICC).

But according to Defoe, Rooke's angry soldiers flew Queen Anne's insignia, so the Rock became an English territory even before the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht.

37 George Rooke (1650-1709) was an English military man and naval strategist with an irregular history. He participated in the great wars of late 17th century against the Dutch first and then against the French. After 1702 he sailed along the Spanish coast attempting small raids in Cadis and Vigo. Tired of gossip about his naval competence, he left military service in 1705.



As a professional soldier, Captain Carleton became anxious in his interim post in London's court. The city's comfortable life was not for him and he hoped to reload his musket and step on to a battlefield. Therefore, he told his superior he wished to know Spain, because he knew that an Allied expedition was preparing a massive landing in Barcelona. The Earl of Peterborough was the supreme general of the fleet. No sooner said than done (Defoe, 1809, p. 99):

[...] and so when all things were ready, I embarked with that noble lord for Spain; to pursue his well-concerted undertaking; which, in the event, will demonstrate to the world, that little armies, under the conduct of auspicious generals, may sometimes produce prodigious effects.

Captain Carleton arrived in Lisbon when the city was seething with Austriacists. The year was 1705 and Lord Peterborough's large expedition had the young Archduke Charles in person, while the Imperial alliance was in a phase of expansion on all fronts in Europe. In Tangiers, they met with Cloudsley Shovel's English squadron, which the well-known Prince of Darmstadt later joined. The army first set sail for Denia, where they won public support for the Archduke's cause thanks to Joan Baptista Basset. Afterwards, they entered Valencia where found no enemy troops and were hosted by the citizens with tokens of gratitude and support. Finally, the Imperial navy arrived off the coast of Barcelona in late August.

Defoe explains how Carleton landed with his regiment near the Besòs river and pointed the guns at Barcelona. The city of that time is described by the captain in this way:

[...] Barcelona is one of the largest and most populous cities in all Spain, fortified with bastions; one side thereof is secured by the sea, and the other by a strong fortification, called Monjouick [Montjuïc]. The place is of so large a circumference, that thirty thousand men would scarce suffice to form the lines of circumvallation. It once resisted for many months an army of that force; and is almost at the greatest distance from England of any place belonging to that monarchy.

Indeed, in 1697 Barcelona was besieged by the French and eventually surrendered. As we can see from this exposition, though, Defoe did not know the city well, as Montjuïc is not on the other side of the sea, and he does not mention some noteworthy geographical features (especially the Tibidabo mountain and the Collserola range, west of the city).

By mid-September 1705 Montjuïc surrendered and later, on October 9th, Barcelona capitulated. Defoe presents Carleton as a main figure in these actions, gaining recognition as a soldier when he managed to transport and make operative some guns pointing at the Gate of Saint Anthony



(Defoe, 1809, p. 148). He met James Stanhope, a promoted Brigadier and Lord, who was to become the most distinguished English soldier in Catalonia. From the very first combats in Montjuïc he stood out for his virtues “*tam Marte quam Mercurio*”, that is, comparable to Mars for his military skills and to Mercury for his ability as administrator. The following excerpt, from Defoe’s thought on this officer, is representative of an English patriot and Tory point of view (Defoe, 1809, p. 156):

Brigadier Stanhope [...] truly he behaved, all the time he continued in Spain, as if he had been inspired with conduct; for the victory at Almanar [sic] was entirely owing to him; and likewise at the battle of Saragosa he distinguished himself with great bravery. That he had not success at Bruhega [sic] was not his fault; for no man can resist fate; for it was decreed by heaven, that Philip should remain King of Spain, and Charles to be emperor of Germany. Yet each of these monarchs have been ungrateful to the instruments which the Almighty made use of to preserve them upon their thrones; for one had not been king of Spain but for France; and the other had not been emperor but for England.

When Barcelona fell to the Allied side, Viceroy Velasco left the city. Shouts of “viva” and “visca” were heard all through the city. At the beginning of November, Barcelona was placed in the very centre of European politics: “according to the articles, Charles the Third made his public entry, and was proclaimed king, and received with the general acclamations, and all other demonstrations of joy suitable to that great occasion.”

From then on, the former Palau de Mar was the official residence of Charles III until his return to Vienna to be crowned Emperor, at the end of 1711. However, Barcelona served still as royal residence for Charles’ wife, Empress Elisabeth of Brunswick, who remained in Barcelona.

English withdrawal

We have witnessed how English policy-making was above its monarchs. The Parliament started the war in Europe and assumed almost all the expenditure derived from the war, as shown in the graphs presented in this book.

The English political scenario favourable to war under the Whig government came to an end in spring 1710, when the liberals fell from power due to financial problems caused by the expenditure generated by the war in Europe, while the glory of great generals like Marlborough was tarnished with accusations of misappropriation of funds and attempts to extend war just for his personal glory. The Tory cabinet came



to government as supporters of an early peace agreement, especially now when land gains had been achieved. As soon as the conservative faction controlled Parliament, secret peace feelers with France were initiated, in order to find the best solution for ending the war, leaving aside their Allies.

The new European scenario was confirmed by the death of Joseph I, Austrian Emperor and Charles' III brother. The pretender left Catalonia and returned to Vienna, where he was crowned Emperor. It was the perfect scenario for England to negotiate peace under the excuse of the danger of a new European hegemony under the House of Hapsburg.³⁸ Contacts among belligerent countries strengthened until the English achieved Philip's V renunciation of the French throne, thus neutralizing the danger of a Bourbon union under the same monarch. In summer 1712 hostilities fell all over Europe, waiting for the final deliberations. The Allies wanted the war finished and, for instance, the Duke of Ormond, who replaced Marlborough in the European front, was under strict orders from the Tory cabinet not to take part in new offensive actions.

Captain Carleton had had enough adventures. It was 1712 and he was in a remote village of La Mancha. He had been taken prisoner three years before but had managed to obtain the protection of the Irish College of Madrid and was known among the villagers for his good manners and for being on good terms with the nobility as well as the lower classes. One day he received a letter informing him of peace negotiations. He possibly received news on the London Preliminaries signed in 1711, which paved the way to the final peace treaty signed in Utrecht. Carleton left La Mancha and visited Madrid with a visa, where he set up his return to England. He travelled through Burgos, Vitoria, Bilbao and San Sebastian and he was not alone as he met some lost English soldiers and officers who were heading towards the French border as well. Ports in the Basque Country and Aquitaine allowed the docking of English ships to gather the arriving prisoners. His companions embarked on the warship Gloucester, while he embarked on the Dover. After a nasty, stormy voyage, Carleton disembarked at Dover on the last day of March 1713. Eight years had passed since his departure.

As usual in this situation, the Captain ends his book with an interesting description on the changes he observed in his country (Defoe, 1809, p. 460):

I took coach directly for London, where, when I arrived, I thought myself transported into a country more foreign than any I had either fought or pilgrimaged in. Not foreign, do I mean, in respect to others, so much as to

38 The Netherlands had lost any interest in the war after Marlborough drove the French out of the nearby lands.



itself. I left it, seemingly, under a perfect unanimity: the fatal distinctions of Whig and Tory were then esteemed merely nominal; and of no more ill consequence or danger, than a bee robbed of its sting. The national concern went on with vigour, and the prodigious success of the Queen's arms, left every soul without the least pretence to a murmur. But now on my return, I found them on their old establishment, perfect contraries, and as unlikely to be brought to meet as direct angles. Some arraigning, some extolling of a peace; in which time has shewn both were wrong, and consequently neither could be right in their notions of it, however an over-prejudiced way of thinking might draw them into one or the other. But Whig and Tory are, in my mind, the completest paradox in nature; and yet like other paradoxes, old as I am, I live in hope to see, before I die, those seeming contraries perfectly reconciled, and reduced into one happy certainty, the public good.

Nevertheless, in Catalonia the withdrawal of Allied troops had a much more gloomy outlook. The political changes arrived in Catalonia in September 1712: English, Dutch and Portuguese troops left the country to the indignation of the people of Barcelona. Only the Imperial troops remained in the city, under the new viceroy and great commander Guido von Starhemberg. All hope fell on Empress Elisabeth of Brunswick, who maintained the guarantee of the Imperial commitment in defending Catalonia.

European political routes determined the fate of Catalonia. Elisabeth of Brunswick left Barcelona in March 1713 to join her husband Charles VI of Germany. In June, Starhemberg signed the Pact of l'Hospitalet with Bourbon representatives, by which the Imperial troops handed over the main Catalan fortresses and the French troops evacuated the Peninsula, agreeing not to intervene again. In July the last Imperial ships left the shores of the Besòs beaches. Without Allied help, the authorities of Barcelona took the decision to withstand as long as possible against Philip, the King of a ruined country deeply weakened for all of the concessions to the Allied powers. So Philip was incapable of overpowering the Catalan resistance until, in summer 1714, the massive French army intervention tilted the scales in the Bourbon direction. Queen Anne died soon thereafter, but it was already too late for the supporters of Charles III.



Part 2

The battles in Catalonia



The first action of war involving English troops in Catalonia was the attack on Barcelona in 1705. Despite contrary voices, the English fleet landed troops near the city of Barcelona on April 23rd, and unsuccessfully tried to capture it. After weeks of uncertainty in which the Allied army was not strong enough to undertake offensive actions, a conclusive attack on Montjuïc, headed by Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, captured the castle and allowed the Allies to besiege the city.¹ The Bourbons surrendered shortly afterwards and the Allies entered what would become their political and logistical base in the Iberian Peninsula for the remainder of the war.

English doubts

Initially, the attack on Barcelona generated serious doubts among the English officers. It was difficult to attack the city because it was garrisoned by a large Bourbon contingent and at the beginning the Catalans did not collaborate much with the Allied army.



Map of Barcelona during the War of the Spanish Succession, according to Stridbeck (ICC).

For these reasons, the officers met and proposed to the Queen that the expedition should leave Catalonia and that troops should be sent to the North Italian theatre of war. There was a strategic impasse between April and September, a time in which, aside from the capture of certain areas of the Catalan coast (especially Mataró), there was no significant military action.

¹ To be precise, a *siege dans les formes*, which consists of establishing three parallel trenches progressively, each closer to the enemy wall, until the wall is breached and the final assault is launched.



By contrast, in politics, Archduke Charles achieved increasingly important support from the Catalans, as he granted favours and positions to individuals and populations supporting his cause, while resolutely defending Catalonia.

This is, for example, the record raised in the council of war held in the Allied camp almost four months after arriving in Barcelona (Freind, 1707, p. 28-31):

At a Council of war, consisting of General Officers, held at Major General Connyngham's quarters in the Camp before Barcelona, Aug. 28. 1705

PRESENT

The Right Hon. the Earl of Peterborow.

Major General Connyngham.

Major General Schratenbach.

The Right Hon. the Earl of Donnegal.

Brigadier P de St. Amant.

The Right Hon. the Earl of Peterborow.

The Lord Vis. Charlemont.

Brigadier Richard Gorges.

Brigadier James Stanhope.

The Right Hon. the Lord Vic. Shannon.

Col. Hans Hamilton Quarter Master General.

Collonel Charles Wills, Adjutant General.

Having overcome the highest difficulties in submitting our Judgements, declared in three Councils of war, supported with undeniable Reasons, to His Majesty's Pleasure, and the Inclinations of our General, provided we had been assisted as in the last Council of War we desired, we are confident His Majesty will allow we gave even a most unreasonable mark of our Respect, having contented to expose the Troops under our Care to visible Ruin, without any prospect of Success, and against all the Rules of War:

We have been delayed by Disappointments in all we were made to expect, wanting Men and Time to carry on the Siege, and diverted by several Resolutions intimated from His Majesty, sometimes for a March, sometimes for a Siege, so little provided with Intelligence from the Place, that we were obliged to Land the Forces without the least Advice, and that made an Argument for an Attempt against a Town, with a Garrison near as strong as ourselves, without any Correspondence in it suitable to what has been told, which Siege must require more than two third parts of our Men on Duty every Day, by the demand of our Engineers.

And having notice from Admiral Wassenaer of the positive time of the departure of the Dutch Ships, some Days before which the Dutch



General assures us he will embark his Troops, and the Engineers not undertaking to make a Battery even in that time, since the Fleet, besides the Marines, which in all our Computations of the Strength of the Army, we had reckoned upon to compose a part of it, are not able to furnish towards carrying on our Works above nine hundred Men, of which, only three hundred can work each Day, instead of 1500 for daily Service, as we had desired; so that the whole assistance that the Fleet can give, being added to the number of effective Foot we have now fit for Service, including, the Battalion of Guards, will make in all but 8515 Men, out of which 5000 Men must be daily employed, either to work at or guard the intended Trenches and Battery.

And, since eight Deputies of the Catalans did declare to the Earl of Peterborow that they would not promise any number of Men to work at our Trenches and Batteries, or in any Place where they should be exposed to Fire, which they said could not be expected from undisciplined Country-People,

And, whereas we expressed in our last Council of War, that our highest Concern was, that we should be disabled from pursuing any other real Service, by staying to endeavour to make a fruitless attempt,

And, seeing our general Instructions are explained, and the first. Services intended to plainly directed anew in several Letters signifying Her Majesty's Pleasure,

It is the unanimous Opinion of this Council of War that the proposed Attempt on Barcelona for eighteen Days cannot be made, but that the Forces be immediately embarked for the probable Service, and the Support of the Duke of Savoy.

The fights for Montjuïc

The increasing support of the Catalans for the Austriacist cause, and the imminent onset of winter forced the Allies to attempt an attack before having to retreat because of bad weather or enemy presence. It was decided to attack Montjuïc by surprise, using the army camped out at the mouth of the Besòs, while simulating its march towards Tarragona.

On the night of September 13th 1705, when the forces arrived at the foot of Montjuïc, presumably to continue to Tarragona, an attack was made, according to Castellví (1997-2002, vol. I, p. 519-534):

Empezóse la marcha en tres cuerpos: uno de 1000 hombres, mandaba el mismo Milord [Peterborough]; otro, el príncipe [Jordi de Hesse-Darmstadt] y otro, Stanhope, apartados alguna distancia. No lejos



del pie de la montaña de Montjuïc descansaron las tropas. Milord y el príncipe hablaron a solas. A las 10 de la noche retrocedieron del camino que seguían y descansaron al pie del monte y refrescaron las gentes. Dispusieron el ataque: milord Peterborough a la derecha, a la parte de la lengua de sierpe, hacia el mar; el príncipe con mil hombres, a la izquierda, a la parte de sobre Santa Madrona, que debía internarse en el foso y pasar a la puerta del castillo o fortificación vieja; el brigadier Stanhope, con mil hombres, a cortar el paso entre la ciudad y el castillo. El príncipe dio dos guías a Milord, la principal el capitán Ignacio Barnadás; dos a Stanhope; tres traía el príncipe, y el Dr. Casellas, práctico del terreno. Milord, el príncipe y Stanhope empezaron la marcha. La caballería, con la gente de Vic, a la Cruz Cubierta.

Las guías de Milord le condujeron con felicidad a la derecha de la Virgen del Port, subiendo a la montaña sin ser advertidos. Las guías del príncipe le condujeron por Safont y debiendo tomar a la izquierda de Santa Madrona le condujeron por angostas sendas, que en partes sólo podía ir un hombre de frente por no alarmar la guarnición. Esto ocasionó dos inconvenientes: no llegó con su cuerpo hasta el crepúsculo del día 14.

Guiaba la vanguardia de 400 granaderos el brigadier Ricardo Gorges y el coronel Sonteval. Esto fue la ocasión de ser descubiertos de los fusileros del coronel Manegat, que estaban en aquel declivio fuera del foso; disparando, alarmaron la guarnición, que se puso en defensa. No obstante, el príncipe llegó antes de haber amanecido dentro del foso de la obra nueva. Milord llegó primero a la parte de la lengua de sierpe y penetró las obras exteriores y llegó en lo interior de la obra nueva con poca resistencia; dominó todas las obras exteriores hasta la Ferrería, edificio en el medio de la obra nueva que le sirvió de defensa al fuego del castillo.

El príncipe prosiguió el avance; advirtió que el cuerpo de Stanhope aún no había ocupado el paso de comunicación de la plaza al castillo a impedir el socorro, que los guías erraron el camino. Pasó Peterborough a unirse al príncipe. Dejando mil hombres en el lugar ocupado, penetraron toda la obra nueva y fortificación exterior. Los defensores se retiraron a la obra vieja u homenaje, dirigiéndose a la parte que mira a Barcelona, pasando por dentro del foso a ocupar el paso entre la ciudad y el castillo. Los aliados hacían un vivo fuego. El fervor de los sitiadores les condujo hasta el mismo foso del Bonete, no obstante del vigoroso fuego de los sitiados, y llegaron hasta la puerta del castillo viejo, siguiendo a los sitiados, con tal ímpetu que de todos entraron en el interior del castillo.

At the precise moment at which the Allies were making significant progress in the attack on the castle, Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt fell mortally wounded. As in Castellví's text, it is worth remarking that



the loss of an officer, especially if he had charisma among the troops, as was the case of Prince George, might plunge the soldiers into a state of considerable disruption.

En el tiempo de este fuego quedó herido de una bala el príncipe en una rodilla, en el mismo lugar que en Flandes años antes había recibido otra. Le tocó una arteria. Prosiguió el avance, despreció el golpe, animando al combate. Poco después se ató un pañuelo. Faltóle el vigor y quedó inhábil al valor. Le retiraron a casa de María la Pastelera, en el declivio del monte. Murió dos horas después en los brazos del ayudante general Leopoldo Errigo de Fortínez [sic], de cuyo manuscrito de las campañas que hizo en Cataluña debe la posteridad quedar informada de diferentes particularidades.

Herido el príncipe y retirado, la gente de su mando, a cuyo frente les inflamaba con el ejemplo, empezó a confundirse, retrocediendo de la empresa. La duración del fuego de más de dos horas dio tiempo de recobrase los generales de la plaza del impensado suceso. Marcharon a socorrer el castillo con 600 infantes, mandados por el general marqués de Risbourg, precediendo el conde de la Ribera con 200 irlandeses de su regimiento. Éste introdujo en el foso del castillo los irlandeses. Faltaban guías a los ingleses. Creyeron por el lenguaje ser los irlandeses de los suyos; éstos cortaron el cuerpo más adelantado de todo el de los aliados; al tiempo que los defensores desde la frente hacían un recio fuego. Rindieron 283 de los aliados; de los holandeses, el sargento mayor Van der Vost, los capitanes Rik y Jaucourt, tres tenientes, dos alféreces, el capitán de Ahumada, 30 soldados, los demás ingleses, y en toda la acción perdieron los aliados más de 500 hombres y los sitiados hasta 180. Quedó el coronel Arlen prisionero.

At the same time, Archduke Charles began to share out military commissions among Austriacist Catalans who came to Montjuïc to participate in the fighting. Notably, as both the Allied troops and defenders were exhausted after the former fights, Catalan reinforcements proved to be decisive in conquering the castle. Finally, the joint action of ground troops and the English fleet dismantled the Bourbon soldiers' stiff defence, who surrendered on September 17th.

En este tiempo el príncipe Enrique de Darmstadt rehízo la gente y con grande desnudo ganó terreno con dos avances. Milord Peterborough animaba los suyos. Les dijo en alta voz: «Morir o vencer, que hoy será de nosotros la gloria». Milord inflamaba el ardor con el ejemplo. Consideró propio lo que antes juzgaba ajeno triunfo. El vigoroso esfuerzo de Milord hacía persistir en el empeño. No obstante, avivado más el esfuerzo de los sitiados y fatigada la gente de la duración del combate, fue precisado a desistir del empeño. Se fortificó a la punta del baluarte del Rey que mira a Santa Madrona y se apostó al mismo tiempo en la obra nueva dicha la Ferrería, unido ya el cuerpo de Stanhope, que llegando tarde



no pudo apostarse entre el castillo y la plaza e impedir el socorro al castillo. Milord recibió una leve herida. El príncipe Enrique, pasado el sombrero. Los aliados desde luego volvieron contra el castillo tres cañones que hallaron en la obra nueva. Milord luego después de herido el príncipe Jorge mandó desembarcar 1500 ingleses de la marina, 270 holandeses con artillería, que a las 12 del mediodía llegaron a Montjuïc. Introducido el socorro en el castillo, pasaron a la ciudad con el triunfo de los prisioneros. El teniente coronel don José Clauser, flamenco, que bajó luego a dar el aviso a Velasco de estar introducido el socorro, Velasco le respondió: «Con todo esto los ingleses se mantienen en la lengua de sierpe y Ferrería». Clauser respondió: «Si V. Ex. quiere, con 100 caballos y alguna infantería yo me pondré en paraje de donde les obligaré a desamparar la obra exterior que ocupan, que será en la Cruz Cubierta; o llevaré a V. E. prisionero al archiduque. Esto lo considero muy conseguible, porque he advertido que los ingleses desde su real marchan a Montjuïc». Velasco le dijo: «Ejecutadlo». Al salir de la puerta le repitió: «Hacedlo. Advertid que esto que permito ha de ser con la suposición que no ha de perderse un hombre y habéis de responder de ello». Clauser, dicen, entendió el enigma. Le respondió: «No me empeño a eso». Los sitiados no emprendieron desalojar los sitiadores, que se fortificaron a su placer. Era practicable el intento, porque el abrigo de la artillería del castillo les daba esperanza y la fatigada tropa de tan obstinado combate facilitaba el logro.

Entre 3 y 4 de la tarde don Antonio Peguera, seguido de la mayor parte, pasó a ocupar la montaña de Montjuïc entre la ciudad y el castillo. Los Puig, don Antonio Perera y José Antonio Martí marcharon a la vanguardia con 350 hombres. A ellos seguía con 800 don Antonio. Desalojaron la gente de los sitiados, que se retiraron después de hora y media de combate al foso de la ciudad. Ocuparon el baluarte de la ermita de San Pedro Mártir con dos cañones. Fue el primero que penetró, don Francisco de Llar, joven de 15 años. Señorearon todo el declivio del monte hasta tiro de fusil de la plaza. Ocupado San Bertrán, hicieron una humeada. Se separaron ocho navíos que pusieron áncora a la parte del río Llobregat. Desembarcaron pertrechos y cañones. Milord dio disposición para la puntual paga de los cabos de Vic y su gente. Lo continuó en todo el mes de octubre, que se dividió la gente y se formaron regimientos. El día 15 los aliados empezaron a batir el castillo con 10 cañones y arrojaron bombas a la obra interior con cuatro morteros. La noche del 14 resolvió Velasco recobrar la comunicación de la plaza con el castillo. La oscuridad de la noche favoreció el llegar a manos del gobernador de Montjuïc, coronel don Charletta Caraccioli, el orden de hacer una salida al amanecer del día 15. El gobernador salió del castillo, auxiliado de la gente que había salido de la plaza; encendiéndose un vigoroso fuego, abrióse paso; volvieron a la plaza la gente que no era precisa en Montjuïc.



A las 8 del día los de Vic y paisanos ocuparon otra vez la montaña. A las 10 y media de la noche empezó el bombardeo desde el mar y puso en confusión a la ciudad. El 16 los sitiadores añadieron hasta 15 cañones y 8 morteros contra el castillo. A la noche continuó el bombardeo contra la ciudad. Milord supo por un desertor el puesto donde estaba la pólvora. Informó a un hábil bombardero holandés, nombrado Derker. El 17 continuó el fuego y el bombardero tiró con tanto acierto que a las 3 de la tarde prendió el fuego en 60 barriles de pólvora. Voló parte del lienzo de muralla que hace frente al mar y a Barcelona y la puerta principal y entre las ruinas quedó muerto el gobernador y parte de la guarnición. Los sitiadores ocuparon desde luego por asalto las ruinas. Los sitiados pusieron bandera y se rindieron a discreción en número de 285, 19 oficiales, y tomaron 7 banderas, y luego se canjearon con los prisioneros que había en la plaza.

In this description Castellví probably used Bourbon sources, because the story is almost identical to De la Cruz's version (1706, p. 209-211).

The Prince died of wounds as a result of the fierce clash and the tables of the campaign were simultaneously turned: the conquest of the castle provided the Allies with an excellent basis to besiege the city, which eventually opened its doors to the Austriacists.

The decision to attack

The obstinate efforts of Archduke Charles and Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt to defend the Catalans were undoubtedly the determining factor for the Allied troops to try a daring assault on Montjuïc's defences, a fact acknowledged even by Peterborough's defenders. However, these tried to have the English officer accredited with the attack. The assault enabling Montjuïc castle to be occupied by the Allies was actually led by both Peterborough and Hesse-Darmstadt, as seen in the previous excerpt, but after the Archduke and the Prince had repeatedly requested the English to attack the fortress (Freind, 1707, p. 32-36).

Thus we see it was resolved to embark all the troops for Savoy, which indeed was the first design of his Lordship's Expedition. But the King of Spain taking a sudden resolution to stay by his Catalans, his Lordship [Peterborough] saw himself reduced to this Dilemma, either to go Home without attempting any thing, or take this attempt upon himself, contrary to the opinion of the General Officers and consequently to positive Instructions. His Lordship, who never cared for being a General without doing something, chose rather to trust



to the good nature of his Country, which he hoped would pardon his succeeding in so considerable an Action, though not strictly undertaken by a formal order. My lord therefore now made use only of his own thoughts; and by an Uncommon artifice made that never to be forgotten attack upon fort Monjuick, the very foundation of all our footing in Spain. This, I know, some would attribute to the late Prince of Hesse: That brave Prince indeed had too great a share in the danger of this undertaking; but as he had no Command in the Army, so he was not in the least concerned in the forming of this Design.

Next, Freind continues to defend Peterborough and tries to justify why the decision to attack is not in any official document or war council. This coincides with Castellví's version whereby it was tried to keep the attack secret, even by simulating the whole army's march southwards.

The injudicious, or rather impossible, proposals made by the Prince of Hesse, and insisted upon by him to the last, were the occasion of those unanimous Councils of War against an enterprise which promised such certain ruin: and the freedoms taken in discourse by that Prince had prevented any correspondence, for some time, between him and the Earl of Peterborow. So far was this Project against Monjuick from being proposed by that Prince to his Lordship, that in truth the Earl of Peterborow was forced to make it a secret even to the Court; where resentments were very public and remarkable, upon orders to embark the artillery and the King's baggage, which his Lordship gave out the better to disguise his real design. Nay; the excuse the Earl of Peterborow made to the Prince of Hesse, for inviting him to assist in an action he could not yet acquaint him with, was, that the indispensable necessity of deceiving the Enemy had made him resolve to surprise his Friends in an attempt, with however desperate, was yet the only possible way of carrying on the Siege with success. All I shall observe further upon this Head is that it was owned by all who were there, that had not his Lordship shown an unexampled Vigour and Courage, and exposed himself more than perhaps became one in his Post the Efforts of the Enemy and the mistakes of some of his own people had put this important enterprise beyond all retrieve. So that will be the least justice that can be done to his Lordship on this occasion to say, that few Generals could have accomplished what he did, and that fewer, considering his circumstances, would have attempted it.

It is hard to know whether the attack on Montjuïc was really Peterborough's initiative, but other sources contradict this argument and, therefore, it is probably an excuse made a posteriori to defend the English commander's faltering performance. The controversy is not new and has been discussed extensively by other authors (Trevelyan, 1931).



The Allied victory

As Montjuïc was being attacked, a fierce bombardment of the city began, which undermined the moral of the Bourbon garrison and breach the wall. However, the bombs falling unceasingly on the city caused great harm among civilians:

Los marciales bríos de Milord se enardecieron más con la toma de Montjuïc. Ésta facilitaba la de la plaza y enfervorizaba su ánimo porque la empresa a que iba ceñía sólo en sus sienes el triunfo. La tibieza en obrar se transformó en el más aplicado y vigilante cuidado. Tal es el estímulo de la propia gloria. Empezóse a abrir trinchera contra la plaza la noche del 19, sin permitir breve descanso a la tropa. Aplicáronse 4000 infantes a la orden del general Stanhope, asistiendo Milord hasta el amanecer. Resolvióse batir la plaza con 50 cañones y llegaron hasta 66, y 20 morteros. El mismo día 14 navíos pasaron a ancorar a la parte del río Llobregat. Rindióse la torre del cabo del río con 38 soldados. El mismo día a las 7 de la mañana desde los declivios del monte empezaron con siete morteros a arrojar bombas. Empezó la confusión en la ciudad. Los moradores no encontraron abrigo ni lo hallaba el virrey, que dejando el alojamiento del colegio del Obispo, pasó al monasterio de San Pedro y se refugió en un fuerte a prueba de bomba. El 20 los sitiados conocieron que los sitiadores se dirigían a abrir brecha entre la puerta de San Antonio y puerta de Santa Madrona. Empezaron a tirar líneas para la formación de la cortadura. Este día escribió el virrey dos cartas, una al marqués de Villagarcía, virrey de Valencia, dándole cuenta del estado de la plaza, para que se apresurase la marcha de la caballería; la otra, al teniente general don José Salazar, para que incesantemente marchase aunque no fuera más que con 600 caballos. Le advertía los señales y conducta para introducirse en la plaza. Este oficial no llegó a Lérida hasta 29 de septiembre, que halló la plaza rendida, como veremos. Estas cartas fueron interceptadas de los sitiadores en 22 que, copiadas de sus originales de los manuscritos de don Francisco Casamitjana, informaran al lector, que son como se leen al fin del año. El 21 los sitiadores empezaron a batir desde dos baterías, una de siete cañones y otra de ocho. La primera, en el cementerio de los judíos; la otra, bajo la fuente de la Satalia. A la noche empezó de entrambas partes un vigoroso fuego de la fusilería y continuó el bombardeo de tierra y mar.

La noche del 21 al 22 los sitiadores perficionaron dos grandes baterías de 42 cañones y al amanecer empezaron a batir la torre y arruinaron los parapetos de la muralla. A las 8 de la noche empezaron cinco balandras a arrojar bombas, y una llegó a la Cruz de Jesús. Las bombas penetraban toda la ciudad y los moradores no encontraban refugio, y en el espacio de día y noche arrojaron 380 bombas. El 23 los sitiadores empezaron a batir el lienzo de la muralla de San Pablo, arruinando las obras muertas.



Desmontaron 10 cañones de la plaza. Los sitiados entendieron era el blanco abrir la brecha. Continuaron con esfuerzo el trabajo de una grande cortadura. Crecía el horror porque en todas las partes de la ciudad las bombas ocasionaban desgracias.



Barcelona's landscape at the time of the battle (ICC)

Finally, the situation became unbearable for the defenders and the Allies called on the garrison to surrender, considering that it was feasible to come into the city through the breach, and that at any time they could launch a general assault that would surely succeed. After some hesitation, the city formally surrendered on October 9th 1705.

El 29 adelantaron los trabajos y continuó el fuego y a las 11 empezó el bombardeo desde el mar y a la noche arrojaron un gran número de piedras a la brecha. A las 9 de la noche calmó el bombardeo desde el mar y el de tierra arrojó muchas bombas a la cortadura. El 30 al amanecer continuó el disparo de la artillería y una bomba dio fuego a alguna pólvora en la cortadura y maltrató 20 soldados. El fuego de los sitiados era lento, pasáronse a la plaza dos bombarderos, que en ella no los había, y luego formaron una batería en la huerta de San Pablo. Dos bombas cayeron en el Hospital y maltrataron 10 personas. Los administradores pidieron permiso para pasar uno al campo a rogar no se arrojasen bombas en aquel pío edificio. No lo consintió Velasco. Los días 1, 2 y 3 fue muy continuo el fuego; el de los sitiados, muy lento. Los sitiadores arrojaron 480 bombas. La guarnición estaba muy cansada y la mayor parte era tropa nueva. Desertaba en gran número a la menor ocasión. La brecha era muy capaz. Faltábale poco para ser perficionada. El día 3 los sitiados apostaron en la brecha 100 soldados españoles y mayor número de italianos. Los sitiadores tuvieron aviso que en la cortadura habían preparado diferentes artificios de fuego para el caso de asalto. Dos días continuos dirigieron el bombardeo a la cortadura. Un desertor informó al mismo bombardero holandés que dio



fuego a Montjuïc de los lugares donde los sitiados en la cortadura tenían la pólvora y pertrechos. Tiró con tanto acierto que a las 8 de la noche una bomba dio fuego a un barril. De allí se comunicó a otros y a las minas que tenían prevenidas los sitiados en caso de asalto. El estruendo fue grande. Hizo estremecer toda la ciudad. Muchos soldados fueron maltratados. Los demás de la cortadura y muralla retrocedieron hasta la Rambla, desamparando los puestos. No lo advirtieron los sitiadores, que sin costa hubieran ocupado la brecha, muralla y cortadura. A las 9 de la noche tuvo Milord el aviso del estrago y a las 10 envió un trompeta a la plaza con una papel a Velasco. En él le decía que sabía el estado de la plaza, el número y calidad de las tropas, el quedar arruinadas las defensas; que sabía el estrago que había padecido la guarnición; que no ignoraba que la brecha tenía 74 pasos geométricos; que estaba perficionada y capaz de admitir un asalto general; que le prevenía que en el presente estado era temeraria la defensa; que por último aviso le daba 5 horas de tiempo para resolverse a entregarle la plaza; que le ofrecía honrosa capitulación; que no ejecutándolo en el término prefijo no le daría capitulación y que le trataría con el último rigor de la guerra.



Engraving showing the English fleet which took part in the conquest of Barcelona in 1705 (ICC).



BARCELONA 1706

The defence against the Bourbon troops besieging Barcelona in 1706 was undoubtedly the most successful action of the Allied army in the Peninsula. The attack aimed to regain Barcelona for Philip V and Louis XIV's side, and it would immediately have sealed the defeat of King Charles III and his subjects; however, the Allied success led to the total disintegration of the Bourbon troops, so the Allies managed to take the war menace from the Catalan border to the heart of Spain.



Siege of Barcelona 1706, according to Tindal (ICC).

The attack on Montjuïc castle

Despite the initial success for the Allies in 1705, the limited number of Allied troops covering the Eastern front of the Peninsula was a problem that did not go unnoticed by their commanders. The area to be defended was extremely elongated (Catalonia, Valencia and part of Aragon), so the units were dispersed throughout the country. In addition to this, the inadequate defensive structure of Barcelona was very vulnerable to attacks after the previous year's fights (Castellví, 1997-2002, vol. II, p. 83-93).

En estos días no eran pocas las zozobras que desvelaban a los dos príncipes competidores. Al rey Carlos no le era oculto lo indefenso de la plaza ni las instancias que continuaba el príncipe Antonio a inclinarse a salir de ella. Estas insinuaciones le eran molestas. Teníale cuidadoso la desconfianza que podía temerse de parte de las tropas porque no pocos de ellas habían tomado violentos el partido cuando se ocupó Barcelona y lo calificaba la desertión consistiendo la defensa únicamente en los naturales.

On the other side, a possible Bourbon offensive would have to try to control the Catalan hinterland, something very difficult because of the large contingent of *miquelets*² controlling mountain areas.

² Miquelets was the name given in Catalonia to mountain fusiliers (light infantry). Contrary to popular belief, at this time the miquelets were not a militia, but a professional light



Al rey Felipe le afligía el ver coronadas las montañas de milicias catalanas a quienes por su trato y afabilidad personal había procurado honrar y complacer. Ignoraba las severidades de su Ministerio y le causaba horror la resolución e inflamaba su blando ánimo. Vivía cuidadoso y con recelos de permanecer constantes los catalanes en asistir al rey Carlos. Consideraba que esto dilataría el asedio, que la permanencia en sostener el empeño daría motivo a las escuadras aliadas a llegar a tiempo de socorrer al rey Carlos. Este príncipe incesantemente aplicaba lo halagüeño y afable con todos a fin de empeñarlos a acelerar las disposiciones y demás importancias.

In these circumstances, the Bourbon army started the campaign by assembling on the Catalan border, and advanced without much opposition to the outskirts of Barcelona at the beginning of April 1706. The Count of Tessé was the French officer who led the siege, which should not have been difficult a priori, given the great disproportion between the Bourbon forces (about 28,000 soldiers) and the Austriacists' (6,000 to 7,000, including the Coronela).³

Tessé decided that the first action of the attackers had to be to capture Montjuïc, since it had been previously shown that once the fortress got conquered, the city surrendered in a relatively short time.

El día 3 muy de mañana el ejército del rey Felipe se acampó en Sarriá. El que mandaba el duque de Noailles, a la torre de Bellafilla. En este tiempo se unieron las partidas de uno y otro ejército. Luego el rey Felipe llamó a consejo en su presencia. Asistieron todos los tenientes generales y el ingeniero mayor Mr. de la Parra. Se dividieron los votos, causa las más veces de ser perjudiciales al soberano las resultas. El mariscal de Tessé y Mr. de la Parra fueron de sentir emprender la reducción de Montjuïc, alegando que las fortificaciones eran débiles, imperfectas y arruinadas; que en el breve espacio de tres días se ocuparía el castillo; que este impensado golpe haría descaecer del todo el ánimo de los barceloneses, de quienes el rey Carlos se prometía los mayores esfuerzos; que esto obligaría al rey Carlos a salirse de Barcelona y facilitaría a menos costa la rendición; que atacándose primero Barcelona, sucediendo la dilación que era precisa para abrir brecha, los naturales y milicias se habilitarían en el manejo y que sucediendo el caso de rendirse Barcelona las más de las gentes se retirarían a Montjuïc, donde harían los mayores esfuerzos, esperando el socorro que se prometían; que, disminuido el ejército en la empresa de Barcelona, no quedaría fuerza para atacar con vigor Montjuïc, reparadas con el tiempo en más defensa las fortificaciones; que, ocupando Montjuïc, desmayarían los ánimos de los catalanes

infantry unit. In the contemporary English documents they also appear as Maccalas or Micalets.

3 La Coronela was the urban militia of Barcelona, organized according to city guilds.



porque el común del pueblo consideraba aquella irregular fortificación el más fuerte escudo de la Cataluña, que la experiencia había enseñado haberlo concebido así en el año antecedente porque luego que los aliados ocuparon Montjuïc había comparecido en el campo delante de Barcelona un gran número de catalanes; que en tanto que se expugnaría Montjuïc podrían introducirse emisarios en Barcelona que infundiesen a los barceloneses pacíficas resoluciones del rey, asegurándoles que se restablecerían con entera satisfacción de los comunes las infracciones de las leyes y privilegios que pretendiesen haberse alterado, retirándose los moradores a sus casas y dejar obrar las tropas y que podrían infundir las mismas voces en los pueblos.

At the beginning of the siege, the Bourbon cordon was still flawed and even 600 mountain fusiliers, under the command of Colonels Bac de Roda and Moliner i Rau, were able to enter Barcelona. Then a force of 5,000 French and Spanish soldiers tried to position itself between the mountain and the city, and occupied the external convent of Santa Madrona, near the Drassanes (the shipyard).

En este tiempo sólo presidiaban a Montjuïc cuatro compañías de la Coronela, 200 hombres de la Guardia Real y 200 fusileros, parte de las milicias de Vilafranca y Mataró. 300 fusileros que guardaban aquellas avenidas dieron sus descargas y se retiraron a la línea de comunicación y desde allí pasaron a reforzar Montjuïc. Luego que los sitiados conocieron el designio, marcharon desde la línea de comunicación a socorrer Montjuïc 300 hombres de la guardia catalana. Los fusileros mandaba don Antonio Desvalls. 400 de Bac de Roda, siguiendo las referidas milicias. A la novedad del avance marchó el general conde de Uhlefeld con 600 hombres de las tropas al socorro, siguiéndole un considerable número de paisanos y muchos de los ciudadanos. Luego se hizo pregón en la ciudad que las gentes que no estuviesen en cuerpos acudiesen a la línea de comunicación con sus armas a llevar que comer y otros a acudir a la atarazana a subir pertrechos y otros a subir agua que faltaba en el castillo.

Therefore, the efforts of both Allied regular troops and new Catalan fighters, along with the cooperation of civilians and particularly women, avoided the isolation of the castle, as they made possible to continuously bring supplies and ammunition from the city to the fortress. As can be seen from the troops referred to in the account, the bulk of the fighting during this stage was undoubtedly borne by Catalan soldiers, since most English units were in Valencia, away from this battle. Throughout the siege, fusilier units garrisoned the city and the castle, as mentioned in Castellví's text.

It is worth noting the presence of Antoni Desvalls as a high-rank officer at the service of Charles III. Desvalls, later Marquis del Poal, would be one



of the leaders of the Austriacist army during the 1713-1714 campaign, as commander of the troops outside Barcelona and responsible for the Catalan victory in Talamanca (Hernández and Rubio, 2009).

On the other hand, the epic nature of the siege in the imagery of the period should not be underrated, as the two young monarchs were there trying to boost the morale of the troops with their presence.

Para más animar los naturales entre 3 y 4 de la tarde el rey Carlos, seguido de todos los generales y mucha nobleza, subió a reconocer Montjuïc. Registró todas las fortificaciones, habló con blando y majestuoso estilo a soldados y paisanos. Esto encendía más el ánimo y revivió el combate a las partes de Santa Madrona que lo arrojado pasó los límites del valor y pisaba los de la temeridad. Siguió la línea de comunicación y toda la muralla de la ciudad y en el tiempo que pasaba el rey delante del baluarte de los Tallers, llegaban al foso las milicias del partido de Manresa capitaneadas por don José y don Melchor Solá de Guardiola y por don Juan Bautista y don Francisco Cortada de Manlleu en número de 600, que penetraron entre los sitiadores y al anochecer se introdujo en la plaza el coronel Mas de Roda con 500 fusileros en el tiempo que las milicias de Manresa voceaban con expresiones de alegría de hallarse en la estacada que oía el rey desde la muralla.

Although the Bourbon fleet disputed the control of the seas, for the great English fleet was in Valencia, regular Allied units finally began to come into Barcelona and boosted defenders' morale. English regiments of Charlemont (foot) and Conyngham (dragoons) went to garrison Montjuïc, while the Foot Guards were stationed as reserves on the Rambla and other dragoons' units guarded the communications between the castle and the city. In the following days, continuous attacks on the siege works were made by the defenders, and while some of these actions were quite successful, siege works continued until the night of April 21st, when the Bourbon troops unleashed the expected assault on the castle, after the failed attempt on the 11th and the constant bombardment from Bourbon batteries and vessels located near the mountain.

Antes de las 9 de la noche se empezó el avance, que pareció no dilatarlo a la mañana del 22 por no dar tiempo a los sitiados a reparar las defensas. Se ejecutó con tanto silencio que al advertirlo los defensores, ya señoreaban lo alto de las brechas. Empezó el fuego con ardor y continuó con tesón, sin poder los sitiadores de la derecha superar aquellas defensas. Tres veces lo repitió el general Puységur. La tropa de los sitiados se obstinó en la defensa que, enardecida de la emulación de ser los defensores de las reales guardias catalana y inglesa, daba más obstinación al combate. En este tiempo el teniente general marqués de Aitona al segundo avance penetró la izquierda de la dilatada brecha del baluarte de San



Felipe, cortó la retirada a la tropa aliada y hizo algunos prisioneros. Los sitiadores, ocupado aquel terreno, pasaron a cortar la retirada a los sitiados que aún defendían los nuevos trabajos de la lengua de sierpe y buey, que, enardecidos en la defensa, no advirtieron con la obscuridad de la noche internados los sitiadores. Confundidos unos con otros, empezó otro sangriento combate. En este tiempo milord Donegal, comandante de Montjuïc, que había bajado a la plaza, advertido de los tiros, subió con precipitación al fuerte. Enfurecido o de su descuido o de la desgracia del suceso, con 400 infantes puesto a su frente se arrojó espada en mano, pasando al baluarte de San Felipe. Al advertir monsieur de Fimarcon este arrojó, le dejó paso franco hasta cerrar con su gente la retroguardia de Milord. Entonces dio con grande ímpetu sobre los sitiados de que, advertido el mariscal de Tessé que ya ocupaba el baluarte, hizo marchar tambor batiente cuatro batallones. En esta pelea sin querer cuartel murió milord Donegal de tres heridas. Los sitiados se retiraron confusamente a un cordón que habían formado más interior de piedra y tierra. La acción duró cerca de 3 horas y el fuego hasta el amanecer. Al acabar el combate subieron a Montjuïc el mariscal Uhlefeld y general Saint-Amant. En esta acción los sitiados perdieron de la Guardia catalana 250, de la Guardia inglesa 150 con tres banderas y todos los oficiales, a la excepción de un alférez y entre ellos el coronel Cook, su comandante; de los holandeses y alemanes, hasta 280.

Although defenders belonged to the elite troops of Catalan and English armies, at this phase of the siege the situation within the castle seemed unbearable. Therefore, it was decided the garrison had to leave the fortress and go strengthen city's defences, but civilians supporting the besieged troops did not understand this military decision and set off a surreal, confusing series of events, in which civilians decided to defend the castle and set aside the actions of regular soldiers.

Empezóse a retirar los pertrechos del castillejo. Lo advirtieron luego las mujeres que acudieron desde el amanecer a las atarazanas a cargarse de pertrechos para subir a Montjuïc, como acostumbraban. Advirtieron que bajaban pertrechos. Empezaron a esparcir la voz que Montjuïc se abandonaba, circunstancia que unida a la voz, que quieren muchos, que en estos días se había esparcido de que dentro de la plaza se habían introducido diferentes emisarios que con pretexto de celo al servicio del rey Carlos inspiraban al pueblo voces, manchando la conducta del gobierno y generales que les querían sacrificar, y que el rey se ausentaría, fueron la causa del alboroto, infundiendo en las mujeres esta idea. Sea o no sea verdad, es cierto que una mujer llamada Francisca Paiell con otras de su séquito empezó muy de mañana a vocear: «A las armas, a las armas, hermanos, que desamparan a Montjuïc». A las 7 dadas, bajaron del castillo algunos paisanos y mujeres y dieron noticia de ocupar los sitiadores las obras exteriores y de retirarse los pertrechos. Crecieron las



voces en toda la ciudad. Uni6se un considerable n6mero de la m6s inferior gente que no estaba empleada. Crecieron las voces: «A las armas, que fraguan traici6n contra el rey y contra nosotros, vamos todos a Montjuic». Y en n6mero de m6s de 500 fueron a las casas de la Diputaci6n y Ciudad gritando que se enarbolasen las banderas de San Jorge y Santa Eulalia. Se aument6 el numero y uno de entre ellos grit6: «Vamos primero al rey a pedirle licencia y que nos se6ale cabos». Pasaron a San Pedro donde se hallaba el rey. Sali6 a lo alto a dejarse ver. Empezaron a gritar: «Se6or, pedimos licencia para sacar las banderas y subir a Montjuic». Confundi6ronse los cortesanos. La Guardia catalana no permiti6 entrarse ninguno. El rey con constancia de 6nimo considerando los da6os que pod6an seguirse les dijo les daba licencia, que les dar6a cabos.

This dangerous situation led to an absurd assault on the Bourbon troops, which were much better prepared and commanded than the civil protagonists of such attack.

Embistieron a mont6n a los sitiadores con tan acelerado ardor en los ramales a la parte de las obras exteriores que penetraron en las l6neas y obligaron a los defensores a retirar tres banderas que ten6an enarboladas. Al mismo tiempo, Agust6n de C6dol y Roset, que segu6a al diputado con n6mero de fusileros y paisanos, penetr6 hasta la l6nea de la casa de Mar6a la Pastelera. Los sitiadores rechazaron el 6mpetu de los sitiados y intentaron penetrar en la l6nea de comunicaci6n de los sitiados para cortar la retirada a la gente que hab6a penetrado en las l6neas. No consiguieron el intento, impedido del fuego continuo de los sitiados. En este tiempo lleg6 el general Uhlefeld con 500 hombres y con cari6o empez6 a persuadir a los ciudadanos a contenerse. Con todo, no pudo reprimir la furia. Dieron otro avance, ocuparon alg6n terreno y fueron precisados a abandonarle, porfiando obstinadamente y los estragos que padec6an les enfurec6an en vez de servirles de escarmiento y conducta a combatir con m6s precauci6n y ordenanza.

In the confusion even the *Conseller en Cap*,⁴ Francesc Nicolau de Santjoan, died because a citizen shot him to avoid him stopping the bells tolling for *sometent*.⁵ Finally, the fortress was evacuated on the 24th, after 21 days of fighting. The successful defence of this Catalan stronghold was decisive because, despite being eventually conquered, the Bourbon army suffered many casualties and the Allies received enough time to send reinforcements to Barcelona.

4 Head of Barcelona City Council.

5 The *sometent* was a Catalan paramilitary militia-like organization, separated from the regular professional army, created in the Middle Ages to self-protect civilians and defend the land during wartime. More broadly, *cridar a sometent* (to call for *sometent*) means to toll the bells with the signal for raising the militia.



The Allied reaction

Meanwhile, on April 17th Allied troops gathered in the area near Martorell, under the command of Lord Peterborough and Prince Henry of Hesse-Darmstadt, and small groups of mountain fusiliers hastened to take control of mountain passes all around Catalonia. Seeing that Barcelona did not appear to be in imminent danger of surrender, Peterborough wanted to minimise the risk for the fleet and troops, and therefore his initial orders intended the bulk of reinforcements to land at Tarragona instead of going directly to Barcelona, as expressed in this letter, written on April 22nd 1706 (Ministry at Home, 1712, p. 98-99):

The destiny of Spain depends upon the arrival of thirty of her majesties ships before the taking of Barcelona: to see the fleet there, that is like to decide this important affair, would make one mad. There is not above eighteen ships of force, and about ten frigates, and two bomb-vessels; it is very unfortunate, that by the end of April a competent number of the forty sail designed to stay at Lisbon for our relief in spring, should not be in these seas by this time, when the great fleet may almost be expected, which the Queen has written to the king of Spain sailed the 12th of March.

The circumstances of the Sea are so uncertain, that without forming any judgment, I only lament our ill fortune; for I cannot conceive any other enterprize could be taken in hand, that could anyways prevent the arrival of the succours and the fleet for an hour; if any such have taken place, the loss of Spain, the risk of the King's person, and the sacrifice of all her majesties troops, is owing to absurd a measure; and as I always informed our ministry, I can only say, our hard fate was that our destiny depended upon others, not ourselves, for I am confident we have done our duty; but in our present condition I only offer my advice, to pretend to more without being upon the place, or apprized of all circumstances, would be very indiscreet: I still continue to think that the Men of War [vaixells de guerra] should get rid of Transport-ships, and all incumbrance, before they come near the enemy, it being uncertain how their number may increase every day: so that a descent at Veneros [Vinaròs], a little beyond Peniscola, or at Tortosa to choose, at least no nearer than Tarragona, is what I have advised already, and continue in the same mind.

However, Peterborough's forces were much smaller than those of Tessé, so it did not seem feasible for breaking the siege cordon around the city. In addition to the regular troops, many mountain fusiliers and somatenas fighters disturbed the Bourbon rearguard, harassing food and ammunition convoys and threatening their lines of communication, according to Castellví (1997-2002, vol. II, p. 93-116):



El día 24 entraron en la plaza 30 paisanos con 7 prisioneros que tomaron dentro de sus tiendas. El 27 Milord hizo revista de las tropas en San Cugat. Se halló con 800 caballos de los regimientos de don Rafael y don Juan Nebot, Moragues, de Morrás, y un escuadrón de Samper, dragones ingleses; infantería, 4 batallones ingleses muy disminuidos, el regimiento de la Reina; fusileros, hasta 1500 y con las milicias repartidas en la circunvalación del campo, hasta 15.000. El 28 llamó a consejo. Tratóse de socorrer Barcelona por tierra, que el socorro que se introducía por el mar era muy costoso. Milord [Peterborough], de quien dependía el todo, alegó que la introducción de socorro por tierra era difícil, que la gente arreglada era poca; que de los fusileros y milicias descendiendo a la llanura no se podía tener seguridad alguna y era necesario mantenerse en las avenidas de los montes, que la primera consideración era mantener aquel pequeño cuerpo para defender la persona del rey en el caso de resolver pasar a Tarragona, que así lo había advertido al rey; que la introducción de socorro aunque costosa si era precisa, debía fiarse a la contingencia del mar poco a poco. El general Nebot alegó que el socorro podía introducirse a menos costo por tierra, que esto alentaría más los sitiados y mitigaría el ardor de los sitiadores. Nebot propuso el plano por la parte del río Besós que aprobaron los concurrentes, a la excepción de Milord, que sólo por complacer convino en ello, sin la intención de ejecutarlo. Antes del anochecer del mismo día mandó marchar las tropas y seguido del general Nebot se puso a la frente. Mandó seguir los fusileros y entrada la noche llegaron a la orilla del río Besós sin ser sentidos. Nebot previno a Milord que pasado el río debía combatirse con la gran guardia. Milord mandó retroceder las tropas y declaró se introduciría por mar el socorro; que las milicias y fusileros sin el abrigo de las tropas quedarían sin acción y no incomodarían a los sitiadores; que la plaza no necesitaba de numeroso socorro; que manteniéndose las tropas abrigando las milicias, los sitiadores no podrían valerse de los víveres del país, ni abastecer su campo, donde se padecía escasez. Milord, seguido de la caballería y del general Nebot, pasó dos veces a reconocer el cuartel de los sitiadores a la parte de Besós y deliberó que el príncipe Enrique con 80 ingleses entrase en Barcelona. Lo ejecutó la noche del día 29 al 30 y entró en el puerto a las 2 y media de la mañana. El arribo del príncipe causó en la ciudad mucha alegría, que el solo nombre de esta familia animaba a los menos briosos al peligro.

The attack to the city

Finally, after having secured Montjuïc, the Bourbon troops prepared to begin siege operations around the city of Barcelona. Sappers' work started from the slopes of the mountain, with the intention of assaulting the city on its southern side, near the mountain. Meanwhile, defenders



continued to come out with cavalry and fusilier units to ruin the siege works; the besieged were motivated because the English fleet, finally spurred on by the imminent danger that threatened the city, was coming from Lisbon to relieve it:

Desamparado el castillo, los sitiadores, amanecido el día 26, enarbolaron a lo alto de él sus vencedoras banderas. Costoso sitio, inútil conquista poco ventajosa al rey Felipe por la lamentable pérdida de 3000 valerosos soldados, de 4500 bombas y un gran número de balas; favorable a todas las consideraciones a los sitiados. Los sitiadores empezaron con tanta celeridad la trinchera que este día trabajaron dos ramales. El uno desde la línea de comunicación dirigido a la parte del mar; el otro bajo de Santa Madrona cerca de la Cruz Cubierta, dirigiéndola al baluarte y puerta de San Antonio, fortificando con tres ramales el declivio de la montaña que miraba a la ciudad y cubrían el trabajo y el mismo día con los cañones que batieron a Montjuïc empezaron con 4 distintas baterías el disparo a impedir el trabajo de los sitiados en los lienzos de la muralla que corre desde San Antonio al baluarte del Rey y Atarazanas. Maltrataban los trabajadores porque las baterías del declivio de la montaña dominaban y descubrían los trabajos. Este día a las 4 de la tarde los sitiados hicieron una vigorosa salida con 300 granaderos y 500 infantes mandados por los coroneles Kaulbars y Castiglioni. Se ejecutó con tanto coraje que deshicieron el ramal de la trinchera de la parte de Santa Madrona, desalojaron las tropas que cubrían los trabajadores.

On the other hand, Charles rejected the advice of most of the Allied officers and politicians, who urged him to embark and leave the city because of the risk of the city falling and the King being captured by his enemies. Meanwhile, the casualty list continued to grow on both sides due to the ongoing skirmishes, in which Desvall's mountain fusiliers stood out. The tactics employed in this type of fighting were something halfway between open field clashes and siege warfare, and are extremely interesting, especially those used by the Allies. The combination of cavalry with miquelets allowed quick attacks to be organised to put Bourbon troops in check.



French map showing the fortifications of Barcelona in 1705-1706 (ICC). It clearly shows the close connection between Montjuïc and the wall section between Sant Antoni and Santa Madrona gates.



El día 6 a las 9 de la mañana el general Camprodón con dos escuadrones de dragones y con la mayor parte de los fusileros y milicias que mandaba don Antonio Desvalls, a quien seguían los coroneles de fusileros Bac y Mas de Roda, pasaron a desalojar los sitiadores de una casa que ocupaban muy ventajosa para facilitar por aquella parte la introducción de socorro en la plaza. El capitán don Jaime Carrera fue mandado a sostener los fusileros que penetraron el edificio y pasaron a cuchillo la guarnición y al mismo tiempo impidieron el socorro. Presidieron la casa con la compañía de voluntarios de don Antonio Caraccioli y fusileros. Los sitiadores junto a Gracia unieron un cuerpo y cargaron sobre los sitiados. Pasó el príncipe Enrique con tres escuadrones a sostenerles. Animó de nuevo los fusileros y paisanos. Seis escuadrones de los sitiadores de la vanguardia deshicieron un escuadrón de los sitiados. El príncipe detuvo el ímpetu de los sitiadores. Animó de nuevo a los fusileros que, favorecidos del terreno, daban continuas descargas. La caballería de los dos partidos llegó a mezclarse.

The event that would reverse the whole campaign was about to happen: the arrival of the English fleet in Barcelona, commanded by Admiral John Leake. It had made a long journey to help the Catalan capital, as related by Castellví. A curious attempt at bribery by Bourbon supporters took place during the trip, but it was refused by the Admiral without even thinking.

Volvió a Lisboa y en 18 de abril, que se le unió una escuadra de 14 navíos y se halló con 30 navíos de guerra, llegando en Lisboa en 15 de abril el aviso que el rey Felipe pasaba a sitiar Barcelona. El 19 llamó a consejo y se resolvió que las tropas aliadas que acababan de llegar sobre navíos de transporte pasasen a los navíos de guerra y luego se tomase el rumbo a Cataluña. Al vicealmirante caballero Byng, que a 5 de abril con 13 navíos de guerra y 150 de transporte que se había hecho a la vela desde Santa Elena y llegado a Lisboa el 17, se le dejó orden de seguirle luego que llegasen los cuatro navíos que escoltaban las tropas de Irlanda, dejando los transportes y asimismo los cuatro que se esperaban de Gibraltar donde debían embarcar dos batallones. Leake se hizo a la vela la noche del 19. Los seis navíos que cruzaban las alturas de Cartagena y Cádiz recibieron duplicados avisos de milord Peterborough del estado de Barcelona. Dieron aviso al almirante Leake, a quien en las alturas de Cádiz se le acercó un barco genovés. En él había un extranjero que le hizo la proposición que deteniéndose todo el mayo en los mares de Andalucía sin pasar a Barcelona le entregaría letras de 100.000 doblones de regalo. Éste era un emisario de Mr. Amelot y princesa de Ursinos. Despreció el almirante con magnanimidad el ofrecimiento. ¡Oh!, si este ejemplo fuera imitado de todos los ministros, pocas llaves se encontrarían que abriesen puerta a los arcanos de los gabinetes y cuán más felices serían los ministros y soberanos. Los primeros vincularían en su posteridad aplausos y no ignominias, los segundos lograrían aciertos en las deliberaciones, ventajas en sus dominios y practicarían justicia en



los beneméritos. Detúvose Leake en las alturas de Altea porque su fuerza era débil hasta que se le unió el almirante Byng en 29 de abril, porque no quiso arriesgar empresa de tanta monta. En 28 fueron unidas las escuadras y en 29 dio aviso a milord Peterborough el enviado Stanhope. A los 6 de mayo se avistó la flota a las alturas de Tarragona. Al avistarse la flota a las alturas de Cataluña tocaban en los pueblos las campanas. La noche del día 7 de mayo hubo en Tarragona una especie de alboroto. Llevaba el pueblo en alto un retrato del rey Carlos con antorchas gritando en confusión, mandando salir a las ventanas a los que consideraban del otro partido y les obligaban a que en voz alta dijeran: «¡Viva Carlos III!»

Peterborough changed his mind given the difficulties to introduce overland support. He departed for Vilanova, where he embarked with the rest of the troops. Finally, on May 8th, the Allied fleet came to Barcelona, where it drove away the Bourbon warships and roused the besieged to euphoria.

Pasó la flota a Sitges y Vilanova. Allí se embarcó milord Peterborough, los generales Wills y Palm; embarcaron hasta 500 ingleses. El número de tropas que venía sobre la flota, disminuidas en la larga navegación, no llegaban a 3000 hombres y las que desembarcaron en Barcelona excedían en poco este número. Los almirantes ofrecieron desembarcar hasta 4000 de su marina. El día 8 al amanecer desapareció la flota de las Dos Coronas de delante de Barcelona y las fragatas de los sitiados tomaron tres barcas francesas. El día 8 a las 7 de la mañana los sitiados empezaron a descubrir la armada aliada y cerca de las 10 del día desembarcó milord Peterborough. Consistía la armada en 53 navíos de guerra y muchos de transporte. Desembarcaron los almirantes Leake, Wassenaer, Allmonde y Van der Dussen y el enviado Stanhope y el general de infantería conde de Noyelles al servicio de Holanda con el supuesto que mandaría las tropas del rey Carlos. Luego empezaron a desembarcar las tropas. El rey Carlos, al avistarse el socorro hizo cantar el tedéum en su capilla y después pasó a ver las tropas en el desembarcadero. Después pasó el rey Carlos a la Rambla marchando calle Ancha, calle de San Francisco y se formaron en la Rambla. El rey con toda su corte pasó a verlas y le saludaron con tres salvas. Batieron las banderas: parte de ellas pasaron luego a coronar la muralla a la parte de San Antonio y se dejaron ver de los sitiadores al sonido de diferentes instrumentos. El rey pasó a reconocer los trabajos y apuntó dos morteros. El resto de las tropas se apostó cerca de la brecha y los sitiadores estaban alojados a la punta de la contraescarpa del baluarte de San Antonio. Los sitiados y sitiadores duplicaron los fuegos. El rey pasó a reconocer la batería principal de la cortadura. Los ciudadanos desde luego demostraron su contento agasajándoles con copiosos refrescos, pero fue preciso impedirlo por el daño que podía ocasionar a la salud de la tropa recién llegada de tan dilatada navegación. Fue voz que Milord a la noche hizo volver a embarcarse 2000 hombres y que a la mañana siguiente los hizo desembarcar a fin de abultar el número del socorro.



The arrival of the English fleet was the factor that convinced the Bourbon besiegers that it was impossible to assault the city with a guarantee of success. So they began withdrawing towards the French border, as a march towards Valencia or Aragon could be very dangerous because the Allies controlled the mountain passes with the Catalan mountain fusiliers. Negotiations were conducted between the Marquis of Aitona, a Catalan nobleman at the service of King Philip, and several *miquelets* officers, who agreed to establish a truce that allowed the Bourbon army to leave. In the following excerpt, it is worth pointing out the various arguments that both Austriacist and Bourbon people asserted to justify their choice of sides:

La tropa se hallaba fatigada, la caballería muy flaca, los víveres pocos y el trabajo era incesante para apartar el fuego de milicias y fusileros que por instantes con más tesón se aumentaba. Oponíanse a todos los pasos y la fatiga cansaba en instantes la tropa. El marqués de Aitona atribuyó el aumentarse la incomodidad en el tránsito a los saqueos e incendios que habían ejecutado diferentes partidas. Fue de sentir que si no se entraba en trato con los paisanos que la tropa disminuiría en extremo y sería preciso abandonar parte de los equipajes y enfermos y que la experiencia enseñaba que en instantes se aumentaba el número; que él se ofrecía a entrar en plática con los paisanos y que tenía esperanza que podría su representación contenerlos porque muchos eran vasallos suyos, y conseguir una especie de convenio nada ignominioso a las armas ni al rey, antes justo en la piedad del rey no destruir vasallos ni pueblos de los cuales se consideraba señor y perdonar con magnanimidad las repetidas quejas que pudiera tener de ellos.

El rey Felipe, a quien la benignidad le es natural, alabó su parecer y ofreció su real palabra de hacer observar lo que él conviniese, asegurando no les molestarían las tropas en el tránsito. Éstas debían penetrar los desfiladeros de San Celoni, pueblo que pertenecía al marqués. El paso, a la verdad, era angosto y no poco difícil de superar sin mucha sangre. El marqués, por diferentes sendas, mandó tres paisanos pasar a encontrar a Ramis de San Celoni, hombre de representación en el pueblo, y a ofrecerle que sobre su palabra pasase a encontrarle. Ramis lo ejecutó. El marqués en nombre del rey le prometió que de allí adelante no se cometería hostilidad ni se permitiría a las tropas entrar en ningún pueblo a fin de evitar motivo a la queja. Ramis ofreció al marqués interponerse con el mayor arte que le fuese posible a mitigar el ardor que al tiempo era delicado y los naturales enfurecidos, que él tenía a gloria ser humilde vasallo de la casa de Montcada. Ramis suplicó al marqués que dándole palabra de no ofenderse le permitiese explicarle una duda. El marqués le alagó y le animó a que la dijera. Ramis le habló así: «Mi duda consiste cómo V.E., que es originario catalán, y tantos otros grandes señores



que poseen tantos grandes pueblos en Cataluña y todos les veneran, ayudan a destruir su patria y pueblos, ultrajando las leyes y privilegios que fueron solemnemente jurados». El marqués le respondió: «Ramis mío: España le aclamó rey, Cataluña le juró por su señor. Si los ministros han faltado en algo a hacer observar las leyes el rey ha sido engañado y mal informado, que su recta y real inclinación es ser en todo religioso. Todo se enmendará, que yo y muchos otros somos los más interesados. Vosotros cuidad de la labor de vuestras tierras, que es modo más fácil de conseguir un general y recto restablecimiento, y yo prometo que de todo informaré al rey». Ramis se despidió y le dio palabra que pasaría a encontrar al coronel Mas de Roda, que sabía había salido de Barcelona con 800 fusileros, que ya estaba muy cerca con 3000 paisanos de milicias. Mas de Roda era vasallo del marqués, el cual había encargado a Ramis le dijera de parte suya que dejarían dos cañones y un mortero para que pareciera ser victoriosos y no poner en sospecha su obrar. Ramis pasó a conferir con Mas de Roda bajo pretexto de poder hacer mayor oposición a unos molinos que estaban muy cerca. El coronel Mas consintió en la proposición. Su gente se hallaba muy fatigada. La dividió en diferentes partidas entre los montes y mucha parte de ella mandó marchar a Gerona con el motivo que el ejército quería atacar la plaza. El ejército se puso en marcha, penetró los desfiladeros con poca oposición en San Celoni y se mandó observar una rígida disciplina. El rey agradeció a Aitona este servicio. El mariscal de Tessé dijo al marqués: «Es mucho de admirar que V.E. haya podido contener la insolencia y orgullo de esta nación». El marqués le respondió: «Cada nación y aun cada una de las provincias sujetas a un mismo rey tiene métodos distintos de atraerles, apaciguarles o irritarles. Esta es una nación en cuyos naturales con la urbanidad y civil trato se encuentra cuanto se puede desear de las más racionales naciones; al contrario, irritándoles con severo trato y injuriosas voces son más feroces que los armenios tigres. Es nación que con galantería hace más que la más sujeta nación; con la fuerza aborrecen el predominio y absoluta autoridad porque nacieron y vivieron con libertad». Llegó el ejército a San Feliu de Guíxols. En esta villa y demás de la carrera las tropas encontraron con qué mantenerse y acémilas para conducir los enfermos y llegó el ejército sin incomodidad a descansar en las llanuras del Ampurdán, donde se detuvieron ocho días y el rey Felipe llegó el día 19 de mayo a Prats de Molló.

A Portuguese document shows the magnitude of the tragedy regarding the Bourbon withdrawal, for the awesome amount of materiel left in the siege cordon (Pedrozo, 1706, p.14):

- 140 Peças d'artelharia de bronze, das quaes doze sao de Campanha, & as mais de calibres de 24, 36 & 48 livras de balla.
- 140 Morteiros de bombas de bronze con suas caixas de ferro
- 50 Barris [barrils] de polvora



- 40.000 Ballas d'artelharria de diferentes calibres, sem incluir as que estão no fosso, na brecha, & que se tem junto na Praça [totes les disparades].
- 2.000 Bombas carregadas [la munició dels morters].
- 500 [barrils de] Ballas miudas de arcabuz, & clavinias [carrabines].
- 40.000 Enxadas, icaretas, & varios instrumentos de mover a terra.
- 12.000 Pares de çapatos.
- 2.000 Sacos de farinha [per a les tropes].
- 3.000 Sacos de cevada [per als animals].
- Uma grande porção de trigo.
- 200 Escadas de mão [escales de mà per a l'assalt]
- Carretas, & vários instrumentos de artelharria hu numero grande, ainda se não tem averiguado.



Siege of Barcelona by the Bourbon army, according to Alexander Forbes' French map (ICC).

Peterborough's performance

Lord Peterborough's admirers came out in defence of the Earl's performance during the siege of Barcelona. This provides several interesting ideas to keep in mind when trying to understand the besiegers' keys to success. The first is undoubtedly the arrival of the British fleet with the long-awaited reinforcements. However, according to Freind,



several of Peterborough's decisions also helped to keep the Bourbon troops from conquering the city. Among these, the attempt to destroy the Bourbon line of communications using selected English troops and Catalan *miquelets*. Therefore, as it was subsequently confirmed, the so-called "small war" on the Catalan theatre of war was very important, apart from the large clashes on which military history traditionally focuses (Freind, 1707, p. 36-39).

They who were so ready to attribute the Honour of taking Barcelona to any rather than to the Earl of Peterborow with equal justice deny his Lordship to have had any share in the relief of it, imputing the entire preservation of that place to the timely arrival of the Fleet. This no doubt was very reasonable and fortunate, and what his Lordship was indefatigably industrious in hastening: But considering that the Enemy had for two days before this made a practicable Breach, let any unprejudiced man judge, whether the appearance of our Fleet upon the Coast, could be the only reason of preventing their assault; nay, rather, whether it was not a reason for them to attack the Town, as they might easily have done, with more vigour and dispatch.

The Terror sure must come from some other quarter: And I think we may very impartially assign it to my Lord Peterborow's being posted in' the Mountains with a few Troops of his own, and a good number of Miquelets; which his Lordship disposed of to that advantage, as to cut off the Enemy from any communication with the Country, hinder all their parties from falling out, and give them continual alarms and uneasiness in their Camp. If they had made an Attack upon the Town, they had good reason to fear they might be attacked themselves at the same time from the Mountains: And they were unwilling to venture the disorders that might have happened to their Army, which they designed for other Services as too plainly appeared soon after. It must be conviced, that my Lord had but a very few regular Troops with him. But those who have had a thousand opportunities of being acquainted with his dexterity in surprising, and his peculiar Art of managing weak instruments to elude and confound the force of a strong Enemy, will easily be convinced that the Appearance he made and the Alarms he gave from the hills, was not the effect of Chance and Hurry, but the pure result of a good Conduct: And that to his unwearied Vigilance and uncommon Stratagems, we owe, in a great measure, the Infatuation our Enemies were then possessed with.

So the troops Castellví mentioned as placed outside Barcelona under the orders of Lord Peterborough played a very important role in Bourbon's impossibility of assaulting the city, and the *miquelets* combined with English dragoons and other selected troops were essential for the Allied victory.



However, praising Peterborough can not hide the fact that the attack on Barcelona was possible in part thanks to the English commander's decision to send the bulk of the troops to Valencia, besides the fact that the English fleet was delayed in arriving at the Catalan theatre of war from the Atlantic.

A comparison of the two sieges of Barcelona

From the defence of Lord Peterborough, we can conduct an interesting analysis by comparing both sieges in Barcelona: the Bourbon siege of 1706 and the Allied siege of 1705. First we see how the Allied line of communications was based entirely on the British fleet, while in turn, in 1706 the Bourbon army relied on supplies slowly marching overland, due to the control of Queen Anne's warships in the Mediterranean sea (Freind, 1707, p. 39-41).

Perhaps it may be no disagreeable entertainment to the Reader, if I should make a short comparison of these two Sieges of Barcelona: The Actions being both of them extremely remarkable for the difference not only of the Event, but of the circumstances the Armies were in when they entered upon the Siege, and of the Methods which they used in carrying it on.

When it was attacked by Her Majesty's Arms, the Success was every where despaired of; and the Attempt opposed by many Councils of War: nor without reason, since the Garrison was, double our number in Horse, and almost equal in Foot; And the English Army, unprovided of Artillery and all things else which are thought necessary where a Siege is in good earnest intended, was in a manner supplied with nothing but from our Fleet.

But when the French attacked they had a Royal Army, encouraged by the presence of a King, led by a Mareschal of France, and countenanced by the Fleet under the command at the Lord High Admiral. The Success was presumed certain all over the World, and insured by the most famous Engineer of France; not without very good grounds, for their preparations of all kinds were equal to such hopes: Their Army was numerous, not less than 24.000, their Troops in good condition, and the quantity of Warlike Stores with which they were furnished for that Siege, almost incredible. We may judge of the rest by the Artillery they left behind upon their Retreat, which was upwards of 100 Brass Canon fit for Battery, and mounted upon the proper Field-Carriages.

Then we see how in both cases, unlike what happened during the siege of 1713-1714, the besieging armies began the assault by trying



to conquer the Montjuïc castle. Once this goal had been achieved, their efforts focused on breaching the southern side of the city walls, which correspond roughly to the present-day Avinguda del Paral·lel. The Bourbon siege of Montjuïc was five times longer than the Allied siege, and this is one of the keys to understanding the defeat of the troops commanded by Tessé. Additionally, the comparison provides interesting details about the situation of the Allied camps in 1705 (Freind, 1707, p. 41-44).

The circumstances of the two Armies that severally sat down before this place being so unlike, the Methods by which they attacked it must needs be very different. The very Works thrown up by the French would have destroyed the Earl of Peterborow's Army in labour and fatigue alone. For they begun their Trenches from the bottom of Monjuick-hill at the distance of twice Musket-shot, and continued 23 days battering the Fort with 50 pieces of Cannon, and lost 3000 of their best men in taking that Citadel, which the Earl of Peterborow secured with little loss in less than an hour. And besides these Works at Monjuick, they carried on their Entrenchments to a vast length, all along the West-side of the Town; and finished them: with such regularity and exactness, as if they had designed to secure them against the insults of the strongest Army.

When the English besieged the City, they were scarce more than 7000 in number, and was necessary that even this little Body should be divided into two Camps, so situated as not to be able to relieve one another under three Leagues march, round by the foot of the mountains: so that the Garrison had double the Force of either part of our Army. This was the only contrivance by which the sitting down of such a handful of men, not capable of surrounding the Town, could have had the effect of a regular Investment.

The disposition of these two small Bodies was thus happily ordered: That on one side in the plain was covered by a Fort just on the edge of the Sea, and great retrenchments were carried on to a little village, where the walls of some Gardens and a River gave security to the right of the Camp; and the Waters upon occasion might be made use of to render the flat Grounds between them and Barcelona almost impassable. That on the other side was placed in a little Valley betwixt Hills so conveniently, and out of sight, that though within small-shot of the walls, the Enemy could only incommode us by the random shot of their Biscayne muskets [fusells amb pany de sílex]. The Works leading from the little Camp betwixt the Mountains to the Battery were so inconsiderable, that two High-ways supplied almost the use of Trenches; which were relieved with those different faints and disguises, that we lost very few Men in changing the Guards.



Allied counter-offensive

After the failure of the Bourbon siege and the defeat of Tessé's army, which was virtually destroyed during the retreat to France, the Allies decided to depart for Madrid and Castile. But they did not know whether to go through Aragon or Valencia. The first option, advocated by Charles III, was to march to Aragon to include this territory of Austriacist tendency within the territories defended by the Allies. There were two reasons, however, that tilted the scales towards the march to Valencia: the only forces that could be considered a Bourbon army in the Peninsula (commanded by Count de las Torres) were there, and the English fleet, which dominated the Mediterranean, could support the Allied army in terms of logistics and transportation. Thus, Peterborough and the rest of the officers, and the King himself, concluded that the best route to get to Madrid was the one passing through Valencia.

Although it seemed that the Bourbon would pose no threat for several months, the English and other Allies decided to leave several troops to defend Catalonia, as shown in the following document written in Barcelona on May 18th 1706, at a council of war in the presence of the King (Freind, 1707, p. 65-66):

Forces to remain in Catalonia

In **Barcelona**

Marines Will's, English – 1.000

Breton's, English – 500

The City Regiment, his Majesty's [Regiment de la Ciutat de Barcelona] – 1.000

Clariana's Horse [Regiment de cavalleria Clariana] – 150

Total: 2.650

In **Girona**

English Fuziliers – 500

Hamilton's English – 500

St.Amant's Dutch – 600

Don Joseph Paguera's, his Majesty's [Regiment de la reina Anna]– 400

The Deputation, his Majesty's [Regiment de la Diputació] – 400

Don Rafael Nebot's Horse, his Majesty's [Regiment de cavalleria Rafael Nebot] – 400

Moraga's, his Majesty's [Regiment de cavalleria Moragues] – 300

Total: 3.100

In **Lerida**

Palms Dutch – 700

Sobia's Regiment, Horse [Regiment de Cavalleria Subies] – 150

Total: 850



In Tortosa

Don Antoni Paguera's, his Majesty's [Regiment de Guàrdies Catalanes]
– 500

Total for the Garrisons in Catalonia

Infantry – 6.100

Cavalry – 1.000

Total: 7.100

As it can be seen, most troops involved in the defence of the Catalan territory were either English or made up of Catalan soldiers integrated in regiments created by Archduke Charles himself.

As for the troops that went to Valencia, these are the data provided:

Infantry

My Lord Peterborow sends by sea to Valencia Englishmen – 1.800

In the said Kingdom there are, including the Regiment of Ahumada – 1.200

The Neopolitan's of Castillioni's Regiment – 1.000

Colbach's Regiment – 500

Total: 4.500

Cavalry

The Guards of Zinzendorf – 500

Morras' Regiment [Regiment de cavalleria Morràs] – 500

Killigrew's and Cunningham's – 1.000

Total: 6.500

So the Allied army was being split into two parts of almost equal strength. Although this was dangerous, the absence of an important Bourbon force in the Iberian Peninsula allowed this decision.

Valencia or Aragon?

Peterborough was criticized because he sent the majority of troops to Valencia rather than to Aragon, as Charles tried at first, and also because he moved slowly to Madrid with hardly justifiable precaution. These events were part of a hard-fought dispute between the monarch and the English commander to deploy troops in the best way to try to get to Madrid quickly (Freind, 1707, p. 70-71):

The Reader will observe, that in this Council of War there is a disposition of all the Troops we had on this side of Spain: a number perhaps that will be surprising to those, that remember how vigorously and early the Parliament, after the first Siege of Barcelona, voted a strong reinforcement to be sent immediately to those parts;



and that accordingly the London Gazette of June 24, 1706 did his Lordship the honour to put him at the head of an Army of 25,000. But however his Lordship, contrary to his usual fortune, happened to be magnified in this particular; all the Forces his Lordship could muster up in Valencia, (his Majesty having been pleased to remand, after my Lord was aboard, about 2,000 of the 6,000 ordered thither) were somewhat above 4,000, and wanted of the twenty five thousand little more than the old twenty.

This Council of War which his Lordship obtained, so solemnly agreed upon and a second time confirmed, shows the Earl of Peterborow's earnestness and impatience for the march to Madrid. In order to which, the day being settled for the King's leaving Barcelona, nay, and the very route of his journey adjusted, his Lordship having sent all the Cavalry before, went on board the Fleet with the Foot, who were in no condition to march for want of baggage necessaries, and landed at Valencia the beginning of June.

Next, the author explains the formation of Lord Peterborough's regiment of dragoons, required because of the lack of horsemen in the force landed in the area of Valencia. Note that, unobviously, transferring soldiers from horse to infantry regiments was not surprising, which means that many soldiers could ride without problems.

Likewise, buying horses for Peterborough's regiment at 10 pounds each, is confirmed by an entry in the accounts book mentioned earlier in this work (Freind, 1707, p. 7174).

His Lordship thought he could make no better use of his short stay here, than to recruit his shattered Cavalry; which he not only did, but mounted a new Regiment of Dragoons, draughted out of the companies of Foot; there being always in this Country, and especially in our circumstances, which required dispatch, a necessity for a good body of Horse. In which single Regiment I can't but remark what may seem a Paradox to some, that his Lordship saved the Queen near 20,000 l. [lliures] the Horses, one with another, costing not above 10 l. a piece, which if they had been transported from England or Ireland, would have stood Her Majesty at least in 60 l. as we found those actually did which first went upon the descent into Catalonia. Indeed it may justly be said of his Lordship, that however liberal he was of his own, no one was ever a more frugal manager of the public Stock: his Lordship given several instances in this extraordinary War, that he could sometimes maintain an Army without money, as well as take Towns without men. And this Regiment, to shew his Lordship had no great mind to delay his march into Castile, had their route given them, the very same day they were mounted.



Another justification for this delay when starting the march to Madrid was the lack of mules needed to quickly move provisions and other materiel used by the army. Thus, the importance of logistics for the mobility at that time is shown, usually the key factor for the complex manoeuvres carried out.

And here his Lordship's indefatigable pains, in procuring and purchasing Mules for the baggage of the Army, deserves to be taken notice of: which, though it may at the first view seem trifle, yet, considering the extreme want we were in for them, and our incapacity to take the Field without them, as well as the difficulty and trouble to get them in a Country just exhausted by the Enemy, ought to be looked upon as no ordinary piece of service; I am sure it was a service that no one there but his Lordship could at that time have done. At least those that saw his Lordship for three weeks together, from morning to night, fatiguing himself in this manner, and submitting to the drudgery of the lowest Officers, did not at all suspect that his Lordship had to little inclination to march, as some have since pretended to discover.

The doubts regarding the route to get to Madrid (from Valencia or passing through Aragon) finally broke into a heated argument within the Allied High Command. While the English considered the first option the most appropriate, Charles finally chose the second in order to regain the Aragonese territories and then head off to Madrid to be crowned king. Thus, although both forces finally arrived near Madrid, all these tensions gave the Bourbons a long enough period to recover from the defeat of Barcelona (Freind, 1707, p. 74-77).

To facilitate our entrance into Castile, his Lordship immediately sent Lieutenant General Wyndbam with a body of 1,500 men to besiege Requena; a strong and troublesome Garrison, and indeed the only one in the road to Madrid, and the first frontier Town of the Enemy: the enterprise succeeded to our wishes and the way lay open for his Majesty's march. For his Lordship proved to the King by the constant passing of Deserters as well as Expresses, that there was nothing now to hinder his Majesty from reaching Madrid with a small party of Horse only; and he thought a King needed not much persuasion to take possession of a Crown, when would be rather a journey of Pleasure, than a March, and this to be easily performed in a fortnights time.

My Lord having made all the necessary preparations for the carrying on the King and the Troops, was surprised to find such a delay in the Court: and though by frequent Messages and Letters he had urged the necessity of the King's departure from Barcelona his Majesty did not



think fit to set out from that place till near a month after the time agreed upon. This was yet a greater surprise to his Lordship, when he had notice that the King, upon his arrival at Tarragona, had entirely altered all the scheme of his march, and was resolved to go round by Saragosa. The Earl of Peterborow represented, with all the earnestness he could, the danger of the least delay in so critical a Juncture; the hazard as well as the great inconvenience of so tedious a march through so barren and mountainous a Country, and where his Majesty might run the risk of being intercepted and surprised by the Enemy. His Lordship showed a more than ordinary Zeal in soliciting this affair: sent Letters every day to dissuade his Majesty from his designed journey, dispatched a Deputation of the Valencian Nobility transmitted the Opinion of Councils of War where the Spanish Ministers as well as English assisted, unanimously desiring and pressing the King to continue his march the easiest and nearest way by Valencia, as was first proposed.

The numerous reinforcements from France finally tipped the balance towards Philip's supporters, with the withdrawal of the Allies from Madrid and their decisive defeat in Almansa on April 25th 1707.



In little over a year, the situation in the Iberian Peninsula experienced a dramatic turn for the interests of the Allies. After the destruction of the Bourbon army in the failed siege of Barcelona, the diverse viewpoints and ongoing discussions among the various commanders and the King had resulted in a strategic planning full of uncertainty, which gave Louis XIV time to help her grandson with troops and money. Thus, a new Bourbon army was created that drove the Austriacist troops out of Castile and, thanks to an excellent manoeuvrability and to the Duke of Berwick, their talented commander, they managed to catch most of the Allied army around Almansa. The Austriacist troops, led by the Earl of Galway, were not in readiness for combat, but still agreed to fight a battle.⁶ The consequences were disastrous for the Allied army, which was annihilated, leaving the doors of the Crown of Aragon open for Berwick's troops.

In the 18th century, a great victory at the beginning of a military campaign (at about spring time) established the best conditions to exploit the success, which is what the Bourbon army did at the time. It recovered most of the territories of Aragon and Valencia and, to quickly close the Peninsula's eastern front, proceeded to attack Catalonia. The first major city was, of course, Lerida, the conquest of which would reopen the road to Barcelona.


The attack on the city

Theoretically, Lerida was a population that had to fall quickly into the hands of the Bourbon army. The successive sieges suffered by the city in the 17th century had damaged its defences, and in addition the garrison was not too numerous. Under these conditions, the Allies knew the intentions of the Bourbon army and took several steps to begin defending the city. Among these, arming clergymen and numerous contingents of civilians stands out (as part of the Coronela of Lerida). Taking into account that the siege would begin late in the campaign, defenders hoped to be able to resist in the city until the cold weather forced the Bourbon besiegers to withdraw (Castellví, 1997-2002, vol. II, p. 390-403).

⁶ An important feature of the 18th-century combat is that the deployment of an army into battle line was extremely slow. Due to the fact that different units had to be combined in lines measuring miles, an army that didn't want to engage with an enemy had usually enough time to withdraw before the opponent was in position to attack.



Al comprender los sitiados que el duque de Orleans se dirigía a atacar la ciudad, el príncipe Enrique de Darmstadt llamó a consejo. Asistieron en él el general Wills, el general don Miguel Ramón y Tort, de quien son las noticias que vamos a referir, dos coroneles ingleses, un brigadier y dos coroneles holandeses y el coronel portugués don Pablo Gaetano de Albuquerque. El general Ramón era gobernador en el nombre; el príncipe Enrique, comandante en la apariencia; el general Carlos Wills, en las direcciones, porque de él dependía la mayor parte de las tropas. Altercóse el punto si desde luego se rendiría la ciudad o si se defendería.



The Bourbon siege of Lerida, according to Tindal (ICC).

El príncipe, el gobernador y coronel Albuquerque fueron de sentir de defenderla. Dedujeron que el número de los naturales, paisanos refugiados, compañías de milicias y fusileros, comprendidos los eclesiásticos, era de 2700, que todos los seculares habían ofrecido interpolarse con las tropas, que esto alentaría las demás ciudades y villas grandes de Cataluña por la emulación de imitar a los de Lérida, que siendo la estación adelantada, defendiéndose la ciudad teniendo los sitiadores poca artillería y pertrechos, se conseguiría que Orleans sería forzado a levantar el sitio.

However, the English and the Dutch decided it was better to defend only the La Seu castle, as the city was too large to be defended by the soldiers available. Discrepancies between the Catalans and the Allies lasted throughout the siege, and were undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the Allied defeat in the battle.

El general Wills, seguido de ingleses y de un coronel holandés, expuso que el número de las tropas era poco; que cada día disminuiría por el calor y sufrida fatiga; que la defensa de la ciudad consumiría la mayor parte; que el castillo quedaría después indefenso; que las fortificaciones de la ciudad eran débiles, irregulares y de poca defensa; que, retirada la gente



al castillo y provisiones, se ganaría el tiempo a más ventaja, obligando a Orleans a levantar el sitio. Últimamente protestaron en cuanto a la tropa inglesa. Los oficiales holandeses hicieron los mismos reparos, con la circunstancia que resolviendo el príncipe defender la ciudad ayudarían con su tropa. Wills, insistiendo el príncipe en las instancias de defender la ciudad, se adhirió a que quedase el gobernador en la ciudad con los paisanos. Éste respondió estar pronto, que consideraba a lo menos dejar 500 infantes y quedó el consejo indeciso. Este día, que fue el 12 de septiembre, el general Wills se detuvo (a) entregar las llaves de la ciudad y castillo. El gobernador dio parte al príncipe. Éste le mandó, a fin de inclinar a Wills (aunque conoció el desaire) que le entregase las demás llaves y las de los almacenes. Las aceptó Wills sin más cumplimiento y puso guardia inglesa. Tuviéronse diferentes consejos. Jamás Wills se removió de su primer dictamen.

While cavalry and fusiliers harassed the already present besiegers with constant attacks and coming out of the city, the rest of the Allied army was kept away from the action because of its terrible state. There were several Catalan regiments hastily created to reinforce the few Austriacist units in Catalonia.

En este tiempo los aliados desde Solivella pasaron a Cervera; de allí, se acamparon en Tárrega. En este campo se unieron al ejército cuatro batallones de los dos regimientos que levantaron ingleses con el nombre de la Reina Ana, el regimiento formado de nuevo del marqués de Rubí y hasta 800 hombres de los regimientos de los coroneles don Manuel Desvalls, don Juan Reart y de don Francisco Sagarriga.

Under these conditions the siege *dans les formes* began, with the Bourbon besiegers opening the first parallel and the artillery batteries bombing the city.

La noche del día 2 al 3 de octubre los sitiadores empezaron a abrir la trinchera desde el convento de San Francisco contra la ciudad a la parte del Carmen, cerca de la orilla del Segre. Era la muralla muy débil y irregular. Los sitiados habían construido de fajina y tierra algunas defensas como medias lunas. Empezaron el trabajo ocho batallones, cuatro de guardias españolas y cuatro de franceses, al orden del general Mr. de Legal. Abrieron dos líneas paralelas cada una de 400 toesas, aplicando 4000 trabajadores. Al amanecer la artillería del castillo empezó a disparar con 15 cañones contra los trabajos. La fusilería de la ciudad hizo fuego y con 10 cañones que apostaron en aquellas imperfectas fortificaciones incomodaban a los trabajadores.



Meanwhile, Wills helped the Lerida inhabitants and troops defending the city, although he kept some of his troops out of danger with his defensive planning. From the military point of view, his initial choice was probably correct, since, as proven during the assault, the city's defences were too weak to withstand an attack from the powerful Bourbon forces. Nevertheless, leaving the inhabitants of Lerida to their fate before the assault was not a popular decision, as the English had left the Catalan defenders' houses and families at the mercy of the attackers.

El general Wills, que se mantenía en el castillo, insistía en hacer llamada y capitular por la ciudad porque a más de su ardor miraba el brío y resolución de los naturales. Día y noche asistía al reparo de las ruinas. Su presencia inflamaba a los moradores y milicias que, unidos con las tropas, manifestaban el más resuelto ardor y demostraban querer morir en la empresa de defender la ciudad. Esto inclinó al príncipe a esperar el asalto, que fue el motivo de la total ruina de los moradores. La defensa era arriesgada. Las brechas eran tres y perfectas del todo: una a la parte de Magdalena; otra al Santo Espíritu y la tercera a la parte del Carmen; y las tres tomaron el espacio de 230 pasos. Ocupaban las brechas quinientos ingleses, holandeses y portugueses y mil hombres de la nueva tropa, milicias y fusileros al orden del teniente coronel Kinolan, inglés, y del sargento mayor Ranfore. Asistía el príncipe con el gobernador de la plaza.

El día 12, perficionadas las brechas, resolvió el duque de Orleans dar el asalto. Pasó a la trinchera. Destinó 10 batallones, 10 compañías de granaderos. 200 hombres armados con petos, la brigada de Orleans, pronta a sostenerles a la orden del teniente general Mr. de Averay, mariscal marqués Orcado y del brigadier Mr. de Lambert. Al ataque por la derecha destinó cuatro batallones; dos de las guardias españolas, dos francesas, seis compañías de granaderos y 400 trabajadores, sostenidos de dos batallones de Auvergne. A la brecha de la izquierda destinó cuatro batallones, dos compañías de granaderos, 300 trabajadores. A las 7 de la noche empezó el asalto. El combate fue obstinado, dos horas duró la porfía, dos veces los sitiadores fueron rechazados. Unióse la brigada de Orleans y al tercer avance ocuparon los sitiadores el baluarte del Carmen. El combate continuaba en el tesón de ocupar el baluarte de Remolins. No pudieron penetrar en el espacio que corría desde la Magdalena a la puerta del Santo Espíritu, que era desde la muralla vieja a la nueva, porque el continuo fuego que hacían las milicias desde la cortadura lo impedía. Ocuparon el baluarte del Carmen y dominaron un ángulo del de Remolins. El príncipe envió un sargento mayor holandés con 200 soldados y 400 milicias a impedir los sitiadores a internarse en la parte del Carmen. El combate fue rudo. Encendióse de nuevo, enviando



el príncipe 100 soldados de refuerzo y algunas milicias. Quedó herido el sargento mayor y muerto un capitán de granaderos holandés y los sitiadores entonces dominaron el todo. El sargento mayor inglés Ranfore hizo el mayor esfuerzo por desalojar los sitiadores del ángulo de Remolins. Una bala le rompió el brazo y murió el capitán inglés Vanderbucon. Esto facilitó a los sitiadores ocupar con menos sangre ambos baluartes.

The plunder

In this situation, the defence of the city became desperate, as the Bourbon forces already controlled a large area within the fortifications that allowed them to advance into the city and impose their numerical superiority.

Al amanecer del día 13 el duque de Orleans entró en la ciudad. Empezaron a internarse 15 compañías de granaderos. Marchó un cuerpo a cortar las milicias que se mantenían en la cortadura a la parte del Carmen, que se retiraron después de tres órdenes que les envió el príncipe. Envío al amanecer un tambor al duque de Orleans. Le escribió que siendo obligado a abandonar la ciudad le rogaba tratar con mansedumbre tantos inocentes eclesiásticos, familias y niños que se retiraban al pie del castillo. Respondió Orleans que aquellas personas le habían servido en la defensa de la ciudad, que si él quería capitular por los castillos, se trataría de ellos y serían incluidos, que de otro modo serían tratados como tomados a discreción y por asalto. Internáronse las tropas, ciñeron por todos lados la ciudad a las 10 del día.

Castellví explains at this point why there was widespread looting in the city, with indiscriminate attacks on civilians. According to the conventions of war at the time, civilians could not participate in the fighting, but since they represented a large part of the armed contingent of defenders, the French officers considered it was right to treat them as they did. This included the religious temples as well, due to the active participation of the various ecclesiastical orders in the Allied defence. The plunder was meticulously organized, contrary to what might be expected, and the brutal result was a city in ruins, looted and burned.

El saco empezó a las 10 del día por dos soldados de cada rancho. Sufrieron saco los templos de Santo Domingo, Santa María Magdalena y San Andrés y otros, a la excepción de las parroquias de San Juan, San Lorenzo y iglesia de jesuitas, aunque sufrió riesgos. El Cabildo había



retirado la plata a Barcelona. Todo padeció contingencia; hasta la plata que particulares y iglesias entraron en el castillo sufrió naufragio, que en él se batió de ella moneda, a la excepción de los sagrados vasos. El sagrado en los templos que no fueron saqueados no valió a particulares que habían retirado sus efectos ni a las personas refugiadas se eximieron de ser las más despojadas de sus precisos vestidos que cubrían la honestidad de sus cuerpos. Hasta los eclesiásticos no fueron exentos. En la parroquia de San Lorenzo un soldado flamenco de las guardias libró del saco el archivo, que después, en agradecimiento, aquella iglesia le procuró licencia de retirarse del servicio, se le procuró casamiento en la ciudad, donde se estableció. En el convento de Santo Domingo, estando expuesto el Venerable, pasaron a cuchillo algunas personas y entre ellas al P. Domingo Barrientos, valenciano, barón de ejemplar vida, con tres más. Los templos, la mayor parte quedaron profanados y el de dominicos, caballeriza. Tomaron presos todos los capuchinos y descalzos y desterraron los más de los religiosos a Castilla y, a la excepción de los jesuitas, pocos se eximieron de exilio. Dieron fuego a 50 casas de los más señalados ciudadanos y temiendo no se comunicase mandó el duque apagarle. El pillaje y saqueo fue muy considerable. Era la ciudad rica y los lugares de la comarcas habían retirado todas sus preciosidades a Lérida, de modo que, según refiere Mr. de Quincy, todo el ejército se enriqueció. A las 7 de la tarde mandó el duque cesar el saqueo y retirarse a sus cuerpos. Los días consecutivos, por el espacio de ocho días, continuó el saco y hasta rendido el castillo padecieron los moradores repetidas desgracias y las más de las familias retiradas a las iglesias. La hambre las extrañó de su patria, desnudas y mendigas. Estos dos grandes príncipes fueron murmurados: el de Orleans, de no haber puesto desde luego guardias a las iglesias y cuando las puso de no imponer rigurosa pena a los oficiales a quienes se confió la guardia, de no imponer una composición sobre los efectos retirados a las iglesias o bien mandar sacar fuera de los templos con correspondiente decencia los bienes de los ciudadanos, no queriendo concederles les valiese el sagrado del lugar; el de Darmstadt fue murmurado de no haber evitado esta desgracia, capitulando por la ciudad después de abiertas las brechas antes de esperar el asalto, considerando no poder defenderla por su debilidad y falta de fuerza.

The assault to the castles

Having conquered the city, the Bourbon army still had to control the two major fortresses in the area: the castles of El Rei and Gardeny. The task was not at all simple: civilian defenders fought fiercely, as the enemy's widespread sacking of the city had made them understand that there would be no forgiveness for them if they lost the battle.



Al retirarse los ciudadanos al castillo, nació la mayor consternación, defendiéndose de calle en calle. Animados del príncipe de Darmstadt, mantenían el fuego en las avenidas del castillo. Crecía el ardor en el príncipe, resentido de la respuesta de Orleans, y en los moradores se aumentaba el encono, perdida la esperanza de salvar sus casas y efectos, haciendo los últimos esfuerzos. Turbó del todo el ánimo de los moradores no querer admitir el general Wills las mujeres y niños en el castillo, que se apartaban del peligro. Los ciudadanos se alteraron. El príncipe hizo protesta al general Wills. Éste cedió de su resolución y a las 11 del día empezó a admitir mujeres y niños en el castillo.

At this point the work began to besiege and conquer the Castle of El Rei, where English and Imperial troops defending Lerida had taken refuge.

[...] el duque despachó a Madrid con la noticia a don Antonio Sentmenat y, acompañado de los generales y ingenieros, reconoció la situación del castillo. Llamó a consejo, resolvióse hacer línea de circunvalación para asegurar no entrase socorro y precisar a los sitiados a desamparar todas las avenidas del castillo, estrecharles al corto recinto de él y abrir la trinchera principal a la parte de Balaguer, dirigiéndola desde San Francisco a los pozos de la nieve que están al declivio del monte, que esto facilitaría poder minar el castillo y al mismo tiempo abrir la trinchera a la llanura de San Martín, nombrada lo Pla dels Gramàtics. La noche de este día se empezó a abrir la trinchera en el almacén del trigo del Cabildo para arruinar las casas y colegio de la Concepción, que estaba en el frente, que impedían batir el castillo, y al mismo tiempo desalojar los sitiados de la parte de San Hilario. Abriéronse al mismo tiempo ramales para abrir brecha a la parte de los pozos. Es en aquella parte elevada la subida del castillo y parte de roca. En fin, emprendióse el ataque por la parte más inaccesible de la campaña, siendo la que daba más facilidad la parroquia de San Martín, y después experimentaron las dificultades. La noche del 15 los sitiados mandaron salir del castillo toda la caballería portuguesa y bagajes, que llegaron al campo de los aliados sin riesgo.

El 16 recibieron los sitiados dos correos, uno de Barcelona y otro del campo, acabó de salir el resto de la caballería y bagajes, en número de 400. La caballería de los sitiadores se acampó en dos líneas a la otra parte del río y el 18 adelantaron los trabajos de la parte de San Francisco y empezaron a arrojar bombas, causando grande estrago, y el 19 una bomba maltrató 25 personas. El día 20 se concluyó la línea de circunvalación.

Meanwhile, the besieged men tried to save time because they expected the Allied army would be able to drive the Bourbon besiegers out of the



area after a few days. However, the undertaking was desperate because the Segre river stood in the Allies' way to Lerida, which would provide the Bourbon army with an excellent chance to destroy the remaining Allied troops. In the following excerpt two of the most serious consequences of the Austriacist defeat in Almansa are expressed: first, the shortage of foot units, which could not escape from the persecution of the Bourbon cavalry after the defeat, and were thus almost totally captured; and the effect the disaster had on the morale and confidence of the Allied army, which desperately needed some kind of success to reaffirm its value.

Los sitiados el 29 recibieron por dos ciudadanos cartas de milord Galway que les esperaba de socorro. Permanecía acampado en las Borjas, poco más de 4 horas de distancia. Allí mandó el rey Carlos unirse al ejército toda la caballería y cuanto infantería fuese posible, la mayor parte tropa nueva. Consistía el todo en 58 escuadrones y 19 batallones; de ellos, 10 diminutos y nuevos; 4 eran los que Milord había levantado, 6 de los provinciales, de ellos sólo 2 con las divisas y no completos, 9 de tropa vieja; 20 piezas de campaña. Las milicias y fusileros eran en algún número apostados hasta cerca de Torres de Segre. Llegó en este campo el conde de Uhlefeld a procurar facilitar el socorro de Lérida. El rey mandó al conde de Centellas y a don Miguel de Pinós pasasen a conferir con los generales aliados para el mismo intento. Tuviéronse diferentes consejos. Asistió el conde de Noyelles. Los generales deseaban socorrer Lérida. Conocían la importancia. Les instaba el deseo de recobrar la opinión que permanecía cadente en el manejo de la batalla de Almansa. Ninguno lo facilitaba con más calor que las Minas, que su ardor excedía a la reflexión propia de un general comandante. Adherían portugueses a su dictamen. Sólo el general don Pedro Mascarenhas expuso con sabio sentimiento que el terreno era llano; el desguazo del río Segre, difícil, que ocupando las Dos Coronas la ciudad era preciso el tránsito; que la caballería de las Dos Coronas era mayor en número, la infantería excedía en mucho a la aliada y que la mayor parte era levantada de nuevo. Resolvióse despachar un correo a Barcelona, instando mayor número de tropas. El conde de Noyelles se opuso porque eran pocas las que quedaban en Gerona. Escribió su sentir al rey Carlos sobre el socorro. Exponía que el socorrer la plaza era muy contingente y arriesgado, que no se debía exponer la tropa porque, perdida, quedaba Cataluña sin defensa. El enviado Stanhope insistió que se socorriese Lérida. Galway no pudo adherirse a su parecer y le hizo entender que se arriesgaba el todo, que era caso como imposible por la situación del terreno, paso del río y superioridad de los contrarios.

As we can see, those in favour of an Allied attack were Archduke Charles and especially James Stanhope, an English officer that was characterized by its constant aggressiveness when commanding troops. On the other



side, some Bourbon units were posted to keep watch on the Allied army as the siege progressed. This and the difficulty to cross the Segre finally determined, on November 8th, a note being sent to General Wills informing him of the inability to relieve the besieged fortresses: Lerida's fate was sealed.

En este tiempo los sitiados y sitiadores continuaban la operaciones. El estado de unos y otros era lastimoso. Los sitiados padecían no creíbles estragos de las bombas y no era menos insoportable la disentería que padecía la guarnición y milicias, a que se añadían la gran sed que sufrían las milicias y demás refugiados, que era del todo intolerable, añadida la gran fatiga. Un paisano llegó a dar medio peso a la centinela de la cisterna por permitirle mojar un pañuelo para después chupar el agua, que el general Wills en los 10 días primeros, apoderado de la agua, no quería dar ninguna pequeña porción y después se conseguía a peso de plata. Pasaron de 1200 personas las que murieron de la sed y disentería. A los sitiadores escaseaban los forrajes, víveres y municiones. Les faltaba artillería y más que todo el tiempo las tropas sufrían considerable trabajo y pérdida por lo costoso de adelantar los ramales en terreno tan empinado. Unos y otros continuaban con tesón venciendo los obstáculos.

When on the 11th Wills received notification from Galway announcing that he could not help him, the English officer tried to convince the other commanders that they should surrender. Despite the disagreement among the various officers, Wills managed to persuade the others to sign the surrender of the garrison remaining in the two castles..

Los habitantes y naturales eclesiásticos y seculares quedaron a la libre clemencia del rey Felipe que, ocupada la ciudad, el duque no quiso escuchar proposición. Luego después el príncipe mandó un ayudante a cumplimentar al duque de Orleans. Los días 12, 13 y 14 hasta las 10 del día fueron empleados en allanar las brechas, que con trabajo podía salir la guarnición. A las 10 dadas del día 14 el príncipe se puso en marcha a la frente de la guarnición, descendió la brecha: batiendo las cajas entró por la puerta de la Magdalena y atravesó la ciudad. A la plaza de San Juan esperaba el duque de Orleans, duque de Berwick y muchos oficiales. El príncipe saludó a Orleans con la espada. Marchó 10 pasos. Dejó la tropa y fue a encontrar al duque de Orleans. Se hicieron recíprocos cumplimientos. El duque de Orleans hizo detener al general Wills en represalias porque pretendió que el brigadier don José de Chaves durante la suspensión en el sitio de Elche había sido detenido. Wills representó el perjuicio que se le hacía por haber de dar cuenta de las operaciones del sitio. El príncipe manifestó su bizarría de ánimo y dio palabra a Orleans que se daría libertad a Chaves. Condescendió a consideración



del príncipe. Éste se detuvo con Orleans hasta que hubo pasado toda la guarnición y siendo tarde se despidió. Toda la noche marchó el príncipe y al amanecer llegó a Juneda, 5 hora, distante de Lérida.

The conditions of capitulation

Unlike what happened during the Thirty Years War, the vast majority of urban assaults made during the 18th century ended with an agreement to surrender after the attackers had reached a sufficiently advantageous position. This lowered the cost of war in human and economic terms, since it avoided the indiscriminate looting of cities and, at the same time, it kept order among the attacking soldiers, who were not allowed to disappear for days in the town searching for booty.

Unfortunately for its inhabitants, the case of the city of Lerida was different. The duration, and especially the conditions of the attack triggered a brutal and indiscriminate looting of the city once the Allied defences were dismantled. The majority of residents and soldiers were able to take refuge within the castle of Lerida, where they waited for the Castle of Gardeny's garrison to help them. However, as we have seen, both strongholds surrendered on the 11th.

As an example of such agreements, here we reproduce what was signed between attackers and defenders of these two places, as it has reached us in Francesc de Castellví's *Narraciones Históricas*.

The ceremony that accompanied the defenders while leaving the city towards the Allied safety zone, without being arrested or disarmed and even bearing part of the artillery guns that had defended the city so far, might seem surprising. The usual dynamics of the armies' march at the time is also shown, according to which the troops marched for two days and the third was used for resting, baking bread and preparing other cooked foods. As a final note, it is worth pointing out how the agreements made during the War of the Spanish Succession cared about injured people and the sick, for whom most of the stipulated clauses are concerned (Castellví, 1997-2002, vol. II, p. 464-465).

Artículos de la capitulación del castillo de Lérida y fuerte de Gardeny entre S.A.R. el Sr. duque de Orleans de una parte y S.A. el Sr. príncipe de Hesse Darmstadt, comandante general de dicha plaza.

1. Que todas las tropas de los aliados, así españoles como de cualquier otra nación que sean, saldrán en el espacio de tres días de la firma de los presentes artículos con todas sus armas, caballos y bagajes, tambor batiente, cuerda encendida, bala en boca y banderas desplegadas, con entera



libertad y seguridad de sus vidas y libertades, marchando a la armada bajo el mando del marqués de las Minas por el camino más corto, i no siendo obligados a marchar más de 4 leguas por día, descansando uno de 3 en 3 sin acampar, donde serán provistos de forraje y alojamiento sin paga. La guarnición tendrá libertad de tomar pan y provisiones para 8 días y marchará por la brecha al amanecer sin ser inquietada ni molestada en su marcha por pretexto alguno y será conducida al marqués de las Minas y escoltada de 100 caballos de nación francesa, y el bagaje marchará por el camino más cómodo que a una legua de la plaza se incorporará con la guarnición.

Acordado como mañana día 12 de este mes las puertas del castillo y fuerte de Gardeny nos sean entregados, esto es, que nuestras tropas ocuparán lo de fuera, en donde concurrirá un oficial general para impedir la entrada de los soldados y las dichas puertas se dejarán abiertas y entregadas a mediodía.

2. Con las citadas tropas saldrán también los comisarios de guerra, todos los ingenieros, oficiales de artillería, artilleros, minadores, bombarderos y asistentes de la artillería, capellanes de regimientos y generalmente todos los que se hallarán pertenecientes y dependientes de dicha guarnición, como proveedores, vivanderos y otra cualquier gente destinada para la asistencia de las tropas con todo su equipaje.

Acordado en cuanto a lo que es necesario la marcha de la guarnición, quedando lo demás incluido en los mismos artículos.

3. Que se enviarán al castillo 150 carros de a 4 mulas para el transporte del equipaje de los oficiales, enfermos y heridos que se hallan en estado de seguir las tropas.

Acordado.

4. Hallándose los oficiales y soldados enfermos y heridos en tal estado que sea conveniente dejarlos en Lérida para su curación, entonces los comisarios, médicos, cirujanos, boticarios y otros dependientes tendrán la libertad de quedar con ellos hasta que los enfermos y heridos puedan unirse al ejército, sea en el campo u cuartel del marqués de las Minas, en el cual caso se les darán los pasaportes necesarios y los convoyes como juzgaren los oficiales más conveniente, de suerte que ellos no reciban daño alguno en Lérida ni en las marchas, y que se les darán las provisiones necesarias y los carros en las villas y lugares



en la distancia de tres jornadas; y para la seguridad de dichos enfermos y heridos se darán rehenes, quedando en las casas particulares u hospitales, de donde no serán desalojados bajo cualquier pretexto que sea hasta que se hallen en estado de marchar.

Acordado.

5. Toda la harina, ganado, vino, medicinas y todas las otras provisiones necesarias para los enfermos y heridos que se encuentran en los almagacenes, se dejarán en manos de lo médicos, cirujanos y otros asistentes del hospital para el vito y servicio di dichos enfermos y heridos.

El gobernador entregará todas las cosas necesarias medicamentos y provisiones para los heridos y enfermos, pero los médicos, cirujanos y boticarios no podrán entregar ni tomar cosa de los almagacenes sin orden de nuestro gobernador.

6. Los sitiados saldrán con cuatro piezas de cañón de bronce, es a saber, dos de a 12 libras de bala y dos de a 6 y para cada pieza pólvora y balas para seis tiros, y se les darán los tiros necesarios para conducir dichos cañones hasta el ejército del marqués de las Minas, como queda dicho.

Acordado.

7. Todos los prisioneros hechos antes y durante el sitio serán restituidos con buena fe de las dos partes.

Acordado.

8. Ningún soldado será detenido ni sacado de sus filas bajo pretexto de desertión y ningún otro motivo.

Acordado.

9. No entrarán en el castillo ni fuerte de Gardeny tropas francesas, españolas ni otras ningunas antes que las guarniciones hayan salido, menos que con consentimiento o licencia de los generales de ambas partes.

Acordado como deuda en el primer capítulo.

10. Los derechos e inmunidades de los eclesiásticos, religiosos y ciudadanos que se hallan en el castillo de Lérida serán mantenidos, protegidas y guardadas sus vidas, libertad y bienes como lo han gozado y gozaban en todo tiempo antes del sitio y el gobernador y ciudadanos tendrán la libertad de disponer de sus efectos en el término de 4 meses y de retirarse donde quieran sin impedimento alguno.



Todos los eclesiásticos, religiosos y ciudadanos que se hallan en el castillo tendrán la libertad de salir con todos sus efectos y de pasar al cuartel de los enemigos o salirse en el espacio de seis días y sus efectos luego que podrán tener carros y mulos para llevárselos.

11. Las armas de los enfermos y heridos serán entregadas a los oficiales que quedarán encargados de dichos enfermos y se darán a los soldados hallándose en estado de marchar.

Acordado.

12. Los comandantes del castillo de Lérida y fuerte de Gardeny harán entregar fielmente todas las municiones de guerra y provisiones sin desperdicio alguno y por este efecto se permitirá a un comisario de guerra y otro de artillería tomar inventario de todo lo que hay en dicho castillo y fuerte de Gardeny.

Acordado.

13. Que no se permitirá a eclesiástico alguno ni a otra persona el llevarse ornamentos ni otras cosas dedicadas al uso de la iglesia y del obispo.

Acordado.

Todos los artículos referidos serán debidamente cumplidos e inviolablemente observados según sus voces, sentido e intención como en ellos viene expresado.

Lérida noviembre, a 11, de 1707. Felipe, duque de Orleans.
Enrique, landgrave de Hesse.

Despite the enormous superiority of the Bourbon forces at the end of 1707, they were unable to move to Barcelona after the capitulation of Lerida. The main reasons were, firstly, that the fall of the city occurred in November, so the offensive against Barcelona would have to wait until the following spring.⁷ Besides, the results in other fronts were more favourable to the Allied interests. In Flanders, Marlborough overwhelmed the French army once again, now in Oudenaarde (1708), and in Northern Italy an expedition of Prince Eugene of Savoy attacked Toulon, the main Bourbon naval base in the Mediterranean (Paoletti, 2006). Although the result was a defeat for the Allies, who had withdrawn from the area, they managed to sink most of the French fleet located in this harbour.

⁷ In the 18th century, fighting during winter was uncommon because it was difficult to afford the logistics needed to keep troops active, apart from the deaths and illnesses among soldiers due to low temperatures.



Another consequence was that some of the Bourbon troops had to leave the Peninsula, in order to reinforce the contingent defending the city of Toulon. Thus, the Bourbon did not have enough forces to conquer Catalonia during the period 1707-1709 (Ostwald, 2000), a time that the Allies used to recover from the defeat in Almansa and build a powerful army that allowed them to reverse the military situation at the Eastern Peninsular front in 1710.



From the surrender of Lerida until 1710, there were not any more large-scale military actions on the Eastern Peninsular front, because the Bourbon army was not able to launch major campaigns against Catalonia, given its precarious situation on the other fronts that had to be defended. However, in 1710 Philip's troops began a campaign, this time aimed at definitely conquering Barcelona. Unfortunately for the Bourbon interests, the Allies had rebuilt their army, thanks largely to the massive arrival of recruits and money from England. Therefore, when the Bourbon forces tried to advance into Catalan territory through the Urgell region, they failed to achieve fruitful results. Despite the long blockade of the town of Balaguer, the Bourbon army could not conquer it, and the Allies received constant reinforcements during the spring and summer of 1710. So the Bourbon commander, the Marquis of Villadarias, had to withdraw to the outskirts of Lerida to prevent his weary troops, who had also suffered several epidemics, from suffering greater hardships.

The Bourbon retreat

Because of the alarm generated by the arrival of reinforcements at the Allied camp, what have initially been an organized retreat, finally turned into an exhausting march that decimated the Bourbon army, as shown in a letter included in *Narraciones Históricas* (Castellví, 1997-2002, vol. III).

Recibióse el aviso cierto el día 24 de julio en el campo de Ivars que el general alemán barón de Wetzel estaba en marcha desde el Ampurdán con un cuerpo de 6.000 hombres para unirse con la mayor prisa a los aliados que se hallaban acampados bajo de Balaguer a la parte de Urgel; que los alemanes, que acababan de desembarcar en Barcelona, estaban en plena marcha para el mismo efecto, sin dejarlos refrescar. Consideraron los generales en el consejo que se tuvo delante del rey, en el campo de Ivars, que los forrajes eran muy escasos, los calores excesivos en aquel llano; que no era posible atacar a los aliados, que su número se había aumentado y su campo más fortificado. Estos motivos y la necesidad de mantener el condado de Ribagorza propio para los cuarteles de invierno, obligó al rey a tomar la resolución de levantar el campo, mejorar de terreno y impedir a los enemigos de penetrar en Aragón. El día 25 muy de mañana se puso en marcha el ejército; duró 10 horas. En ella padeció en extremo la infantería. Era el calor excesivo; faltaba el agua, murieron no pocos, y en particular de la infantería flamenca, no acostumbrada a este clima. Pasóse el Segre sobre el puente de Lérida.



Prelude

Among the information provided in Lord Mahon's work,⁸ written in the 19th century, an interesting document stands out written by General Stanhope on July 31st 1710, and addressed to the Earl of Sunderland.⁹ The letter explains with complete clarity the conditions under which the Battle of Almenar¹⁰ took place, and also the role played by the English troops.

The first thing that is reflected in this letter is Stanhope's aggressiveness, in broad contrast to the caution showed by both King Charles III and Guido von Starhemberg. In view of Stanhope's urgent need to attack, the Allies adopted a compromise solution by posting some troops under the command of the English officer to act in the vanguard of the army (Lord Mahon, 1832, appendix cxi-cxv).

My lord,

Three days after the date of my last to your Lordship, which went by Mr. Craggs, our succours joined us about nine in the morning, upon which a council being called, it was strenuously urged by the English, Dutch, and Palatines, to march immediately to Lerida, in order to force the enemies to a battle, by cutting them off from that place: but the King and Mareschal strongly opposed, and showed themselves determined not to venture any thing. Their pretence for not doing it was, that the enemies' army might get to Lerida, and cross the river before we could be up with them; which afterwards proved to be otherwise, since they did not get over the river, by twelve hours, so soon as was pretended they would. Our next thought was to cross the Segre at Balaguer, and push to get over the Noguera, to which purpose I was despatched with eight squadrons of dragoons, and 1000 grenadiers, with which I marched at midnight, and took post at Alfaraz [Alfarràs], on the Aragon side of the Noguera, at six in the morning of the 27th.

The enemies had commanded ten squadrons of horse, 1000 grenadiers, and seven battalions of foot, to prevent our taking post: but notwithstanding that they had much less way to march, the negligence of their commanding officer, the Duke of Sarno, made them come late; for we did not discover them till nine in the morning: and when they did discover us, instead of attacking us, they possessed themselves of Almenara [Almenar], a village on the Noguera, about two miles below

8 Philip Stanhope inherited the title of Lord Mahon from James Stanhope, on whom it was bestowed after the capture of Port Mahon.

9 Lord Sunderland was one of the five Whigs elected to lead the English government, as part of the cabinet known as the Whig Junto.

10 The place name Almenar has a variety of spellings in English sources. The most common spelling is Almenara, but there are some villages in Castile with the name of Almenara, not to be confused with the Catalan village of Almenar we are talking about. Other common spellings are Alminar and Almanar.



Alfaraz, where we were. About noon, our left wing of horse passed the river, which I formed on a plain about cannon shot from the river, between which plain and the river was a deep valley. By this time the enemies' horse came up space and formed before me about eighteen squadrons, which I was going to attack, when the Mareschal came up and prevented, seeming still determined not to hazard any thing.


The troops on both sides were gradually accumulated in the vicinity of Almenar, deployed with their cavalries above the town, on the high plateau overlooking the entire area. Bourbon sources collected in Castellví's *Narraciones Históricas* relate the same approach to the battle:

El día 26 marchó el general Sello con un cuerpo de dragones y caballería a ocupar la orilla del río Noguera, río que media entre Lérida y Balaguer, y apostarse en buen terreno creyendo que desde allí se socorrería el castillo de Areny, que tenían bloqueado los voluntarios y miqueletes. Marchó tarde el general Sello, y al llegar cerca del lugar de Almenar avisaron los batidores que los enemigos se formaban en el terreno que debía ocupar. Los enemigos (según los desertores) al tiempo que se les unía el general Wetzel hicieron movimiento; y en el consejo que tuvieron delante del Archiduque fue resuelto que el ejército marchase a atacarnos, forzando una marcha, y nos cortase el camino de Lérida, presentándonos batalla. Revocaron esta resolución oponiéndose al Archiduque, siguiendo el sentir de Starhemberg, que fue de marchar luego un numeroso destacamento a la otra parte de Balaguer y ocupar la parte opuesta del río Segre, tomar el paso del río Noguera, marchando al mismo tiempo el ejército. Ejecutaron con tanta prisa la marcha que a las 7 de la mañana el cuerpo de su vanguardia había pasado ya el río Noguera, ocupado el mejor terreno y el paso de Alfarràs. Dos horas después llegó el general Sello. Le pareció no atacar a los enemigos, aunque se consideró superior en fuerza. Dio aviso al rey que estaba en plena marcha con el ejército. Esta suspensión dio tiempo a que todo el ejército enemigo pasase el puente de la Noguera. El rey confirió con el marqués de Villadarias.

The battle

After repeatedly asking the King and Starhemberg for permission, Stanhope finally gave the order to attack at dusk, just when all the Allied army had crossed the Noguera river at Alfarràs. It is worth noting this, unknown even to Stanhope, because this is why Starhemberg took so long to give him permission to attack. A defeat of the Allied cavalry when half the troops had not yet crossed the river would have been extremely dangerous for the Allied army.





Battle of Almenara, according to Tindal (ICC).

I herefore marched to them with the left wing, which consisted of twenty-two squadrons, which were formed in two lines, and a corps de réserve of four squadrons; the ground we were drawn up in, not allowing us to make a greater front. So soon as we began to move, the squadrons of the enemies which had come down the rising I mentioned, retired to their line. When we got up that rise, with my first line consisting of but ten squadrons, we found the enemy drawn up in two lines, the first of twenty two squadrons and the

second of twenty, with two battalions of foot betwixt their lines, and a brigade of foot on their right. I was therefore forced, so soon as I came in presence, to make a halt to get up some squadrons from the second line, the ground where the enemies were being so much wider than that which I had marched from; besides that getting up the hill had put our line in some disorder.

It is noteworthy how Stanhope guided the march of horse regiments because, despite the substantial number of troopers involved (about 4,000), he managed to stop and reform them, all in full view of the enemy, showing the great experience, calmness and courage of the Allied officers. Another important aspect was the sun's position, which lit the battlefield from behind the Allies in such a way that the Bourbon horsemen did not realize of the magnitude of the Allied attack. This is not something that can be undervalued, as the dust raised by the four thousand trotting horses would have magnified the effect of the sunlight, while undermining the morale of the defenders, who could not see exactly what was falling on them. This is highlighted by an anonymous source, a horseman of Lord Raby's regiment who was present at the battle (Falkner, 2005, p. 223):

About an hour before the sun set on the 16th day of July 1710, our squadrons had orders to advance, the left [of] our army being a great deal nearer to the enemy than our right, therefore our right wing was obliged



to advance as fast as our horses could go. The sun then was not above a quarter of an hour high [per sobre de l'horitzó] when the left began to engage and the right was soon and behold how like lions our men fell upon them with sword in hand.

Despite the initial reservations of some Allied commanders, the attack was very successful. Although some points of resistance faced up to the attackers, the line of Bourbon cavalry was broken up by such a fierce attack led by the English commander.

The enemies were so good as to give us the time we wanted; we brought up six squadrons and put our line in good order, which consisted thus of sixteen in all: six English, four Dutch, and six Palatines. Mr. Carpenter and I were on the left; Mr. Frankenberg, the Palatine General, and Major-General Pepper, on the right. So soon as ever we were thus formed we attacked them; and, by the blessing of God, broke their two lines, which consisted of forty-two squadrons.

On the right were the Gardes du Corps and other choice regiments, which did not do ill, but their left made no resistance. I cannot sufficiently commend the behaviour of all the troops that were engaged, which never halted till we had driven their horse off the plain, beyond their infantry, which was in the valley; and if we had had two hours' day light more, your Lordship may be assured that not one foot soldier of their army could have scaped.


The night gave them an opportunity to retire to Lerida, which they did in such confusion, that they threw away their tents, lost good part of their baggage, and some of their cannon, and have continued ever since encamped within and about the glaxis of Lerida. The Duke of Anjou and all his Generals were in the action.

Consequences of the victory

As a result of the fight and the chaotic withdrawal of the Bourbon army, an odd situation took place in which King Philip was escorted by Catalan troops. The event is explained in the Bourbon letter collected by Castellví and it had no major consequences, but it does show how the Bourbon officers mistrusted even the Catalans in their ranks.

Podía suceder un infortunio en esta retirada por la imprudencia de un señor de la corte. Iban retirándose los dragones catalanes de Marimón; se unieron con las guardias del rey. Este cortesano dijo en voz alta al





Battle of Almenar, according to the manuscript map found in the archive of Turin

rey: “Señor, ruego a V.M. se retire por esta parte siguiéndome, que estos son dragones catalanes”. El rey, con cuerda reflexión y sabia prevención, se volvió a ellos y les dijo: “Hijos, ahora estoy seguro entre vosotros”. Respondieron: “Viva V. M. que moriremos defendiéndole”. Llegó el rey a Lérida fuera de camino, siguiéndole los dragones. Perdióse parte de la secretaría, que erraron el camino por la gran obscuridad. Luego que se esparció la voz de la retirada del rey, perdió del todo la forma nuestra gente, y aún a la tarde del día 28 iba llegando gente bajo el cañón de Lérida. No hay duda en que nos favoreció la noche, y que los enemigos estaban vencedores, y al apagarse el día se dio fin al combate.

Despite the swift action, the battle was extremely hard, according to Stanhope. The fact that two Allied colonels died is quite relevant, because it demonstrates that high-ranking officers put themselves at risk in combat, especially horse regiment officers, and often had a higher percentage of casualties than other soldiers (Lord Mahon, 1832, appendices CXI-CXV).

I am sorry, now, my Lord, to tell you, that this action has cost her Majesty very dear, in the loss of two young men of quality, who would have made a great figure in this country, and done it great service,- my Lord Rochford and Count Nassau. Lord Rochford had joined us with his regiment from Italy but the day before; and he brought it in so good order, and set them so good an example, that, though they had to do with the best troops of the enemy, they beat them. I have often had occasion to mention Count Nassau to your Lordship: he was this day on the left of all, at the head of his own regiment, which was outflanked by several squadrons, and exposed to the fire of their infantry; notwithstanding which disadvantages he broke what was before him, and, after so vigorous an action, was unfortunately killed by a cannon from a battery of our own. Enclosed I send your Lordship the list of what other officers have been killed and wounded.



Out of the six squadrons of her Majesty's troops which were engaged, viz. two of Harvey's, two of Nassau's, two of Rochford's we have 200 men killed and wounded, and four out of five of them with swords. A Palatine regiment which was on our left, and a Dutch regiment which was in the centre, have likewise suffered considerably; the others had better fortune, having met with little opposition. The commanding officers of all nations signalised themselves; and it has been of no small use to me, who had been very little conversant with the treble service, to have the assistance of Mr. Carpenter, who was with me during this whole action, and did not a little contribute to the good success of it.


As for the Bourbon army, the defeat had reduced its cavalry, and especially its morale, which was decisive for the further development of the campaign. Moreover, the defeat at Almenar confirmed that without the help of Louis XIV and the French forces, Philip was unable to keep the Spanish territories under control, given the threat posed by the Allies.

Nosotros hemos perdido al duque de Sarno, al coronel marqués de Gironella y otros oficiales. El general don Próspero Verboon queda herido y prisionero, y hemos perdido hasta 400 hombres. Creemos que el número de los enemigos es mayor, entre ellos el conde de Nassau, pariente de la reina Ana. Ayer se acampó el archiduque en Almenar. La culpa de este desorden hay algunos que la atribuyen a la conducta de nuestro general, criticando que no debía haber mandado a la caballería se avanzase tanto; que, al contrario, debía retirarse más atrás, mejorando de terreno, mayormente que podía discurrir que el todo del ejército enemigo estaría cerca a unirse con su destacamento; y que nuestra armada no podía llegar a tiempo de sostener el reencuentro. Ello es cierto que al discurrir de los más, tanto en el combate como en la retirada le atribuyen sin rebozo la culpa. El rey despachó ayer dos correos, uno a París y otro a esa corte. Se asegura que el rey, por aquietar ciertas diferencias entre los generales, ha pedido al rey su abuelo un general. No es de dudar que nuestro mayor enemigo es la discordia que hoy reina entre los generales.

Afterword: defeat at Brihuega

After the victory of Almenar, the Austriacist army continued to advance into Aragon, where some weeks later it had a decisive victory against the Bourbon army. Philip's troops broke up and, as happened in 1706, the Allies were again able to choose their strategic goals and achieve them without hindrance from opponents.





Armies marching and Battle of Denain on July 24th 1712, according to Tindal (ICC).

Spurred on by English officers, and particularly by James Stanhope, the Austriacist troops advanced into Castile to dominate the centre of the Iberian Peninsula, and especially its capital. Philip had to flee Madrid for the second time and Charles was finally crowned King of Spain. However, in the long term this strategic decision was one of the Allies' worst mistakes during the war, although it seemed quite an interesting option in the autumn of 1710.

On one hand, lack of connection with the Austriacist territories of Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia disrupted both communications and the logistics line for the Allies, which were very elongated and highly vulnerable to Bourbon dragoons raids. On the other hand, failure to close the passes connecting France and the Iberian Peninsula allowed Louis XIV to send a large contingent of troops to his grandson. These troops were under command of the Duke of Vendôme, and to finally restore the situation, another French army under the command of the Duke of Noailles invaded the north of Catalonia to threaten the Austriacist territories. Since the bulk of the Allied army was in Castile, it was an optimal situation for the Bourbon's interests, because there was no Allied force large enough to fight with. This offensive therefore further destabilized the precarious strategic situation of the Allies.

Noailles decided to besiege Girona at the end of 1710, with the intention of smoothing the way to Barcelona. The Allies were certainly surprised by the fact that the siege began in December, as it was unusual to conduct offensive actions in late winter. Given the serious strategic situation, the Austriacist commanders decided to retreat to Catalonia to pass the winter there. The English contingent took a different route from the rest of the army, and was surprised and surrounded by Bourbon forces in Brihuega, where they surrendered a few days later. In turn, Starhemberg, the supreme Allied commander, met the entire Bourbon army in Villaviciosa, when trying to help the English (not knowing that they had



already surrendered). Both sides claimed victory in the muddled battle that took place on December 10th. However, the clash left Vendôme's army so damaged that Starhemberg was able to retreat to more optimal positions in the Segarra area.

The demarcations of the armies were not much changed during the following campaigns, because the 1710 campaign went on well into the following year and Vendôme did not move until summer of 1711. The attempt to cross the Allied defensive line culminated in the Battle of Prats de Rei and the subsequent siege of Cardona, two Allied victories that left the Bourbon army badly damaged and withdrawing again to Lerida. But the English army was no longer present in Catalonia after the surrender of Brihuega, except for some small units. In the Iberian Peninsula there were no significant battles in 1712-1713, due to the opening of peace negotiations, as mentioned throughout the book.

In addition, the Imperial army was solidly defeated by Marshal Villars' troops in Denain, and the war situation quickly deteriorated for the Austriacist side, as, for their part, the English and the Dutch were negotiating agreements with the Bourbons.

The Treaty of Utrecht ended the English intervention in Catalonia, and shortly afterwards the final chapter of the War of the Spanish Succession began: the Catalan campaign of 1713-1714.



Conclusions

As we have seen throughout this work, the English intervention in Catalonia is a complex issue, because there are political, diplomatic, economic and military factors involved in it. In particular, the relationship between the last two items contributes to a new perspective with regard to the proceedings of the English government.

England's animosity toward the Bourbons was caused by the constant struggle between William of Orange and Louis XIV in the last quarter of the 17th century, and it moved from an extreme position (reaffirmed by the slogan "No peace without Spain") to a position tending towards negotiation. Undoubtedly, France's economic ruin caused by the war was one of the causes, because around 1712 no one in England saw the French King as an enemy capable of dominating and subjugating the rest of Europe. Moreover, the incredible expense that the conflict imposed on England, which we have discussed in part (as Flanders accounted for the highest expense), contributed to the decline of the war party and the next government adopted a Tory position, inclining towards signing advantageous peace.

Either way, the thousands of English soldiers that fought in Catalonia were largely responsible for the Catalan revolt prospering and Charles becoming the first monarch for centuries to hold the court in Barcelona. The battles in which these soldiers participated are some of the most decisive moments of the war in Catalonia, as is highlighted by the authors of the time, and the countless small acts of war involving English units make the army led by Peterborough and Stanhope one of the largest military forces that ever fought on Catalan lands. Paradoxically, it was a force made up of foreigners.

The legacy of this intervention was also very relevant. Apart from the enormous production of war materiel required by the army, which certainly benefited certain manufacturing families, the English army was taken as a reference by the Catalan army led by Antoni de Villarroel and the Marquis del Poal in 1713-1714, as shown in the manual written by Colonel Joan Francesc Ferrer. It was undoubtedly one of the reasons why the Catalan State held out against the Bourbon attack for more than a year, while the invaders required another French intervention to put an end to the Catalan adventure.





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3. *God Save Catalonia. La intervenció anglesa a Catalunya durant la Guerra de Successió*, Xavier Rubio (editor)



GOD SAVE CATALONIA!

ENGLAND'S INTERVENTION IN CATALONIA DURING THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

The War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714) is undoubtedly one of the most important wars in the history of Catalonia. Battles such as the battle of Almansa (1707) and, especially that of September 11TH (1714) have become reference dates in the country's culture. Nevertheless, the conflict is quite unknown, as there are not many works attempting to explain it from a military and political point of view. In this work, various authors, coordinated by Xavier Rubio, give an overview of the massive British intervention in Catalonia through the study of the army, its finances, the battles and sieges in which the army took part. The authors, after a thorough description of the war regiments involved, narrate the experience of British forces in various battlefields, giving prominence to the

main characters in fight, in order to show how war was waged during the 18th century and how the English soldiers perceived the war in which they were fighting. The use of almost unknown primary sources, not previously analyzed, gives us new data on the British action during the conflict, and offers us a new vision of the War of Succession to provide a better understanding of this landmark in the history of Catalonia.

